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I.

REFUSING TREATMENT: DUE PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS

In the interface of psychiatry and law, no issue has generated-more
controversy1 than the claim by involuntarily confined mental patients of
a right to refuse psychotropic medication. 2 The debate was fueled by
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1. See, e.g., Jonathan Brant, Pennhurst, Romeo, and Rogers: The Burger Court
and Mental Health Law Reform Litigation, 4 J. LEGAL MED. 323, 345 (1983) ("The
question of whether patients have a right to refuse treatment is probably the most
controversial issue in forensic psychiatry today."); William M. Brooks, A Comparison
of a Mentally Ill Individual's Right to Refuse Medication Under the United States and
the New York Constitutions, 8 TOURO L. REV. 1, 1 ( 1991) ("The right of a mentally ill
and involuntarily hospitalized individual to refuse medication prescribed by a psychiatrist
has divided the legal and psychiatric professions more than any other recent issue.");
Bruce J. Winick, New Directions in the Right to Refase Mental Health Treatment: The
Implications of Riggins V. Nevada, 2 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 205, 206 (1993)
("[T]he issues surrounding the availability and dimensions of such a right remain mired
in controversy.").
2. In legislation, court decisions, and legal scholarship, the words "psychotropic,"
"antipsychotic," and "neuroleptic" are often used indiscriminately to refer to medication
prescribed to treat people with major mental disorders. The words, however, are not
synonymous. "Psychotropic" is derived from two root words, "psycho-" meaning the
mind or mental processes, and "-tropic" meaning changing or directing. Thus,
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two early, and often-cited,3 articles---one asserting that the right to
refuse psychiatric treatments is necessary to inhibit a ''therapeutic
orgy," 4 the other asserting that patients who are allowed to refuse
needed medication are permitted to "rot with their rights on."5

psychotropic medications include all chemical agents that act on and affect the mind.
ROBERT J. W ALDINGER, FUNDAMENTALS OF PSYCHIATRY 396 (1986). Antipsychotic
medications, also known as neuroleptic medications or major tranquilizers, are one type
of psychotropic medication and are used to treat thought disorders such as schizophrenia.
Other psychotropic medications include antidepressants and mood stabilizers. These
drugs are used to treat mood disorders. Id. at 397-98. Lithium, for example, is used to
treat manic-depressive illness, and is classified as a mood stabilizer. Id. at 434; see Brief
for the American Psychiatric Association and the Washington State Psychiatric
Association as Amici Curiae at 2-3 n.1,Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (No.
88-599). Because the claim of a right to refuse treatment applies to involuntary mental
patients with either thought or mood disorders, I have used the broader word
"psychotropic" in this article.
3. See, e.g., Catherine E. Blackburn, The "Therapeutic Orgy" and the "Right to
Rot" Collide: The Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs Under State Law, 27 Haus. L.
REV. 447, 449-50 (1990); Alexander D. Brooks, The Right to Refuse Antipsychotic
Medications: Law and Policy, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 339, 343 (1987); Winick, supra
note 1, at 207.
4. Robert Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy: Mental Patients' Right to
Refuse Treatment, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 461 (1978).
·
5. Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas G. Gutheil, "Rotting With Their Rights On":
Constitutional Theory and Clinical Reality in Drug Refusal by Psychiatric Patients, 1
BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 306 (1979) [hereinafter Appelbaum & Gutheil,
"Rotting With Their Rights On "]; see also Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas G. Gutheil,

The Boston State Hospital Case: "Involuntary Mind Control, " the Constitution, and the
"Right to Rot", 131 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 720 (1980) [hereinafter Appelbaum & Gutheil,
The Boston Hospital Case]; Thomas G. Gutheil, In Search of True Freedom: Drug
Refusal, Involuntary Medication, and "Rotting With Your Rights On", 137 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 327 (1980) (editorial). The ''rotting with their rights on" language may
have been paraphrased from a well-known article published six years. earlier in which
the psychiatrist-author charged that legal reforms to the civil commitment process might
enable mental patients to die with their rights on. Darold A. Treffert, Dying With Their
Rights On, 130 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1041 (1973).
In one article, Appelbaum and Gutheil criticize a judge for using "[s]uch loaded terms
as 'involuntary mind· control' to describe the effect of antipsychotic medications.'.'
Appelbaum & Gutheil,. The Boston Hospital Case, supra at 721. The authors assert that
psychiatrists administer drugs not to control minds but to restore them to the patients'
control. Id. Ironically, for those who critique the inappropriate use of language by
others, use of the word ''rotting" seems most inapt. The bodies of people with
schizophrenia or other nonorganic mental disorder do not undergo any rotting or decay
even if they never receive the benefit of psychotropic medication. Even if "rotting" is
given a broader definition to refer to untreated people "wasting away" while confined
indefinitely in mental hospitals, the word is inappropriate. Regardless of whether they
accept or refuse treatment, mentally disordered persons can only be involuntarily
committed so long as their mental conditions meet the jurisdiction's involuntary
commitment criteria. Often doctors discharge patients who are found competent to
refuse treatment.
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Although the rhetoric of subsequent publications is somewhat less
polemic,6 legal and psychiatric commentators remain intensely interested
in the subject. One author7 divided the voluminous scholarship8 into
three categories, the first focusing on theoretical justifications for the
right,9 the second on psychiatric objections to the right, 10 and the third

6. But see Barry B. Perlman, Letter to the Editor, 38 HOSP. & COMMUNITY
PSYCHIATRY 673 (1987). Dr. Perlman, Director of Psychiatry at St. Joseph's Medical
Center in Yonkers, New York, asserted that the right to refuse treatment creates an
"unworkable situation." To pressure the legislature to remedy the problem, Dr. Perlman
recommended that hospital staff members be encouraged to bring criminal charges
against mental patients who cannot be medicated legally but who commit assaults. Dr.
Berman cautioned, however, that prosecution of mental patients "would have to be
carefully explained to the public as acts on behalf of the proper treatment of patients,
lest a backlash against caregivers occur." Id.
7. Michael L. Perlin, Are Courts Competent to Decide Competency Questions?:
Stripping the Facade from United States v. Charters, 38 KAN. L. REV. 957, 957-58
(1990).
8. In 1987, Alexander Brooks declared that the legal and psychiatric literature on
the right to refuse treatment was "voluminous." Brooks, supra note 3, at 339 n. l. In·
comprehensive, but not exhaustive, footnotes, Brooks cited 34 articles and five book
chapters in the legal literature published between 1975 and 1986, and 23 articles and
eight book chapters in the psychiatric literature published between 1973 and 1987. Id.
at 340 nn.1-2. See also AB.A. COMM'N ON MENTALLY DISABLED, THE RIGHT TO
REFUSE ANTIPSYCHOTIC MEDICATION 101-10 (David Rapoport & John Parry eds., 1986)
for an annotated bibliography of 70 right to refuse treatment articles published between
1974 and 1985. For examples of more recent scholarship, see authorities cited infra
notes 9-11.
9. See, e.g., Blackbum, supra note 3; Brooks, supra note I; Dennis E. Cichon,

The Right to "Just Say No": A History and Analysis of the Right to Refase Antipsychotic Drugs, 53 LA. L. REV. 283 (1992); Ellen W. Clayton, From Rogers to Rivers: The
Right of the Mentally Ill to Refase Medication, 13 AM. J.L. & MED. 13 (1987); Donald
H.J. Hermann, Autonomy, Self Determination, the Right of Involuntarily Committed
Persons to Refuse Treatment, and the Use of Substituted Judgment in Medication
Decisions Involving Incompetent Persons, 13 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 361 (1990);
Michael L. Perlin, Decoding Right to Refuse Treatment Law, 16 INT'L J.L. &
PSYCHIATRY 151 (1993); Perlin, supra note 7; Winick, supra note 1; Bruce J. Winick,
On Autonomy: Legal and Psychological Perspectives, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1705 (1992)
[hereinafter Winick, On Autonomy]; Bruce J. Winick, The Right to Refuse Mental Health
Treatment: A First Amendment Perspective, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1989) [hereinafter
Winick, A First Amendment Perspective]; Jeannette Brian, Comment, The Right to
Refuse Antipsychotic Drug Treatment and the Supreme Court: Washington v. Harper,
40 BUFF. L. REV. 251 (1992); Skye F. Gibson, Comment, A Bright Thread for
California's Legal Crazy-Quilt: A Proposed Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs, 22
U.S.F. L. REV. 341 (1988); Anne Hull, Note, The Mentally Ill's Right to Refuse Drug
Treatment: A Panacea or a Bitter Pill to Swallow?, 29 WASHBURN L.J. 62 (1989);
James A. King, Comment, An Involuntary Mental Patient's Right to Refuse Treatment
with Antipsychotic Drugs: A Reassessment, 48 Omo ST. L.J. 1135 (1987); Lisa
Litwiller, Note, Defining Constitutional Parameters: The Forced Drugging of Civilly
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on empirical studies of results occurring when the right was implemented.11 He characterized the proliferation of scholarship in these categories as the emergence of "cottage industries." 12
After a twenty-year debate, survival of the right to refuse treatment
seems assured. Alan Stone, M.D., noted Harvard psychiatrist and former
President of the American Psychiatric Association, found that the legal
justifications for the right to refuse treatment were so "clear and

Committed Mental Patients, 1 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 57 (1992); Mary C
Mccarron, Comment, The Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs: Safeguarding the
Mentally Incompetent Patient's Right to Procedural Due Process, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 477
(1990).
10. See, e.g., PAUL s. APPLEBAUM & THOMAS G. GUTHEIL, CLINICAL HANDBOOK
OF PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 97-104 (2d ed. 1991); Paul S. Appelbaum, The Right to
Refuse Treatment With Antipsychotic Medications: Retrospect and Prospect, 145 AM.
J. PSYCHIATRY 413 (1988); Paul S. Appelbaum & Warren F. Schwartz, Minimizing the
Social Cost of Choosing Treatment for the Involuntarily Hospitalized Mentally-Ill
Patient: A New Approach to Defining the Patient's Role, 24 CONN. L. REV. 433 (1992);
Samuel J. Brake! & John M. Davis, Taking Harms Seriously: Involuntary Mental
Patients and the Right to Refuse Treatment, 25 IND. L. REV. 429 (1991); Gregory B.
Leong & J. Arturo Silva, The Right to Refuse Treatment: An Uncertain Future, 59
PSYCHIATRIC Q. 284 (1988); Stephen Rachlin, Rethinking the Right to Refuse Treatment,
19 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 213 (1989).
11. See, e.g., Renee L. Binder & Dale E. McNiel, Involuntary Patients' Right to
Refuse Medication: Impact of the Riese Decision on a California Inpatient Unit, 19
BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 351 (1991); J. Richard Ciccone et al., Right to
Refuse Treatment: Impact a/Rivers v. Katz, 18 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L.
203 (1990); Francine Cournos et al., A Comparison of Clinical and Judicial Procedures
for Reviewing Requests for Involuntary Medication in New York, 39 HOSP. &
COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 851 (1988); Frank H. DeLand & Neal M. Borenstein,
Medicine Court, II: Rivers in Practice, 147 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 38 (1990); Michael G.
Farnsworth, The Impact of Judicial Review of Patients' Refusal to Accept Antipsychotic
Medications at the Minnesota Security Hospital, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY &
L. 33 (1991); William .A. Hargreaves et al., Effects of the Jamison-Farabee Consent
Decree: Due Process Protection for Involuntary Psychiatric Patients Treated With
Psychoactive Medication, 144 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 188 (1987); Steven K. Hoge et al.,
A Prospective Multicenter Study of Patients' Refusal of Antipsychotic Medication, 47
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 949 (1990); Robert D. Miller et al., The Impact of the
Right to Refuse Treatment in a Forensic Patient Population: Six-Month Review, 17
BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 107 (1989); Pascal Sauvayre, The Relationship
Between the Court and the Doctor on the Issue of an Inpatient's Refusal ofPsychotropic
Medication, 36 J. FORENSIC Ser. 219 (1991); Ronald Schouten & Thomas G. Gutheil,
Aftermath of the Rogers Decision:' Assessing the Costs, 147 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1348
(1990); Harold I. Schwartz et al., Autonomy and the Right to Refuse Treatment:
Patients' Attitudes After Involuntary Medication, 39 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY
1049 (1988); Jeffery T. Young et al., Treatment Refusal Among Forensic Inpatients, 15
BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 5 (1987); Julie M. Zito et al., New York Under the
Rivers Decision: An Epidemiologic Study of Drug Treatment Refusal, 148 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 904 (1991) [hereinafter Zito, New York Under Rivers]; Julie M. Zito et al.,
One Year Under Rivers: Drug Refusal in a New York State Psychiatric Facility, 12
INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 295 (1989) [hereinafter Zito, One Year Under Rivers].
12. Perlin, supra note 7, at 957.

346

[VOL: 32: 343, 1995]

Judging Judgment
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

compelling" 13 that he urged his psychiatrist colleagues to accept the
right's existence. 14 Dr. Stone conceded that a mentally disordered
person's refusal of psychotropic medication is merely one example of
refusal of medical treatment by any ill person. 15 In a treatment refusal
situation, the doctrine of informed consent 16 restricts the state's
authority to intrude on the individual's autonomy.17 Only when the
individual, whether from mental disorder or other cause, is unable to
make competent decisions, may another's judgment be substituted.
Although autonomous decisionmaking is negated by incompetence, 18
incompetence is not established solely by proof of mental disorder or
proof that treatment is clinically indicated. 19
Dr. Stone, however, would structure the civil commitment decision to
deny the right to refuse treatment to those most in need of it. Dr. Stone
has proposed,20 and the American Psychiatric Association has endorsed
his proposal,2 1 that civil commitment be conditioned on a finding of
incompetence to make treatment decisions. Under the proposal,
competent mentally disordered people will be neither civilly committed
nor involuntarily treated, but civilly committed people will be subject to
involuntary treatment. The right to refuse treatment survives, but it is
not a right enjoyed by involuntarily confined mental patients. For them,
the right will be restored only when they are released from confinement.
13. , Alan A. Stone, The Right to Refuse Treatment:· Why Psychiatrists Should and
Can Make It Work, 38 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 358, 358 (1981).
14. Id. at 360.
15. Id. at 359.
16. See Alan A. Stone, Foreword to CHARLES W. LIDZ ET AL., INFORMED
CONSENT: A STUDY OF DECISIONMAKING IN PSYCHIATRY at xi (1984). Stone noted that
the doctrine of informed consent is supported by both a deontological and a utilitarian
justification, i.e., the value of individual autonomy and protection against iatrogenic
harm. Only a utilitarian objection can be offered against it, i.e., that informed consent
will not work. Stone questioned whether the claim that "doctor knows best" can be
elevated to a deontological principle that warrants opposition to the doctrine.
17. See Winick, On Autonomy, supra note 9. Legal doctrine, political theory, and
principles of psychological well-being support the value of autonomy. Id. at 1772.
18. Stone, supra note 13, at 359.
19. Id.
20. ALAN A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 68
(1975); Stone, supra note 13, at 361; see also Loren H. Roth, A Commitment Law for
Patients, Doctors, and Lawyers, 136 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1121 (1979).
21. In 1982, the American Psychiatric Association approved a model civil
commitment law. The model law is presented and discussed in Clifford D. Stromberg
& Alan A. Stone, A Model State Law on Civil Commitment ofthe Mentally Ill, 20 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 275, 333-34 (1983).
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Dr. Stone's proposal has been severely criticized. The proposal forces
a decision that may be premature. At the time of the initial civil
commitment hearing, information on the proposed patient's competence
to make treatment decisions may not be available. The proposed
patient's mental disorder may not have been finally diagnosed and a
treatment plan may not have been developed. How can a proposed
patient's competence to make an informed decision be measured when
the treatment has not been prescribed and the risks, benefits, and
alternative treatments have not been explained?22 Additionally, the
proposal has been .criticized for eliminating any meaningful opportunity
for an involuntary mental patient to challenge the doctor's treatment
decisions. 23 Loss of the right to refuse treatment seems particularly
inappropriate for a patient who was unable to make reasoned treatment
decisions when initially confined but who has regained competence
during the period of involuntary commitment.24
If incompetence to make treatment decisions is a prerequisite for civil
commitment, the judge or administrative officer conducting the civil
commitment hearing is unlikely to make a careful assessment of the
proposed patient's competence. 25 If the other criteria for civil commitment have been proven, i.e., the person is mentally disordered and either
dangerous or unable to provide for basic personal needs, a pro forma
finding of incompetence is likely if such finding is necessary to place the
person in a structured environment.
Fortunately, few states have adopted Dr. Stone's proposal.26 Most

22. Cichon, supra note 9, at 389.
23. The 1847 Code of Ethics of the American Medical Association included a
statement of "Obligations of Patients to Their Physicians." Loren H. Roth, The Right
to Refuse Psychiatric Treatment: Law and Medicine at the Interface, 35 EMORY L.J.
139, 143 (1986) (quoting AM. MEDICAL ASS'N CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, ch. 1, art.
1, § 2, reprinted in PERCIVAL'S MEDICAL ETHICS 218 (Leake ed. 1927)). The code
provided that "[t]he obedience of a patient to the prescriptions of his physician should
be prompt and implicit. He should never permit his own crude opinions as to their
fitness, to influence his attention to them." Id.
24. Cichon, supra note 9, at 388.
25. Id.
26. In Kansas, a "mentally ill person" is subject to civil commitment. Included
within the definition of "mentally ill person" is a requirement that the individual "lacks
capacity to make an informed decision concerning treatment." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 592902(h)(2) (Supp. 1993). That term is further defined as an inability "despite
conscientious efforts at explanation, to understand basically the nature and effects of
hospitalization or treatment, or [as an inability] to engage in a rational decision-making
process regarding hospitalization or treatment, as evidenced by [an] inability to weigh
the possible risks and benefits." Id. § 59-2902(e). Although another statute declares that
"a person shall not lose rights as a citizen, property rights or legal capacity by reason
of being a patient," that statement is specifically subject to limitations imposed by other
statutes. Id. § 59-2930 (1983). Another statute authorizes medications to be
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states do not presume or require incompetence as a criterion for civil
commitment.27 The mentally disordered person's dangerousness to self
or others, or inability to provide for basic necessities, justifies a

administered over a patient's objection. See id. § 59-2928(b) (Supp. 1993).
In Delaware, a "mentally ill person" subject to civil commitment is defined as one
who is "unable to make responsible decisions with respect to his hospitalization." DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5001(1) (1983). Other Delaware statutes, however, do not specify
whether this inability is determinative of incompetency to refuse treatment.
In Iowa, Michigan, and South Carolina, civil commitment requires a finding that the
proposed patient be unable to make responsible decisions regarding treatment (Iowa and
South Carolina) or the need for treatment (Michigan). IOWA CODE ANN. § 229.1(14)
(West 1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.140l(c) (West 1992); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 44-17-580 (Law. Co-op. 1985). In each of these states, however, another statute
specifically declares that civil commitment does not raise a presumption of incompetence. IOWA CODE ANN. § 229.27(1) (West 1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 330.1489(1) (West 1992); S.C. CODE ANN.§ 44-17-580 (Law. Co-op. 1985). These
conflicting statutes do not appear to resolve the question of whether the civil
commitment decision constitutes an adjudication of the patient's incompetence to refuse
treatment.
In New Mexico, incompetence to make a treatment decision is not a criterion for civil
commitment. However, if the civil commitment criteria are present, the committing
court is required to consider and decide whether the patient is capable of informed
consent. N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 43-1-1 l(D) (Michie 1993). Thus, some New Mexico civil
committees may be competent to make treatment decisions. See id. § 43-1-5. A
treatment guardian may be appointed for those who are not. Id. § 43-1-15(B). The
court specifies a period of time, up to a maximum of one year, during which the
treatment guardian exercises his or her powers. Id. § 43-1-15(C).
Similarly, in Idaho, incompetence to make a treatment decision is not a criterion for
civil commitment. However, a statute requires the order of commitment to "state
whether the proposed patient lacks capacity to make informed decisions about
treatment." IDAHO CODE§ 66-329(m) (Supp. 1994). Thus, some Idaho civil committees
may be competent to make treatment decisions. In Bradshaw v. State, 120 Idaho 429,
433-34, 816 P.2d 986, 990-91 (1991), the Idaho Supreme Court required the committing
court to consider evidence of incapacity to make treatment decisions separately from
evidence of civil commitability and required that a finding of incapacity be supported
by clear and convincing evidence.
27. See Blackbum, supra note 3, at 472 n.88, for statutes declaring that civil
commitment neither raises a presumption of, nor constitutes a finding of, the patient's
incompetence. See also Cichon, supra note 9, at 350 n.435, for court decisions
separating the commitment and competence issues. In fact, as of 1985, only eight states
even allowed civil commitment and competency to be determined in the same
proceeding. SAMUEL J. BRAKEL ET AL. THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 374
n.35, 405-07 (3d ed. 1985).
Psychiatrists have strongly supported law reform efforts to assure that civil
commitment does not automatically deprive patients of their right to vote, to enter into
contracts, to marry, or to drive automobiles. Stone, supra note 13, at 359. Apparently,
however, psychiatrists draw the line at patients' decisionmaking authority to refuse
treatment.
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deprivation of liberty, but without a separate determination of incompetence, does not justify a deprivation of the patient's right to refuse
treatment or other rights.
Although most states have recognized the right of competent, though
involuntarily committed, patients to refuse treatment, they have divided
almost equally on the question of procedural protections necessary to
enforce that right. 28 When a mental patient refuses treatment, does due
process require that his or her competence to make that judgment be
assessed in a formal hearing before a judge or other law-trained
decisionmaker or is an informal assessment by a staff psychiatrist or
hospital committee sufficient?
In cases on related issues involving mentally disordered persons, the
United States Supreme Court held that an informal, medical
decisionmaker model satisfies the due process requirement. In Parham
v. J.R., decided in 1979, the Supreme Court acknowledged that children
have a substantial liberty interest in avoiding unnecessary confinement
for treatment. 29 Nevertheless, the Court ruled that parents retain
plenary authority to obtain treatment for their children in a mental health
facility subject to a physician's independent examination and medical
decision. 30 Because the commitment decision was deemed "essentially
medical in character,"31 due process did not require the state to provide
either a preadmission or a postadmission adversarial hearing before a
law-trained judicial or administrative officer.32
Arguably, the Parham precedent is not directly applicable to the right
to refuse treatment issue. Children, because of their youth and
immaturity, are subject to the substitute decisionmaking of their parents
and physicians; competent adults, even if involuntarily confined, should
not be. A decision to override a competent person's refusal of treatment
is not essentially medical in character. From their medical expertise,
doctors know the risks and benefits of, and the alternatives to, treatments
they are prescribing. The doctrine of informed consent requires them to
provide this information to their patients. However, as the California
28. To determine whether an involuntarily committed mental patient's treatment
refusal will be upheld, 14 states use a medical decisionmaker model and 18 states use
a judicial decisionmaker model. Blackburn, supra note 3, at 479 & n.101, 493 & n.147.
29. 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979).
30. Id. at 604.
31. Id. at 609.
32. Id. at 613. For a critique of Parham, see Michael L. Perlin, An Invitation to
the Dance: An Empirical Response to ChiefJustice .Warren Burger's "Time-Consuming
Procedural Minuets" Theory in Parham v. J.R., 9 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L.
149 (1981); see also Grant H. Morris, The Supreme Court Examines Civil Commitment
Issues: A Retrospective and Prospective Assessment, 60 TuL. L. REV. 927, 946-52
(1986).
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Supreme Court noted, "The weighing of these risks against the
individual subjective fears and hopes of the patient is not an expert skill.
Such evaluation and decision is a nonmedical judgment reserved to the
patient alone."33
In Youngberg v. Romeo, decided in 1982, the United States Supreme
Court acknowledged that involuntarily. committed mentally retarded
persons have liberty interests in freedom and safety from restraint and
that the state must provide minimally adequate or reasonable training to
assure that those interests are protected. 34 In determining whether the
state has adequately protected the confined person's rights, the Court
merely required that judgment be exercised by a qualified professional.35
In Youngberg, the Court focused primarily on the extent of the state's
affirmative obligation to provide habilitation services - a "right to
treatment" issue. The Court also deferred to professional judgment on
the question of whether physical restraints should be imposed in
individual cases - a "right to refuse treatment" issue. The Youngberg
Court, however, did not fully consider the right to refuse treatment
issue. 36 Romeo was a profoundly retarded person with the mental
capacity of an eighteen-month old child. 37 Obviously he lacked the
mental capacity necessary to make treatment decisions. The Court did
not discuss or decide whether a competent patient can refuse treatment
that is deemed appropriate in the judgment of a professional.
Two weeks after announcing Youngberg, the Court vacated the
judgment of a circuit court of appeals that had recognized the right of
involuntarily confined mental patients to refuse psychotropic medication.
The Court remanded the case for further consideration in light of
Youngberg. 38 By implication, the Court was suggesting that deference

33. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 243, 502 P.2d 1, 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 514
(1972).
34. 457 U.S. 307, 314-19 (1982).
35. Id. at 321-22.
36. In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990), the
Supreme Court acknowledged: "Youngberg . .. did not deal with decisions to administer
or withhold medical treatment." Id. at 280.
37. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 309.
38. Rennie v. Klein, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982), vacating 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981)
(en bane).
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to professional judgment might also be a usable standard in right to
refuse treatment cases. 39
In 1990, for the first time, the Supreme Court directly considered
whether competent mental patients have a right to refuse treatment and,
if so, who determines their competence. In Washington v. Harper, the
Court found that a prison inmate possesses a significant liberty interest
in avoiding the unwanted administration of psychotropic medication. 40
The Court, however, rejected the prisoner's contention that this liberty
interest prevents the state from overriding his treatment refusal decision
without a judicial finding of his incompetence.41 The Court upheld a
prison regulation that authorized the involuntary administration of
psychotropic medication upon a treating psychiatrist's determination that
the prisoner was both mentally disordered and dangerous to either
himself or others.42 The Court read into the regulation a requirement
that the treatment ordered be in the prisoner's medical interest.43 In the
Court's judgment, the state's interest in prison safety and security
warranted involuntary treatment without a full court hearing. If a prison
regulation is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, it will
be upheld even if a more rigorous standard of review would ordinarily
be required to measure the alleged infringement of a fundamental
constitutional right. 44

39. On remand, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals applied the Youngberg
professional judgment standard. Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983) (en bane).
The Rennie court expressed its belief that the Youngberg Court had declined to limit the
state's authority by requiring that the treatment ordered be the least intrusive of the
patient's liberty. Id. at 268. For a critique of the professional judgment standard,
especially in right to refuse treatment situations in which the individual is asserting a
negative right against invasive state action, see Susan Stefan, Leaving Civil Rights to the
"Experts": From Deference to Abdication Under the Professional Judgment Standard,
102 YALE L.J. 639 (1992); see also Cichon, supra note 9, at 376-405.
40. 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990).
41. Id. at 222, 228.
42. Id. at 227. The prison regulation also authorized the involuntary administration
of psychotropic medication on prisoners who were both mentally disordered and gravely
disabled. Id. at 215. In a subsequent opinion, Justice Kennedy, author of the majority
opinion in Harper, clarified that Harper addressed only the situation in which
involuntary medication is administered to a prisoner "to insure that the incarcerated
person ceased to be a physical danger to himself or others." Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S.
Ct. 1810, 1818 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
43. Harper, 494 U.S. at 227. In a concurring and dissenting opinion, three justices
noted that the state's policy did not require a determination that involuntary treatment
would advance the prisoner's medical interest. Id. at 244 (Stevens, J., concurring and
dissenting). Thus, in their judgment the policy inappropriately "sacrifices the inmate's
substantive liberty interest to refuse psychotropic drugs, regardless of his medical
interests, to institutional and administrative concerns." Id. at 245-46.
44. Id. at 223. The Court noted: "There are few cases in which the State's
interest in combating the danger posed by a person to both himself and others is greater
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Because a state can claim no legitimate penological interest in the
confinement and treatment of noncriminals, the Harper decision appears
applicable only to mentally ill prisoners. However, could the state's
interest in the safety and security of its mental treatment facilities
support the involuntary treatment of dangerous civilly committed patients
who pose a danger to themselves or other patients?45 Harper provides
no definitive answer. 46
After disposing of the prisoner's substantive claim, the Court
addressed the adequacy of the prison regulation's procedural protections.
The regulation provided for a prisoner-initiated hearing to review the
treating psychiatrist's decision. A committee consisting of a psychiatrist,
a psychologist, and the facility's associate superintendent conducts the
hearing. No committee member can be involved in the prisoner's
current treatment or diagnosis. If the committee determines that the
prisoner suffers from a mental disorder and is dangerous, the prisoner
may be medicated involuntarily.47 The Supreme Court upheld this
regulation as satisfying procedural due process requirements. 48

than in a prison environment ...." Id. at 225.
45. The prison regulation used definitions of"mental disorder," "gravely disabled,"
and "likelihood of serious harm" that were identical to the definitions used in the state's
civil commitment statute. Id. at 215 n.3. Do these similarities suggest that the adoption
of the same regulation for civilly committed patients would satisfy minimum federal
constitutional requirements?
46. Less than a year later, however, the Court hinted that Harper might be
applicable to a treatment refusal situation that did not involve prison security. Perry v.
Louisiana, 498 U.S. 38 (1990) (per curiam). In Perry, the Court vacated a Louisiana
trial court decision ordering a death row inmate to be treated involuntarily with
psychotropic medication to restore him to competency to be executed. The Supreme
Court ordered a reconsideration in light of Harper. Id. Although Perry was a prisoner,
there was no proof that without medication he was dangerous to himself or others. Was
the Court suggesting that mentally disordered prisoners cannot be treated involuntarily
if they are not dangerous? Was the Court suggesting that dangerousness is not the only
justification for treatment of mentally disordered prisoners? On remand, the trial court
reinstated its order, but, on appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed in part,
distinguishing Harper. State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 747, 751-55 (La. 1992). The
Louisiana Supreme Court found that the involuntary administration of psychotropic
medication for the purpose of restoring competence for execution "does not constitute
medical treatment but forms part of the capital punishment sought to be executed by the
state." Id. at 753. Under the Louisiana Constitution, such a practice violates the right
to privacy and constitutes cruel, excessive, and unusual punishment. Id. at 747.
47. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 215-16 (1990).
48. Id. at 231-35.
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The Court suggested two reasons why the state may defer to the
judgment of an internal professional review committee. First, the Court
noted that the intentions (i.e., judgments) of a mentally disordered person
are difficult to assess and are changeable.49 Those intentions can be
better determined by frequent and ongoing clinical observations of
mental health professionals than by a judge in a single judicial hearing. 50 The Court's assertion is most curious. Under the procedure
approved by the Court, the internal review committee is not required to
hold multiple hearings at which the prisoner's intentions are discerned.
In fact, under the Court's ruling, the prisoner's judgment, whether
competent or incompetent, is irrelevant.
Second, the Court was concerned with the costs of a judicial hearing.
Financial resources and staff time would be diverted from patient
care. 51 The Court cited studies indicating that patient refusals of
psychotropic medications are upheld infrequently, whether the
decisionmaker is a judge or a mental health professional, internal or
external to the facilify. 52 Thus, because the regulation approved in
Harper requires the hearing committee to review the treating staff's
medical decisions regarding the type and dosage of medication, the state
could legitimately conclude that an administrative review using medical
decisionmakers would be more effective than a judicial review. 53 The
Court ignored studies cited in amicus curiae briefs demonstrating that a
judicial review model that provides therapeutic benefits to patients54
could be implemented without seriously burdening the mental health
system. 55

49. Id. at 231.
50. Id. at 231-32.
51. Id. at 232.
52. Id. at 234 n.13.
53. Id. at 233.
54. Brief of the National Association of Protection and Advocacy Systems et al.
as Amici Curiae at 24-27, Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (No. 88-599)
(Judicial oversight increased the doctor's attention to medication side effects and
increased the doctor's willingness to accommodate patient needs. An effective
therapeutic alliance resulted in therapeutic benefit. Patients who refused treatment were
not adversely affected by any delay from scheduling a competency hearing. They did
not become violent and disruptive.).
55. Brief for the Mental Health Legal Advisors Committee of the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court et al. as Amici Curiae at 16-18, Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S.
210 (1990) (No. 88-599) (In Massachusetts, using a judicial review model, patients who
refused treatment were not hospitalized for longer periods than similarly situated patients
who accepted treatment. Accidents and injuries to patients and staff did not increase.
Use of restraints to control violent and destructive behavior did not increase. Because
hearings were conducted at the mental health facilities, staff time spent away from the
facilities was small and document preparation time was minimized.).
For a critique of Harper, see Cichon, supra note 9, at 409-16.
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Federal courts, often relying on Parham, Youngberg, and Harper, have
upheld statutes and regulations that use a mental health professional
decisionmaker model to review mental patient treatment refusals. 56
Nevertheless, the Harper Court insisted on procedural protections to
insure that the treating professional 's decision to medicate involuntarily
is neither arbitrary nor erroneous. 57 Therefore, the Court is unlikely to
uphold the involuntary medication of patients on the unreviewed
·
judgment of the treating professional.
Recently, the Supreme Court signaled a new direction in its right to
refuse treatment decisionmaking. In Riggins v. Nevada, 58 a criminal
defendant who had been found mentally competent to stand trial moved
unsuccessfully for an order suspending the administration of psychotropic medication during his trial. The Supreme Court reversed the
defendant's conviction because the trial court, in denying the defendant's
motion, had not acknowledged the defendant's liberty interest in freedom
from unwanted medication. The trial court did not make any finding
that medication was necessary to accomplish an essential state interest.59 By allowing the state to medicate the defendant over his
objection in the absence of .such a :finding, the trial court may have

56. See, e.g., Shennan v. Four County Counseling Ctr., 987 F.2d 397,409 (7th Cir.
1993) (treating mental health professional decides); Felce v. Fiedler, 974 F.2d 1484,
1498-500 (7th Cir. 1992) (independent neutral decisionmaker required; must not be
involved in treatment or diagnosis); United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302, 312 (4th
Cir. 1988) (en bane), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016 (1990) (treating mental health
professional decides); Dautremont v. Broadlawns Hosp., 827 F.2d 291, 297-98 (8th Cir.
1987) (treating mental health professional decides); Johnson v. Silvers; 742 F.2d 823,
825 (4th Cir. 1984) (professional judgment must be exercised); Project Release v.
Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 968, 980-81 (2d Cir. 1983) (internal professional review); Rennie
v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266, 269-70, 274 (3rd Cir. 1983) (internal professional review);
United States v. Bryant, 670 F. Supp. 840, 844 (D. Minn. 1987) (treating mental health
professional decides); Stensvad v. Reivitz, 601 F. Supp. 128, 131 (W.D. Wis. 1985)
(treating mental health professional decides); R.A.J. v. Miller, 590 F. Supp. 1319, 1322
(N.D. Tex. 1984) (internal medical review); Gilliam v. Martin, 589 F. Supp. 680, 682
(W.D. Okla._ 1984) (treating mental health professional decides); Davis v. Hubbard, 506
F. Supp. 915, 938-39 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (Some hearing on the patient's competence must
be held. The decisionmaker need not be legally trained, and may be internal to the
institution.).
57. Harper, 494 U.S. at 228.
58. 504 U.S. 127 (1992) ..
59. Id. at 138. On remand, the Nevada Supreme Court ordered Riggins retried
without the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication unless, following the
cessation of all such medications, the trial court makes the findings required by the
United States Supreme Court. Riggins v. State, 860 P.2d 705, 705-06 (Nev. 1993).
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violated the defendant's right to a fair trial. 60 Harper's twin requirements of overriding justification and medical appropriateness, which
allow the forced medication of convicted prisoners, are also required for
criminal defendants. 61 In fact, because criminal defendants are not
confined in prison unless and until they are convicted,62 due process
may require more deference to their liberty interest than is required for
prison inmates. 63
The Riggins' majority did not delineate with finality the substantive
standards that govern the forced medication of criminal defendants. 64
The majority did, however, suggest a standard that "certainly would
satisf[y] due process."65 Due process would be satisfied if the trial
court finds that the compelled treatment is "medically appropriate and,
considering less intrusive alternatives, essential for the sake of [the
defendant's] own safety or the safety of others.''66 Additionally, due
process might be satisfied if the compelled treatment is medically
appropriate and an adjudication of guilt or innocence cannot be obtained
by using less intrusive means. 67
60. Id. The Court noted that the side effects of the psychotropic medication may
have impacted the 'defendant's "outward appearance, the content of his testimony on
direct or cross examination, his ability to follow the proceedings, or the substance of his
communication with counsel." Id.
61. Id. at 135.
62. Only sentence-serving prisoners are in "the unique circumstances of penal
confinement." Id. at 134.
63. One federal district court has already construed Riggins to require more than
Harper. In Woodland v Angus, 820 F. Supp. 1497 (D. Utah 1993), the plaintiff, who
was charged with murder, was found mentally incompetent to stand trial. Such a
finding, however, was held not to include an adjudication of the defendant's incompetence to make treatment decisions. Id. at 1502. In a separate proceeding, the court
determined that the plaintiff was also incompetent to make treatment decisions. Id. at
1504. In deciding whether to permit forced medication to restore the defendant's
competence to stand trial, the court rejected Harper's reduced standard of review. Id.
at 1509. Citing Riggins, the court required proof of a compelling state interest to
outweigh the plaintiffs liberty interest. Id. at 1510. The plaintiffs liberty interest is not
outweighed in the absence of proof that forced medication will render him competent
to stand trial. Id. at 1512. The state's parens patriae authority does not justify its
decision to administer psychotropic medication merely by showing that such medication
is in the plaintiffs medical interest. The plaintiffs liberty interest is protected through
the appointment of a guardian who considers the incompetent individual's values and
preferences in deciding whether to consent to treatment. Id. at 1517.
64. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 136. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas asserted
that the Riggins' majority "appears to adopt a standard of strict scrutiny." Id. at 156
(Thomas, J., dissenting). The majority denied the assertion. Id. at 136.
65. Id. at 135.
66. Id.
67. However, because Riggins did not claim a right to discontinue psychotropic
medication if its administration was necessary to continue his competence to stand trial,
the Court specifically refused to consider whether he, or any competent criminal defendant, had such a right. Id. Justice Kennedy, author of the majority's Harper decision,
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By focusing the trial court's attention on alternatives to involuntary
treatment that are less intrusive to the individual's liberty, Riggins
departs from previous Supreme Court decisions. In Harper, the Court
imposed no requirement that the state's asserted interest in maintaining
prison safety be measured against less intrusive alternatives to involuntary treatment.
Similarly, in Youngberg, the Court imposed no
requirement that the exercise of professional judgment be tempered by
a consideration of alternatives that are less intrusive than medically
appropriate, but involuntary, treatment. Most importantly, the Riggins'
standard, as worded, requires the consideration of less intrusive
alternatives,, not of the mental health professional's analysis of the
medical appropriateness of the proposed treatment, but rather, of the
state's claimed justification for overriding the individual's treatment
refusal. The question of whether the forced administration of psychotropic medication is necessary to accomplish an essential state policy is
not within the expertise of mental health professionals. It is a question
for the courts to address. 68 The Riggins' majority even suggested that
in deciding individual cases, the trial court should require that the
substantive standard for involuntary treatment be proven by clear and
convincing evidence. 69
Neither Harper nor Riggins involved treatment refusals by civilly
committed patients, and the Supreme Court has not determined the
standard applicable to that context. Civilly committed patients may be
entitled to greater due process protection than are either prison inmates

wrote a concurring opinion in Riggins to express his doubt that the state's interest in
conducting a trial allows it to medicate the defendant involuntarily to assure competence
to stand trial. Id. at 138-45 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
68. Although noting that Riggins specifically required the trial court to make the
necessary findings in the criminal trial context, one commentator questioned whether a
judicial model would also be required in other right to refuse treatment contexts. In the
criminal trial context, the trial judge is already involved and making decisions. Thus,
an administrative decisionmaker is unnecessary to decide the treatment refusal issue.
Winick, supra note 1, at 220 n.104. However, the consideration of less restrictive
alternatives, imposed by the Riggins standard, is addressed to the state's justification for
compelled treatment, not to the medical appropriateness of that treatment. As such, it
is an issue that is more suited to judicial, rather than to clinical, decisionmaking.
69. Immediately after presenting a substantive standard for judging the forced
administration of psychotropic medication, the Court noted that due process requires
clear and convincing evidence to establish the _criteria for civil commitment. Riggins,
504 U.S. at 135 (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979)).
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or criminal defendants. 70 The state cannot claim that forced treatment
of civilly committed patients without any court hearing is necessary to
maintain prison safety and security. Unlike the prison inmate in Harper,
civilly committed patients are not subject to punishment in a prison.
The state cannot claim that forced treatment of civilly committed patients
without any court hearing is necessary to determine their guilt or
innocence. Unlike the criminal. defendant in Riggins, civilly committed
patients are not on trial.
·
·
Mentally disordered persons who are incapable of living in society or
are dangerous to themselves or others are subject to civil commitment.
The state's legitimate interest in protecting them, and in protecting others
from them, is satisfied by the confinement itself-without coercing
treatment. Although the state does have a legitimate interest in
protecting other patients and staff from dangerous mental patients, the
danger is far less in a mental hospital than it is in a prison.71 At most,
all that is needed is authority to medicate temporarily when emergencies
arise. 72 In nonemergency situations, greater deference to the civilly
committed patient's liberty interest in refusing treatment seems
appropriate.
It remains to be seen whether, following Riggins, the Supreme Court
will require an expanded due process model for civilly committed
patients, or whether, consistent with Youngberg and Harper, a limited
due process model will be held to suffice. Regardless of how the issue
is resolved, the Court will only be deciding the minimum required by the
United States Constitution. As the Supreme Court noted in a treatment
refusal case, states may recognize substantive liberty interests that are
more extensive than those protected by the Constitution.73 Those statecreated liberty interests are protected by the federal Due Process
Clause.74 A state may also confer procedural protections beyond those

70. One author has suggested that treatment refusal cases can be divided into three
categories. Under Harper, prison inmates are subject to a reasonableness standard of
review. Under Riggins, pretrial detainees are subject to a higher standard of review,
requiring that the forced administration of psychotropic medication be the leastintrusive
measure to accomplish a compelling' state objective. Civilly committed patients are
"entitled to the most exacting standard of review." Cichon, supra note 9, at 419.
71. See Winick, supra note 1, at 228-29. Winick notes that, unlike prisons, mental
hospitals have professional and support staff trained in dealing with problems of
potential violence. Hospitals are also able to deal with violence using alternative
approaches such as segregation, physical restraints, psychotherapy, and behavior therapy.
Id. at 229.
72. Id. at 229.
73. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 300 (1982); see also Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,277 (1990).
74. Mills, 457 U.S. at 300.
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minimally· required by the United States Constitution. 75 If the state
does so, the minimal requirements of the Constitution do not control.76
Many state courts have relied upon liberty interests derived from state
constitutions, statutes, and the common-law doctrine ofinformed consent
to mandate judicial findings of incompetence before treatment refusal
decisions of civilly-committed patients can be overridden. 77 Occasion-

75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., Riese v. St. Mary's Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 209 Cal. App. 3d 1303,
1308, 271 Cal. Rptr. 199, 201 (1987) (In nonemergency situations, involuntarily
committed mental patients have statutory rights to exercise informed consent to the use
of psychotropic medication absent a judicial determination of their incapacity to make
treatment decisions.); People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961, 967, 973 (Colo. 1985) (en bane)
(Under the common law and statutes, involuntarily committed persons, whether
competent or incompetent, have a right to refuse treatment that poses a significant risk
to their physical well-being. To override a treatment refusal of psychotropic medication,
a court must find, among other things, that the patient is incompetent to participate
effectively in the treatment decision.); Goedecke v. State, Dep't oflnsts., 198 Colo. 407,
411, 603 P.2d 123, 125 (1979) (en bane) (In the absence of a finding by a competent
tribunal that an involuntarily confined mental patient lacks capacity to make treatment
decisions, .statutes and the common law afford the patient the right to withhold consent
to psychotropic medications in nonemergency circumstances.); In re C.E., 161 Ill. 2d
200, 204, 641 N£2d 345, 347 (1994) (A statute that authorizes the forced administration of psychotropic medication only if the court finds, among other things, that the
civilly committed patient lacks the capacity to make a reasoned decision about the
medication, is not unconstitutional on its face.); In re Orr, 176 Ill. App. 3d 498, 510-12,
531 N.E.2d 64, 73-74 (1988) (Prior to the enactment of the statute construed in In re
C.E., supra; the trial court lacked authority to order forced medication as part of the civil
commitment decision. By statute existing at the time of the decision and by the
common law doctrine of informed consent, a separate adjudication of incompetency is
required to override patient refusals in nonemergency situations.); Rogers v. Commissioner of Dep't of Mental Health, 390 Mass. 489, 497-98, 458 N.E.2d 308, 314-15
(1983) (By statute and by common law, involuntarily committed mental patients are
competent and do not lose the right to refuse treatment until adjudicated incompetent by
a judge. For patients found incompetent, the judge makes a substituted judgment
decision.); Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139, 148-50 (Minn. 1988) (The state
constitution guarantees a right of privacy that is not lost through civil commitment.
Judicial review is required before a patient may be treated involuntarily with
psychotropic medication.); Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 498, 495 N.E.2d 337, 344,
504 N.Y.S.2d 74, 81 (1986) (Neither mental disorder nor institutionalization justifies
overriding an individual's fundamental right to refuse psychotropic medication. A
person's due process rights, guaranteed by the state constitution, require that, in each
case, a court balance the individual's liberty interest against the state's asserted
compelling need to forcibly medicate.); In re K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747, 750-52 (Okla. 1980)
(Under the right to privacy-not further defined as a state or federal right-legally
competent adult mental patients have a right to refuse treatment with psychotropic
medication. A judicial proceeding is required to declare a patient incompetent and to
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ally, a state court has expressly refused to be bound by an ex1stmg
federal court decision offering less protection to civilly committed
patients. 78
Numerous empirical studies have been conducted in states that use a
law-trained decisionmaker model. The studies, and their results, are
remarkably alike. Typically, the researchers are psychiatrists or other
mental health professionals. They report that in an overwhelming
number of cases, the decisionmaker found the patient incompetent,
overriding his or her treatment refusal. 79 The researchers then assess

appoint a guardian to make an informed judgment for the patient.); Henderson v. Yocum,
11 Mental & Physical Disability L. Rep. (ABA) 327 (S.D. Cir. Ct. 1987) (By statute and
by constitution, involuntarily committed mental patients have a right to refuse psychotropic medication in nonemergency situations. To override a treatment refusal, a court
must review the patient's competence. If the patient is found incompetent, the court
must balance the patient's right to refuse against competing state interests and also
assure that the proposed treatment is provided in the least restrictive way.), ajf'd, 438
N.W.2d 225 (S.D. 1989) (mem.); State ex rel. Jones v. Gerhardstein, 141 Wis. 2d 710,
734-39, 416 N.W.2d 883, 893-95 (1987) (Because precommitment detainees have a
statutory right to refuse psychotropic medication, the equal protection clauses of the state
and federal constitutions are violated by statutes that allow other involuntarily committed
individuals to be treated over their objection in nonemergency situations. Because a
court review of competence is required before a precommitment detainee may be
involuntarily treated, a similar review is also required for other involuntarily admitted
individuals.).
In related contexts, courts have mandated judicial hearings of patients' competence
before involuntary treatment is authorized. See, e.g., Keyhea v. Rushen, 178 Cal. App.
3d 526, 541, 223 Cal. Rptr. 746, 755-56 (1986) (Under the statutes, state prisoners are
entitled to a judicial determination of their competency to refuse treatment before they
can be subjected to long-term involuntary psychotropic medication.); People v. Gilliland,
769 P.2d 477,483 (Colo. 1989) (Involuntarily committed insanity acquittees have a right
to refuse psychotropic medication. To override their treatment refusals, a court must
make the same findings that are required to override treatment refusals of civilly
committed patients.); Gundy v. Pauley, 619 S.W.2d 730, 731-32 (Ky. Ct. App. 198 l)(In
the absence of an emergency, the constitution-;iot further defined as state or
federal - requires a judicial declaration of incompetence before an involuntarily
committed patient can be compelled to undergo electroconvulsive therapy.); Williams
v. Wilzack, 319 Md. 485, 510, 573 A.2d 809, 821 (1990) (A state statute authorizing the
involuntary medication of insanity acquittees without any judicial review was held to
violate procedural due process under state and federal constitutions. In the absence of
a valid statute, common law principles applied. Those principles prohibit nonconsensual
administration of medication on mentally competent adults under nonemergency
circumstances.); In re Guardianship of Roe, 383 Mass. 415, 417, 421 N.E.2d 40, 42
(1981) (In the absence of an emergency, psychotropic medication may be administered
forcibly to a noninstitutionalized ward only when ordered by a judge.).
78. See State ex rel. Jones v. Gerhardstein, 141 Wis. 2d 710, 742, 416 N.W.2d
883, 896 (1987) (expressly declining to follow Stensvad v. Reivitz, 601 F. Supp. 128
(W.D. Wis. 1985)).
79. See, e.g.; Binder & McNiel, supra note 11, at 353 (A study of 444 patients
admitted to a 16-bed locked unit in a university psychiatric hospital revealed that 32
competency hearings were conducted during a 17-month period. Only four patients, i.e.,
12.5%, were found competent.); Ciccone et al., supra note 11, at 211-12 (A study of a
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the costs involved in holding these hearings and usually express their
opinion that an alternative, less expensive, model is warranted. 80 In a

107-bed psychiatric service in a private university hospital and an 850-bed state-operated
psychiatric hospital revealed that 16 competency hearings were conducted during a oneyear period. Only three patients, i.e., 18.8%, were found competent.); Coumos et al.,
supra note 11, at 852-53 (A study of a 1200-bed adult state mental hospital revealed that
21 competency hearings were conducted during a one-year period. Only three patients,
i.e., 14.3%, were found competent.); DeLand & Borenstein, supra note 11, at 39-41 (A
study of a state forensic hospital with an average census of 200 to 250 patients revealed
that 15 competency hearings were conducted during a one-year period. Not one of the
15, i.e., 0%, was found competent.); Farnsworth, supra note 11, at 35-37 (A study of a
state security hospital with 153 patients revealed that 16 competency hearings were
conducted during a two-year period. Only one patient, i.e., 6.3%, was found
competent.); Hoge et al., supra note 11, at 950, 952 (A study of 1434 patients admitted
to four acute inpatient units in state-operated mental health facilities revealed that 19
competency hearings were conducted during a six-month period. Not one of the 19, i.e.,
0%, was found competent.); Steven K. Hoge et al., The Right to Refuse Treatment Under
Rogers v. Commissioner: Preliminary Empirical Findings and Comparisons, 15 BULL.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 163, 164-65 (1987) (A study of all 350 competency
hearings conducted in Massachusetts during a 17-month period revealed that only 12
patients, i.e., 3.4%, were found competent.); Miller et al., supra note 11, at 110-11, 115
(Of the 272 patients who were either confined in a maximum security state forensic
facility at the time the competency hearing requirement was implemented or who were
admitted to that facility within six months, 39 competency hearings were conducted.
Not one of the 39, i.e., 0%, was found competent.); Sauvayre, supra note 11, at 222-23
(A study of all patient refusals resulting in court hearings at a maximum security
forensic hospital revealed that 40 competency hearings were conducted on 33 patients
during a two-year period. In only eight cases, i.e., 20% of the hearings, were patients
found competent.); Schouten & Gutheil, supra note 11, at 1348-49 (A study of all 2216
competency hearings conducted in Massachusetts during an 18-month period revealed
that only 21 patients, i.e., 0.9%, were found competent.); Jorge Veliz & William S.
James, Medicine Court: Rogers in Practice, 144 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 62, 63-64 (1987)
(A study of a strict-security facility for criminally insane men revealed that 39
competency hearings were conducted during a one-year period. Only four patients, i.e.,
10.3%, were found competent.); Zito, New York Under Rivers, supra note 11, at 905-06
(A study of all New York state adult psychiatric and forensic facilities revealed that for
the 49,408 patients admitted, 358 competency hearings were conducted during a one-year
period. Only 32 patients, i.e., 8.9%, were found competent.); Zito, One Year Under
Rivers, supra note 11, at 297-98, 300 (A study of a large state psychiatric facility
revealed that for the 2328 patients in residence at the start of the study or admitted
during the study, 15 competency hearings were conducted during a one-year period.
Only two patients, i.e., 13.3%, were found competent.).
In jurisdictions that use a medical decisionmaker review model, most refusals of
treatment are overridden and most patients are treated involuntarily. See Paul S.
Appelbaum & Steven K. Hoge, The Right to Refuse Treatment: What the Research
Reveals, 4 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 279, 288-90 (1986) (discussing studies).
80. See, e.g., Binder & McNiel, supra note 11, at 353-54, 357 (Court decisions do
not take into account the realities of severe mental disorder and the benefits of
psychotropic medication. Patients receive inappropriate or incomplete treatment when
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few studies, the researchers state the doctors' reasons for recommending
treatment over their patients' objections81 and/or the patients' reasons

they are found competent to refuse treatment. Additionally, in some situations, doctors
may not even contest a patient's medication refusal if they believe the patient will be
found competent at a hearing.); Ciccone et al., supra note 11, at 210-11 (Court hearings
required an average of 31 days to resolve at the private hospital and 68 days to resolve
at the public hospital. The legal expense to the private hospital is over $2000 per
hearing. Two clinicians and an ethicist, who reviewed patient charts at the public
hospital, found no patients who benefited from the hearing requirement.); Cournos et al.,
supra note 11, at 855 (Court hearings are costly and require staff time. Judges almost
always defer to physicians to make treatment decisions.); DeLand & Borenstein, supra
note 11, at 41 (Each competency hearing required approximately six hours of a
psychiatrist's time, and each psychiatrist interviewed expressed the belief that the
physician-patient relationship was adversely affected by the hearing process.);
Farnsworth, supra note 11, at 38-41 (Judicial review significantly delayed the beginning
of treatment for patients found incompetent-an average of 80 additional days. The
financial impact of holding patients for 80 days without treatment is enormous.); Hoge
et al., supra note 11, at 955-56 (Delay in preparing petitions and awaiting judicial
hearings prolonged hospitalization, increased patient morbidity, increased the number of
patient assaults and disruption of the therapeutic milieu, and diverted clinical staff time.);
Hoge et al., supra note 79, at 168 {The cost of 350 hearings was estimated at $1 million
including the time of the judge, lawyers, and doctors.); Miller et al., supra note 11, at
1 I 5-17 (Costs of hearings include delays in treatment and staff time required for
hearings. The willingness of courts to accept telephone testimony eliminated staff travel
time and time waiting in court for the case to be called.); Schouten & Gutheil, supra
note 11, at 1349-51 (In fiscal year 1985, the legislature appropriated $364,000 and in
fiscal year 1986, the legislature appropriated an additional $824,000 to fund the
personnel costs of conducting hearings. Noneconomic costs include damage to the
therapeutic relationship and the suffering of patients when treatment is delayed. Delays
of 8 to 10 weeks were common.); Veliz & James, supra note 79, at 63-66 (Court
hearings are extremely time-consuming and cumbersome. The waiting period between
petitioning for a hearing and the hearing itself averaged 4.5 months. Each hearing
requires an enormous investment of professional time.); Zito, New York Under Rivers,
supra note 11, at 907-08 (The court-review procedure reduces the likelihood of achieving
the clinical goal of compliance with psychotropic medication regimens. Court hearings
are inefficient; the delay in scheduling and holding hearings averaged slightly more than
one month. When patients were found incompetent, courts simply agreed with requested
medication orders, failing to tailor therapy narrowly to individual patients' clinical
needs.); Zito, One Year Under Rivers, supra note 11, at 300 {The median time from a
request for a court hearing to a court decision was 35 days.).
81. See, e.g., Cournos et al., supra note 11, at 853-54 {The primary reasons for
requesting treatment were severe mental illness with regression in 33% of the cases,
severe mental illness without regression in 29% of the cases, and serious untreated
medical illness in 10% of the cases.); DeLand & Borenstein, supra note 11, at 41
(Psychiatrists testified that patients were incompetent because the patients denied their
illnesses, were unable to recognize the benefits of the medication or the dangers of
refusing treatment, or were so delusional and disorganized that they could not make
rational judgments about the medication.); Hoge et al., supra note 11, at 951 (When
asked to identify patients' reasons for refusing medication, physicians identified
psychotic or idiosyncratic reasons in 49% of the cases; transferential problems, anger
toward the clinician, or other interpersonal issues in 11 % of the cases; and side effects
of medication in 7% of the cases.); Veliz & James, supra note 79, at 64 (Psychiatrists
testified that patients lacked competence for the following reasons: the patient is not
rational because of his mental illness, the patient becomes psychotic and violent when
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for refusing treatment. 82 In these studies, the researchers either report
their own assessment of patient reasons for refusal, 83 or fail to identify

he does not take medication, the patient does not acknowledge his mental illness, or the
patient does not understand the benefits of medication.); Zito, One Year Under Rivers,
supra note 11, at 299 (Psychiatrists requesting competency hearings targeted the
following symptoms for treatment with medication: violence/assaultiveness in 40% of
the cases; refusal to eat in 20% of the cases; schizophrenic symptoms such as delusions,
hallucinations, and disordered thinking in I 0% of the cases; refusal of medical treatment
in 10% of the cases; and depression/suicide risk in 10% of the cases.).
82. See, e.g., Hoge et al., supra note 11, at 951 (After interviewing patients who
refused medication, researchers characterized patients' reasons as follows: 35% refused
because of side effects from the medication, 30% refused for reasons that overtly
reflected psychotic or idiosyncratic thought processes, 21 % denied being mentally ill,
and 12% claimed the medication was ineffective.); Miller et al., supra note 11, at 111
(Of 91 patients who refused medication, the reasons for refusal included denial of illness
in 69.2% of the cases, assertion of legal rights in 26.4% of the cases, complaints about
side effects in 15.4% of the cases, use of medication refusal as a bargaining tool with
staff over other issues in 7.7% of the cases, too disorganized to refuse or consent in
3.3% of the cases, assertion that medication had not helped in the past in 1.1 % of the
cases, and assertion that patient didn't want the medication in 1.1 % of the cases.); Zito,
One Year Under Rivers, supra note 11, at 299-300 (As recorded by the treating
psychiatrists, patients refused treatment for the following reasons: paranoid belief that
the medication was poisonous in 35% of the cases; denial of the need for medication and
the belief that they were not mentally ill in 25% of the cases; side effects from previous
administration of medication such as acute dystonic reaction, dry mouth, and
sleeplessness in 10% of the cases; unconfirmed religious restrictions in 10% of the cases;
no reason offered in 15% of the cases.). See also Schwartz et al., supra note 11, at
1050, 1052 (During a four-month study period, researchers identified 25 patients on two
inpatient psychiatric units of a university-affiliated hospital who had been involuntarily
treated in a medical emergency or as a result of a court order. At discharge, 24 of these
patients were asked why they had refused treatment. Patients denied the need for
medication in 33.3% of the cases, were severely confused or exhibited psychotic ideation
in 29.2% of the cases, expressed concerns about side effects in 20.8% of the cases, and
gave no reason or did not know in 16. 7% of the cases.).
Some researchers have studied reasons for patients' refusal of psychotropic medication
unrelated to whether the refusals resulted in court hearings of the patients' competence
or other reviews of their decisions. See, e.g., Appelbaum & Gutheil, "Rotting With
Their Rights On", supra note 5, at 310-11; Appelbaum & Hoge, supra note 79, at 28486 (discussing studies).
83. See, e.g., Hoge et al., supra note 11, at 950 (Researchers interviewed patients.);
Schwartz et al., supra note 11, at 1052 (Researchers interviewed patients.); Zito, One
Year Under Rivers, supra note 11, at 299-300 (Treating psychiatrists recorded patients'
reasons for refusing treatment. Researchers then classified the reasons as meritorious or
nonmeritorious. Although illness-based reasons were considered nonmeritorious, a selfreported depression was categorized as meritorious. Unconfirmed religious restrictions
were categorized as nonmeritorious.).
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the source of the stated reasons. 84 When researchers characterize
patients' reasons, biased reporting is a significant possibility. 85
Since 1990, I have served as a law-trained decisionmaker in hearings
to determine mental patients' competence to refuse psychotropic
medication. Each hearing was electronically recorded, and I wrote a
case report within a few hours after each hearing was completed. A case
report contains: statistical data on the patient; summaries of the facility
representative's testimony, the cross-examination by the public defender,
and the patient's testimony; my decision and the reasons for my
decision; and any additional observations that I considered noteworthy.
This article reports on, and analyzes, my experience. Thus, unlike other
empirical studies, this article focuses on the evidence presented in each
hearing, the judgment of the decisionmaker, and the decisionmaker's
perspective on the process itself.
In Part II, I discuss the California court decision imposing a judicial
hearing requirement, San Diego Superior Court rules implementing the
decision, and legislation codifying the hearing requirement but modifying
procedural safeguards. In Part III, I present and analyze data on the
competency cases I decided, focusing on factors that may have affected
my decisionmaking. I also compare my hearing results with those of
other decisionmakers.
I discuss attitudinal problems of treating
physicians in relating to patients as autonomous human beings, in
understanding and accepting the legal requirement of informed consent,
and in cooperating with and participating in the competency hearing
process. Generally, these problems are not statistically quantifiable.
However, they do impact the hearings by altering the evidence available
to the decisionmaker. In my judgment, they also support a policy
judgment requiring that competency hearings be conducted by lawtrained decisionmakers. In Part IV, I suggest how this model may be
implemented without undue cost or burden. I caution, however, that
although these hearings will provide due process for patients who
participate in them, they will provide only the illusion of due process for
patients who do not. Appropriate measures are needed to assure that
consent obtained from competent patients is truly voluntary and
informed.
84. See Miller et al., supra note 11, at 111. The authors merely state the reasons
for patients' refusals without attributing any source of those reasons. Some of the
reasons presented, however, suggest that the source was not the patients themselves, but
the assessment of patients' reasons by either the treating physicians or the researchers.
For example, some patients were reported to use a "medication refusal as a bargaining
tool with staff over issues unrelated to medication." Id. Other patients were
characterized as "too disorganized to be considered competent to refuse or consent." Id.
85. Appelbaum & Hoge, supra note 79, at 285.
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IL RIESE V. ST. MARY'S HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL CENTER: 86 THE
CASE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

In June, 1985, Eleanor Riese entered St. Mary's Hospital as a
voluntary patient. Prior to this admission, she had been treated for
chronic schizophrenia with Mellaril®, 87 a psychotropic medication. As
a result of that earlier treatment, her bladder had been severely
damaged. 88 Nevertheless, the treating doctor prescribed Mellaril®, and
she consented to its use. Although she complained of dizziness and dry
mouth and stated that she was receiving too much medication, the
dosage was not reduced. When she protested and refused medication,
she was forcibly injected and committed as an involuntary patient. 89
Ms. Riese brought a class action on behalf of patients involuntarily
committed under California's seventy-two-hour treatment and evaluation
detention90 or its fourteen-day intensive treatment certification. 91 She
sought a court order requiring that patients' informed consent be
obtained before psychotropic mediation can be administered. 92
Although plaintiffs lost at the trial level, the California Court of
Appeal reversed, upholding the patients' right to exercise informed
consent in nonemergency situations. 93 The court began its analysis by
discussing the benefits and detriments of psychotropic medication. The
court acknowledged that psychotropic medications "are the principal and
single most effective treatment" for acute psychosis.94 Properly used,
the primary effect of psychotropic medications is a normalizing one,
86. 243 Cal. Rptr. 241 (Ct. App. 1987), review granted, 751 P.2d 893, 245 Cal.
Rptr. 627 (Cal. 1988), review dismissed and court of appeal opinion ordered published,
774 P.2d 698, 259 Cal. Rptr. 669 (Cal. 1989), 209 Cal. App. 3d 1303, 271 Cal. Rptr.
199 (1987)(republished opinion).
87. Mellaril® is the Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corporation brand of thioridazine
HCL. PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 2168 (49th ed. 1995).
88. Ms. Riese died on April 6, 1991. She was 47 years old. Although no autopsy
was performed, her death was attributed to renal failure resulting from the cumulative
effects of medication she. had received over her lifetime. Telephone Interview with
Colette Hughes, Protection and Advocacy, Inc., co-counsel for Eleanor Riese in Riese
v. St. Mary's Hosp. & Medical Ctr. (July 11, 1994).
89. Riese, 209 Cal. App. 3d at 1308-09, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 201-02.
90. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE§ 5150 (West 1984).
91. Id. § 5250 (West Supp. 1995).
92. Riese, 209 Cal. App. 3d at 1308, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 201.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1310, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 203.
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alleviating symptoms by restoring the brain's chemical balance. The
medications do not brainwash the patient by creating new thoughts or
ideas or by permanently inhibiting thought generation. 95 Nevertheless,
these powerful drugs act upon thought processes and are in that sense
"mind altering."96 Further, psychotropic medications are not always
used properly. Abuses have been documented, especially in understaffed
and underfunded public mental hospitals. 97 Psychotropic medications
also produce adverse side effects,98 which the court characterized as
"equally well recognized" as "their universally accepted bene:fits."99 ·
Many of these side effects are reversible when the medication is
terminated or given at a reduced dosage, but one, tardive dyskinesia, is
an irreversible neurological disorder. In its most progressed state,
tardive dyskinesia interferes with all of the patient's motor activity. 100
Turning to the plaintiffs' claim, the court discussed and relied upon
numerous statutory provisions to support the requirement of informed
consent by involuntarily committed mental patients. 101 Although the
court withheld judgment on whether constitutional bases also support
informed consent in this context, 102 it noted that the right of persons
not adjudicated incompetent to give or withhold consent to medical

95. Id. (discussing Appelbaum & Gutheil, "Rotting With Their Rights On", supra
note 5, at 308); see also Thomas G. Gutheil & Paul S. Appelbaum, "Mind Control, "
"Synthetic Sanity, " "Artificial Competence, " and Genuine Confusion: Legally Relevant
Effects of Antipsychotic Medication, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 77 (1983). "Available
evidence suggests . . . that [psychotropic] medications lack the subtle, deleterious effects
on mental functioning attributed to them .... " Id. at 119.
96. Riese, 209 Cal. App. 3d at 1311, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 203. Winick has argued
that because psychotropic medications directly affect mental processes and intellectual
functioning, their proposed administration over a patient's objection demands first
amendment scrutiny. Winick, A First Amendment Perspective, supra note 9, at 69-80;
Bruce J. Winick, The Right to Refuse Psychotropic Medication: Current State of the
Law and Beyond, in A.B.A. COMM'N ON MENTALLY DISABLED, supra note 8, at 7, 9-12.
97. Riese, 209 Cal. App. 3d at 1311, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 203.
98. Winick has asserted that the label "side effects" is misleading and denigrates
the impact of these undesirable consequences on patients. "Although these side effects
are unintended, they are intrinsic to the drugs' benevolent properties and should not be
trivialized, particularly since patients frequently experience them to be distressing enough
to outweigb the drugs' positive clinical effects." Winick, A First Amendment
Perspective, supra note 9, at 70.
99. Riese, 209 Cal. App. 3d at 1311, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 203.
100. Id. at 1311-12, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 203-04. Tardive dyskinesia is."manifested
by involuntary, rhythmic and grotesque movements of the face, mouth, tongue, jaw and
extremities." Id. at 1311, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 203. Although the condition generally
occurs after prolonged treatment with psychotropic medication, it can occasionally occur
after only brief treatment. Id. at 1312, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 204. For a discussion of the
temporary and permanent side effects of psychotropic medication, see Cichon, supra note
9, at 297-310, and sources discussed therein.
101. Riese, 209 Cal. App. 3d at 1308, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 201.
102. Id.
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treatment 103 is protected both by the common law and by the constitutional right to privacy. 104 California courts uphold decisions by
competent adults to refuse life-sustaining treatment. 105 Logically, they
cannot reject non-life threatening medication-refusal decisions by
competent mental patients.
If incompetence to make treatment decisions is a prerequisite for
involuntary commitment, and if the incompetence adjudication is
subsumed in the commitment decision, then involuntarily committed
mental patients would not enjoy a right to refuse treatment. 106 California statutes, however, do not so provide. Typically, the involuntary
commitment process originates without any judicial oversight. A
seventy-two-hour evaluation and treatment detention merely requires a
probable cause belief by a peace officer or evaluation facility staff
member that the person detained is, as result of mental disorder, either
a danger to others, to himself or herself, or gravely disabled. 107
Following a seventy-two-hour detention, the patient can be detained for
fourteen days on an intensive treatment certification signed by a treating
An administrative hearing, conducted by a courtphysician. 108
appointed commissioner, referee, or certification review hearing officer,
The
is statutorily mandated during that fourteen-day period. 109
decisionmaker determines whether probable cause exists to believe that
the commitment criteria are established but does not determine whether

103. Because treatment with psychotropic medication profoundly affects mind and
body in both intended and unintended ways, the court declared that the right to refuse
psychotropic medication "clearly falls within the recognized right to refuse medical
treatment." Id. at 1318, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 208 .
104. Id. at 1317-18, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 207-08.
105 . Id. at 1317-18, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 208 (discussing Bartling v. Superior Court,
163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 195, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 225 (1984)).
106. See supra text accompanying notes 20-27.
107. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE§ 5150 (West 1984). "Gravely disabled" is defined
as "[a] condition in which a person, as a result of a mental disorder, is unable to provide
for his or her basic personal needs for food, clothing, or shelter." Id. § 5008(h)(l)(A)
(West Supp. 1995).
108. Id. § 5250 (West Supp. 1995). A person who has been evaluated under a 72hour detention may be certified for 14 days of intensive treatment if the professional
staff of the evaluating facility has found that the person is, as a result of mental disorder,
either a danger to others, to•himself or herself, or gravely disabled. Id.
109. Id. §§ 5254-5256.8. The. hearing is conducted within four days of the
beginning of the intensive treatment certification. Id. § 5256.
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the person certified is competent to refuse treatment. 110 Even if a
mental health conservatorship is subsequently established for a gravely
disabled patient, 111 the conservatorship does not, of itself, constitute an
adjudication of incompetence. 112 A conservatee can be compelled to
accept treatment to alleviate the condition of grave disability only if the
conservatorship court authorizes the conservator to order such treatment.113 Although the statute does not specifically require an adjudication of incompetence before the conservatee loses the right to refuse
treatment, the Riese court noted that the conservatorship court must
make the "appropriate findings" before authorizing the conservator to act
as a surrogate decisionmaker. 114
The Riese court cited five statutes that confirm the involuntarily
committed patient's status as presumptively competent to give or
withhold informed consent. 115 A statute that defines informed consent
and prohibits coercion by physicians in obtaining consent also provides
that a confined person is not to be deemed incapable of refusing
treatment solely because he or she was diagnosed as mentally disordered.116 Another statute declares: "No person may be presumed to be
incompetent because he or she has been evaluated or treated for mental
disorder . . . regardless of whether such evaluation or treatment was
voluntarily or involuntarily received." 117 Three other statutes identify
the extent to which rights enjoyed by nonpatients are retained by
involuntarily committed patients. One declares that mentally disordered
persons "have the same legal rights and responsibilities guaranteed all

110. Id. §§ 5256.5 (West 1984), 5256.6 (West Supp. 1995). I have reported on my
experience as a certification review hearing officer. Grant H. Morris, Civil Commitment
Decisionmaking: A Report on One Decisionmaker's Experience, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.
291 (1988).
111. For a critique of California mental health conservatorship law and the process
by which conservatorships are established, see Grant H. Morris, Conservatorship for the
"Gravely Disabled": California's Nondeclaration ofNonindependence, 15 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 201 (1978).
112. Riese v. St. Mary's Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 209 Cal. App. 3d 1303, 1313, 271
Cal. Rptr. 199, 204 (1987) (republished opinion); see also Conservatorship of Moore,
185 Cal. App. 3d 718, 732, 229 Cal. Rptr. 875, 884 (1986) ("[C]onservatees are not, by
reason of their conservatorship, automatically considered incompetent ....").
113. CAL. WELP. & INST. CODE§ 5358(b) (West Supp. 1995).
114. Riese, 209 Cal. App. 3d at 1313, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 204.
115. Id. at 1313-17, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 205-07.
116. CAL. WELP. & INST. CODE§ 5326.S(d) (West 1984). Although the decision
in Riese was unanimous, one justice wrote a concurring opinion to express his belief that
this statute should serve as the sole basis for the court's decision. A discussion of other
statutes was said to be scholarly and interesting but unnecessary to the decision and to
the narrow statutory basis upon which it rests. Riese, 209 Cal. App. 3d at 1324-25, 271
Cal. Rptr. at 213 (Benson, J., concurring).
117. CAL. WELP. & INST. CODE§ 5331 (West 1984).
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other persons by the Federal Constitution and laws, and the Constitution
and laws of the State of California unless specifically limited by federal
or state law or regulations." 118 The other two declare that involuntarily
committed patients shall retain all rights 119 and shall not forfeit any
rights 120 unless specifically stated to the contrary in the statutes. The
court rejected the hospital's argument that the legislature's failure to
articulate an explicit right to refuse psychotropic medication was
intended to exclude such right: "[T]hroughout the statutory scheme the
Legislature repeatedly admonishes that the failure . . . to explicitly
confer a particular right upon mentally [disordered] persons cannot
provide a basis upon which to deny it. " 121
The court also rejected the hospital's argument that if the right to
refuse treatment exists, the court's role is merely to assure that
professional judgment has been exercised in the decision to medicate
patients. 122 Rather, the Riese court declared that the role of the court
is to determine whether the patient is competent to refuse medication
despite his or her mental disorder. Quoting the New York Court of
Appeals, the Riese court asserted that the determination of competence
to refuse medication "is uniquely a judicial, not a medical function." 123
California statutes provide for an evidentiary hearing whenever a
mental patient's competence to consent to convulsive therapy is in
question. 124 Appellate courts interpreting those statutes require that the
patient's incapacity be established by clear and convincing evidence. 125
The Riese court held that the statutory provisions governing the
determination of the patient's competence to consent to convulsive

118. Id. § 5325.1.
119. Id. § 5327.
120. Id. § 5005.
121. Riese v. St. Mary's Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 209 Cal. App. 3d 1303, 1316-17,
271 Cal. Rptr. 199, 207 (1987) (republished opinion).
122. Id. at 1320-21, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 210.
123. Id. at 1321, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 210 (quoting Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485,496,
495 N.E.2d 337, 343, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74, 80 (1986)).
124. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.7 (West 1984).
125. Conservatorship of Waltz, 180 Cal. App. 3d 722,733,227 Cal. Rptr. 436,442
(1986); Lillian F. v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 314,324,206 Cal. Rptr. 603,609
(1984). In Lillian F., the court noted that although the state has an interest in insuring
appropriate treatment for those who are incapable of understanding its benefit, "[i]t has
an equal interest in insuring that such a serious and intrusive procedure is not forced on
a [patient] who does not want it and who is simply in disagreement with his [or her]
physicians." Lillian F., 160 Cal. App. 3d at 323, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 608.
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therapy were equally appropriate to a determination of the patient's
competence to refuse psychotropic medication. 126 Specifically, the
Riese court imposed a requirement that the patient's incapacity to refuse
medication be established by proof that is clear and convincing. 127
Borrowing liberally from a text for psychiatrists prepared by Thomas
Gutheil, M.D., and Paul Appelbaum, M.D., 128 the Riese court identified
three factors that judges should consider in assessing the competence of
a patient's medication refusal. First, the judge should consider "whether
the patient is aware of his or her situation." 129 The court offered one
example of such awareness: If the judge believes that the patient is
psychotic, does the patient acknowledge the psychosis? 130 The court's
singular example seems unfortunate. Doctors often assume that patients
who do not acknowledge their disorder are unable to appreciate the
benefits of medication to treat that disorder and are, therefore, incompe-

126. Riese, 209 Cal. App. 3d at 1322, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 211.
127. Id.
128. THOMAS G. GUTHEIL & PAUL S. APPELBAUM, CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF
PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 219-20 (1982). Subsequent to the Riese decision, this book
was revised. In the revised edition, standards for specific competence appear at pages
221-23. PAUL S. APPELBAUM & THOMAS G. GUTHEIL, CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF
PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 221-23 (2d ed. 1991). For other discussions of competency
assessment factors and "tests" of competency, see Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso,
Assessing Patients' Capacities to Consent to Treatment, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1635,
1635-36 (1988) (Competence involves four related skills: to communicate choices, to
understand relevant information, to appreciate the situation and its consequences, and to
manipulate information rationally.); Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Appelbaum, Mentally Ill
and Non-Mentally-Ill Patients' Abilities to Understand Informed Consent Disclosures for
Medication, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 377,378 (1991) (Study was conducted measuring
ability to understand information relevant for decision making about medication.); Loren
H. Roth et al., Tests of Competency to Consent to Treatment, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
279, 280-82 (1977) (Tests of competency fall into 5 categories: evidencing a choice,
making a "reasonable" choice, making a choice based on "rational" reasons, ability to
understand, and actual understanding); Elyn R. Saks, Competency to Refuse Psychotropic Medication: Three Alternatives to the Law's Cognitive Standard, 47 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 689, 691-93, 757-58 (1993) (This article discusses three noncognitive standards for
judging competency: a "different person" standard, a "volitional impairment" standard,
and a "product of mental illness" standard. The author concludes that the law's
treatment competency standard, which focuses on cognition, is superior.); Elyn R. Saks,
Competency to Refase Treatment, 69 N.C. L. REV. 945, 949-50 (1991) (A competency
standard must: identify the abilities that are necessary to making decisions that deserve
deference, protect a person's expression of unconventional values and beliefs, and
designate as incompetent a reasonably small class of individuals who are under the
pervasive influence of the irrational and the unconscious.). For a more comprehensive
listing of legal and mental health professional literature addressing competency to make
treatment decisions, see id. at 948 n.9.
129. Riese, 209 Cal. App. 3d at 1322, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 211.
130. Id.
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tent. 131 Although denial of mental disorder may be a factor in assessing a person's awareness of the situation, it is certainly not the exclusive
measure. Even if a person denies having a mental disorder, he or she
is aware of the situation if the person knows that he or she is involuntarily confined in a mental hospital, that the doctors have diagnosed the
person as having a mental disorder, that the doctors have prescribed
psychotropic medication to treat the disorder, that the doctors believe the
medication will benefit the person by relieving symptoms, and that the
person is refusing the medication because of concern about medication
side effects that have been previously experienced.
Second, the judge should consider "whether the patient is able to
understand the benefits and the risks of, as well as the alternatives to, the
proposed intervention." 132 Here, too, the Riese court gave an example.
Even if the patient is acutely psychotic, the patient should understand
that dystonic reactions are a risk, that resolution of the psychotic episode
is a benefit, and that psychotherapy, milieu therapy and possibly
electroconvulsive therapy are alternatives. 133 This example, suggested
by Drs. Gutheil and Appelbaum, 134 appears helpful. Nevertheless, one
can question whether treating physicians even consider the suggested
alternative therapies as viable substitutes for psychotropic medication.
The Riese court admitted, for example, that electroconvulsive therapy is
almost never prescribed during the seventy-two-hour and fourteen-day
treatment periods. 135
Third, the judge should assess the patient's ability "to understand and
to knowingly and intelligently evaluate the information required to be
given patients whose informed consent is sought (§ 5326.2) and
otherwise participate in the treatment decision by means of rational
thought processes." 136 The court cited with approval a suggestion
offered by Drs. Gutheil and Appelbaum that the patient should be
assumed to be utilizing rational thought processes in the absence of

131. GUTHEIL & APPELBAUM, supra note 128, at 219 ("Patients who are required
to make a decision about psychiatric treatment but who deny the existence of a psychotic
state or of their severe depression cannot be considered to be competent to decide about
means of ameliorating their condition.").
132. Riese, 209 Cal. App. 3d at 1322, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 211.
133. Id. at 1322-23, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 211-12.
134. GUTHEIL & APPELBAUM, supra note 128, at 219.
135. Riese, 209 Cal. App. 3d at 1323 n.17, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 212 n.17.
136. Id. at 1323, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 212.
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proof clearly linking delusional or hallucinatory perceptions to the
individual's ultimate decision. 137
An assessment of a patient's ability to understand information begins
with the information that the patient has been given. Although the Riese
court did not itself discuss what information must be provided, it
incorporated, by specific reference, California Welfare and Institutions
Code section 5326.2. That statute itemizes information that must be
given to the patient in a· clear and explicit manner· in order to obtain a
voluntary informed consent.· Among the required disclosures are: (1) the
nature and seriousness of the patient's mental disorder that serves as a
reason for treatment; (2) the nature of the proposed treatment, including
probable frequency and duration; (3) the degree and duration of
improvement or remission anticipated with or without such treatment; (4)
the nature, degree, duration, and the probability of side effects and
significant risks of the proposed treatment and how and to what extent
they may be controlled, if at al1; 138 (5) the reasonable alternative
treatments, and why the physician is recommending this particular
treatment; and (6) that the patient has the right to accept or refuse the
proposed treatment, and that if the patient consents, he or she has the
right to revoke the consent for any reason and at any time prior to or
between treatments. 139
After discussing the competency assessment factors, the Riese court
considered the results of the adjudicatory process. If the patient is found
competent to give informed consent and refuses to do so, the patient
may not be medicated involuntarily. 140 If the patient is found incompetent to give informed consent, and the patient is being detained on a
seventy-two-hour or fourteen-day treatment hold, the patient may be
required to accept psychotropic. medication that has been medically
prescribed. 141 The doctor is empowered to impose treatment without

137. Id. (citing GUTHEIL & APPELBAUM, supra note 128, at 220).
138. Because tardive dyskinesia is a known, significant side effect of psychotropic
medication, its risk must be disclosed. The statutory requirement precludes the
suggestion of Drs. Gutheil and Appelbaum that information about tardive dyskinesia
should be withheld by doctors until the acute episode of their patients' mental disorders
has been resolved. See GUTHEIL & APPELBAUM, supra note 128, at 219 .
139. CAL. WELP. & INST. CODE § 5326.2 (West 1984). This statute was enacted
in 1976 as one of several statutes designed to place limitations on the use of psychosurgery and convulsive therapies. Act of Sept. 20, 1976, ch. 1109, § 3.5, 1976 Cal. Stat.
4992, 4994-95. Thus, the statute contains some disclosure requirements that are
particularly applicable to those treatments. For example, disclosure is required of: (1)
the probability and duration of memory loss, including its irreversibility, and (2) the
division of opinion that exists regarding the efficacy of the proposed treatment. Id.
140. Riese, 209 Cal. App. 3d at 1323, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 212.
141. Id.
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obtaining the approval of a court, guardian, or other surrogate
decisionmaker. If the incompetent patient has been placed on a mental
health conservatorship in which the conservator may authorize the
patient's confinement and treatment for renewable periods of one
year, 142 consent must be obtained· from the patient's conservator. 143
The court noted that surrogate decisionmakers should attempt to
ascertain the choice the patient would have made if the patient were
competent, 144 and if it is not possible to do so, the surrogate should be
guided in the decision by the patient's best interests. 145
The Riese court's refusal to require a surrogate decisionmaker for
incompetent patients on seventy-two-hour or fourteen-day treatment
holds is surprising. In other states, courts have required not only a
judicial determination of the patient's competence, but also, a
judge's 146 or guardian's approval 147 before treatment may be imposed

142. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5358 (West Supp. 1995), 5361 (West 1984).
143. Riese, 209 Cal. App. 3d at 1323, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 212.
144. Id. (quoting Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1021, 195 Cal.
Rptr. 484, 493 (1983)). For example, the patient's concerns about medication side
effects may have been expressed before the patient became incompetent:
145. Id.
146. See, e.g., People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961, 973-74 (Colo. 1985) ("If the court
is convinced of the patient's mental incompetency, it must then determine whether the
proposed treatment is necessary either to prevent a significant and likely long-term
deterioration in the patient's mental condition or to prevent the likelihood of the patient
causing serious harm to himself or others in the institution." If less intrusive alternatives
to psychotropic medication are available, nonconsensual treatment should be denied.);
In re Boyd, 403 A.2d 744, 750 (D.C. 1979) ("The court, as surrogate for the
incompetent, is to determine as best it can what choice that individual, if competent,
would make with respect to medical procedures."); Rogers v. Commissioner ofDep't of
Mental Health, 390 Mass. 489, 504, 458 N.E.2d 308, 318 (1983) ("We conclude that,
if a patient is declared incompetent, a court must make the original substituted judgment
treatment decision and should approve a substituted judgment treatment plan. . . . The
judge may delegate to a guardian the power to monitor the treatment process to ensure
that the substituted judgment treatment plan is followed."); Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d
485, 497-98, 495 N.E.2d 337, 344, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74, 81 (1986) ("If ... the court
concludes that the patient lacks the capacity to determine the course of his own
treatment, the court must determine whether the proposed treatment is narrowly tailored
to give substantive effect to the patient's liberty interest, taking into consideration all
relevant circumstances, including the patient's best interests, the benefits to be gained
from the treatment, the adverse side effects associated with the treatment and any less
intrusive alternative treatments.").
Research discloses, however, that judges who find patients incompetent almost always
find that they would choose to accept medication if they were competent to decide.
Veliz & James, supra note 79, at 64. The substituted judgment requirement has not been
an effective barrier to coerced treatment of incompetent patients.
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on an incompetent patient. 148 Those courts have not distinguished
between incompetent patients on short-term treatment holds and those on
longer-term or indefinite treatment holds. To support the requirement of
judicial determinations of competence, the Riese court noted that "the
forcible administration of powerful mind altering drugs ... involves
moral and ethical considerations not solely within the purview of the
medical profession." 149 Nevertheless, the Riese court was unwilling to
consider whether those moral and ethical considerations are equally
applicable to medication decisions for incompetent patients and should
also require court oversight. Without extensive discussion, the Riese
court merely instructed competency court judges not to decide medical
questions, such as whether the prescribed medication was really needed
or was the least drastic therapy available. 150 As previously discussed, 151 the Supreme Court's decision in Riggins may well necessitate judicial consideration of less intrusive alternatives to psychotropic
medication for all mental patients, whether competent or incompetent.
In 1988, the California Supreme Court granted review of the Riese
court of appeal decision. 152 A year later, the California Supreme Court
dismissed the review, remanded the case, and ordered the court of appeal
decision published. 153 The court of appeal decision was republished
in 1990. 154
In response to the Riese decision, courts throughout California began
conducting competency hearings. On March 1, 1990, the San Diego
County Superior Court promulgated court rules establishing procedures
to implement the Riese hearing requirements. 155 The court rules

147. See, e.g., In re K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747, 751-52 (Okla. 1980) ("[I]nvoluntary
treatment would require instigation of a judicial proceeding to have [the patient] declared
legally incompetent and appointment of a guardian to make an informed decision for
her.").
148. The Riese court specifically declined to follow the procedures for incompetent
patients utilized in other states. Riese, 209 Cal. App. 3d at 1322 n.16, 271 Cal. Rptr.
at 211 n. 16.
149. Id. at 1324, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 212-13.
ISO. Id. at 1322, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 211.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 58-72.
152. Riese v. St. Mary's Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 751 P.2d 893,245 Cal. Rptr. 627
(Cal. 1988).
153. Riese v. St. Mary's Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 774 P.2d 698, 259 Cal. Rptr. 669
(Cal. 1989).
154. Riese v. St. Mary's Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 209 Cal. App. 3d 1303, 271 Cal.
Rptr. 199 (1987). Although the republished opinion uses the date of the opinion as
originally issued, the republication occurred in a West advance sheet dated August 10,
1990. 271 Cal. Rptr. No. 2 (August IO, 1990).
155. SAN DIEGO SUPER. CT. Rs. 2.124-.142 (The rules are titled "Determination of
Capacity of Mental• Health Patient to Give or Withhold Informed Consent to Administration of Antipsychotic Medication.").
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require competency hearings for treatment-refusing patients who are
detained on seventy-two-hour holds, fourteen-day holds, and temporary
conservatorships. 156 The decision to include persons on temporary
conservatorships is warranted. In establishing a temporary conservatorship, the court determines whether the patient is able to provide for food,
clothing, and shelter, not whether the patient is competent to refuse
medication. 157 Additionally, temporary conservatorships are established upon the ex parte judgment of the court. No adversarial hearing
is conducted on any issue. 1 8 A separate Riese hearing is needed to
provide temporary conservatees with their day in court on the treatment
competency issue.
The court rules require competency hearings for patients in public and
private hospitals. 159 This clarification seems appropriate. Although
the Riese defendant was a private facility, the Riese court did not
specifically limit its decision to patients in private facilities. As
authority for its decision, the court relied upon statutes that were equally
applicable to patients in private and public facilities.
In Riese, the court required a judicial determination of the patient's
incompetence before psychotropic medication can be administered
without informed consent. Riese, however, involved patients in
nonemergency situations. 160 A California statute authorizes the denial
of a patient's rights "for good cause" and requires the Director of Mental
Health to "adopt regulations specifying the conditions under which [a
patient's rights] may be denied." 161 .The regulation promulgated
pursuant to that statute permits the physician to take appropriate action
in an emergency-including the administration of antipsychotic
medication. 162 The regulation narrowly defines the situations in which

156. Id. R. 2.124.
157. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE§ 5352.1 (Westl984).
158. Id. § 5352.1. A temporary conservatorship expires when the court conducts
a hearing on the conservatorship petition or after 30 days if a conservatorship hearing
has not been conducted prior to that time. If the proposed conservatee demands a court
or jury trial on the issue of grave disability, the temporary conservatorship may be
extended until the issue is decided, but not longer than six months. Id.
159. SAN DIEGO SUPER. CT. R. 2.124.
160. Riese v. St. Mary's Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 209 Cal. App. 3d 1303, 1308, 271
Cal. Rptr. 199, 201 (1987) (republished opinion).
161. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326 (West 1984).
162. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 9, § 853 (1995). If psychotropic medication is
administered in an emergency, its administration is limited to "that which is required to
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a Riese hearing is not required: "An emergency exists when there is a
sudden marked change in the patient's condition so that action is
immediately necessary for the preservation of the life or the prevention
of serious bodily harm to the patient or others, and it is impracticable to
first obtain consent." 163 The term "antipsychotic medication" is
defined broadly to include all psychotropic medication used to treat
either psychotic or nonpsychotic symptoms of any serious mental
disorder. 164 The court rules repeat those definitions and interpret Riese
to impose a judicial hearing requirement only in nonemergency
situations. 165
The court rules provide for the treating physician to initiate the
hearing process by petitioning the court for a judicial determination of
the patient's capacity to give or withhold informed consent. 166 Whenever possible, the hearing is calendared within two court days. 167
Under the rules, the superior court appoints court commissioners who act
as judges pro tern to conduct the evidentiary hearings. 168 At each
hearing, a request is made to the parties to stipulate to the court
commissioner's designation as judge pro tern for all Riese hearing
purposes. If the parties stipulate, then the court commissioner is
empowered to make all :findings, conclusions, decisions, and orders in
the matter. If the parties do not stipulate, the hearing is set before the
superior court judge, who calendars the hearing within one court day of
the originally set date, whenever possible. 169

treat the emergency condition." Id.
The statute authorizing a 72-hour detention of dangerous or gravely disabled persons
without any court involvement is regarded by commentators as an emergency detention.
See, e.g., SAMUEL J. BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 101 {3d
ed. 1985); lngo Keilitz et al., A Study of Involuntary Civil Commitment in Los Angeles
County, 14 Sw. U. L. REV. 238, 247-49 (1984); Robert T. Roth et al., Into the Abyss:
Psychiatric Reliability and Emergency Commitment Statutes, 13 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
400, 412 n.42 (1973). However, the "emergency" authorizing such detention is not the
"emergency" authorizing involuntary treatment without a Riese hearing.
163. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 9, § 853 {1995).
164. Id. § 856; see supra note 2.
165. SAN DIEGO SUPER. CT. R. 2.125. The Riese court also cited the definitions
of "emergency" and "antipsychotic medication" promulgated in the administrative
regulations. Riese v. St. Mary's Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 209 Cal. App. 3d 1303, 1308
n.2, 1310, 271 Cal. Rptr. 199, 201 n.2, 202 (1987) (republished opinion) (citing CAL.
CODE REGS. tit. 9, §§ 853, 856 {1995)).
166. SAN DIEGO SUPER. CT. R. 2.126. The treating physician is required to
complete a document entitled "Petition and Declaration of Treating Physician Regarding
Capacity to Give or Withhold Informed Consent." Id. R. 2.127.
167. Id. R. 2.128.
168. Id. R. 2.131.
169. Id. R. 2.132.
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The policy of using court commissioners as judges in Riese hearings
is meritorious. It responds to the problem of delay frequently associated
with the requirement of judicial hearings. 170 When court commissioners are used, treatment_ refusal cases do not have to be calendared onto
already busy superior court dockets. Patients do not have to be
transported to and from court. Doctors do not have to waste valuable
time waiting for the case to.be called. Hearings can be held within two
court days of their request. The hearings can be, and are required by the
rules to be, held at the mental health facility where the patient is being
detained. 171 Because court commissioners decide the matter at the
conclusion of the hearing, 172 treatment can be initiated immediately for
those patients found incompetent. Thus, the use of court commissioners
assures that the judicial system is not unduly burdened, that hearings are
conducted without significant interruption in the daily routine of doctors
or patients, and that cases can be decided and decisions implemented
quickly.
.
The California Cons#tution empowers the legislature to provide for
trial courts to appoint "commissioners to perform subordinate judicial
duties." 173 The legislature authorized court commissioners to serve as
temporary judges when they are appointed for that purpose and "when
otherwise qualified so to act." 174 Court commissioners are required by
statute to be citizens of the United States and residents of California.
Courts may also impose a requirement that persons appointed as
commissioners be lawyers who have been admitted to practice in the
state. for a period of at least five years. 175
.
. In San Diego County, most of the court commissioners who conduct
administrative hearings to determine whether probable cause exists to
detain mental patients for fourteen days are not lawyers. Typically, their
professional backgrounds are in various clinical disciplines including
social work, rehabilitation counseling, and criminal justice administra-

170. See supra note 80.
171. SAN DIEGO SUPER. CT. R. 2.135. The rule requires hearings to be held in
surroundings that allow for quietness and a reasonable degree of confidentiality. Id.
172. Id. R. 2.141.
.
173. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 22.
174. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 259(e) (West Supp. 1995).
175. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 70142 (West 1976).
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tion. 176 Are these court commissioners eligible to serve as temporary
judges in competency hearings?
The Riese court required a judicial, not an administrative, determination of the patient's competence. 177 The decisionmaker must decide
whether clear and convincing evidence establishes the patient's
incapacity, 178 not merely whether probable cause exists to believe so.
To carefully weigh the evidence in a Riese case, a legal education is a
necessary prerequisite. While not all court commissioners need be
lawyers, only those court commissioners who are lawyers are qualified
to act as temporary judges. 179 In San Diego County, the eight court
commissioners appointed as temporary judges in competency hearings
were attorneys. 180
Ordinarily, court commissioners report their findings to the court
which approves, rejects, or modifies them or conducts a hearing on
exceptions. 181 If the parties stipulate that the court commissioner may
act as a temporary judge, however, the court commissioner is empowered to make a final determination of the case without any action or
oversight by the court that appointed the commissioner. The request for
the parties' stipulation, required by the court rules, confirms the "lawyers
only" qualification for competency hearings. The California Constitution
authorizes parties to stipulate to the trial and final determination of a
matter "by a temporary judge who is a member of the State Bar." 182
The Public Defender represents the patient in the Riese hearing, unless
the patient retains. his or her own attorney. 183 The physician and the

176. Morris, supra note 110, at 335.
177. Riese v. St. Mary's Hosp. &Medical Ctr., 209 Cal. App. 3d 1303, 1308, 1320,
271 Cal. Rptr. 199, 201, 210 (1987) (republished opinion).
178. Id. at 1322, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 211.
179. See People v. Tijerina, 1 Cal. 3d 41, 49,459 P.2d 680,685, 81 Cal. Rptr. 264,
269 (1969) (A court commissioner may not "act as a temporary judge if he is not
otherwise qualified so to act.' ").
180. Ironically, five of the eight were engaged in the private practice of law while
serving as court commissioners, in apparent violation of CAL. Gov'T CODE § 70142
(West 1976). At the time these individuals were appointed as court commissioners, the
superior court knew of their qualifications and understood that they intended to continue
their private practices while serving as court commissioners on an infrequent, as needed,
basis. The statutory prohibition may have been intended to preclude only full-time
commissioners from engaging in law practice, although the statute is not so limited in
its wording.
181. In re Edgar M., 14 Cal. 3d 727, 735, 537 P.2d 406, 412, 122 Cal. Rptr. 574,
580 (1975); see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE§ 259(t) (West Supp. 1995).
182. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 21. Ironically, one individual appointed as a court
commissioner/judge pro tern was not a member of the California Bar, although he was
a member of a bar in another state. The court knew of his qualifications at the time he
was appointed.
183. SAN DIEGO SUPER. CT. Rs. 2.129, 2.133.
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mental health facility may be, but are not required to be, formally
represented by counsel. 184 At the hearing, a facility representative
presents the petition and declaration, and any oral or documented
evidence. The facility representative must be a psychiatrist, psychologist, registered nurse, or social worker with at least a masters' degree.185 The court.rules do not require the treating physician to testify,
but they caution that the physician's absence may result in insufficient
evidence to support a finding of the patient's mental incapacity. 186
The rules provide for the patient's right to be present at the hearing and,
through counsel, to present evidence and to cross-examine witnesses.
The patient may, however, choose not to attend the hearing. 187
The court rules repeat Riese's placement of a clear-and-convincingevidence burden on the facility 18 and restate the three factors identified in Riese as the focus of a competency assessment. 189 In an
apparent misreading of the first factor, however, the court rule directs the
decisionmaker to consider the narrow issue of the patient's awareness of
his or her mental condition, not the broader issue of the patient's
awareness of his or her situation. 190
In addition to considering the evidence at the hearing, the judge pro
tern is authorized by the court rules to consider the patient's relevant
medical records. 191 At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge pro
tern is required to make a determination of the patient's capacity to give
or withhold informed consent. 192 The rules provide for confidentiality
of the proceedings and records of the proceedings. 193 .
In 1991, the California Legislature enacted statutes that codify, with
some significant modifications, Riese's competency hearing require-

184. Id. R. 2.134.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. R. 2.138.
188. Id. R. 2.136; see supra text accompanying notes 125-27.
189. Id. R. 2.137; see supra text accompanying notes 128-39.
190. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 129-31.
191. Id. R. 2.139.
192. Id. R. 2.141.
193. Id. R. 2.142. The proceedings are declared to be confidential as provided in
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5328 (West Supp. 1995). The statute provides for
confidentiality of "[a]ll information and records obtained in the course of providing
services ... to either voluntary or involuntary recipients of services . . . . " Id.
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ment. 194 The legislation declares that involuntarily committed mental
patients 195 have a right to refuse psychotropic medication. 196 Medication may be administered, however, to patients who do not exercise
their right following disclosure of the right and of statutorily mandated
information 197 about the probable effects and possible side effects of
the medication. 198 Although the legislation assures patients that they
will receive information that will support their decision to refuse
medication, for those patients who do not refuse, the legislation
eliminates their right to exercise informed consent. Nonprotesting
patients may be treated with psychotropic medication without giving a
competent consent. The Riese court's reliance on a statutory basis to
support an informed consent requirement is undermined by the 1991
legislation. Whether constitutional guarantees of due process and equal
protection will assure nonprotesting patients of no lesser informed
consent right than other people remains undetermined. 199
The legislation specifically provides that in an emergency, a protesting
patient may be treated with antipsychotic medication that is necessary to
treat the emergency condition.200 The legislature narrowly defined
"emergency"201 and broadly defined "antipsychotic medication,"202

194. Act of Oct. 7, 1991, ch. 681, 1991 Cal. Stat. (codified at CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE §§ 5008(1)-(m), 5325.2, 5332-5337 {West Supp. 1995)).
195. The statute specifically includes persons detained for: 72 hours of evaluation
and treatment without any court order pursuant to CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5150
(West 1984), 14 days of intensive treatment pursuant to CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 5250 (West Supp. 1995), an additional 14 days of intensive treatment as an imminently
suicidal person pursuant to CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5260 (West 1984), or an
additional 30 days of intensive treatment as a gravely disabled person pursuant to CAL.
WELF.·& INST. CODE§ 5270.15 (West Supp. 1995). Ironically, the statute contains no
reference to patients who are involuntarily committed for 72 hours of evaluation and
treatment by court order pursuant to CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE§ 5206 (West 1984) or
patients who have been placed on a temporary conservatorship and are involuntarily
committed for up to 30 days by their temporary conservator pursuant to CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 5353 (West 1984). The failure to include patients in these two categories
is unwarranted. Patients in both categories are involuntarily committed without any
hearing on the treatment competence issue. See supra text accompanying notes 156-58.
196. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE§ 5325.2 {West Supp. 1995). The right to refuse
medication is not absolute; it is subject to statutory limitations. Id.
197. Id. §§ 5152(c), 5213(b).
198. Id. § 5332(a).
199. The Riese court relied upon statutes to declare a right of involuntary mental
patients to exercise informed consent to the use of psychotropic medication. The court
did not reach constitutional issues. Riese v. St. Mary's Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 209 Cal.
App. 3d 1303, 1308, 271 Cal. Rptr. 199, 201 (1987) (republished opinion); see supra
text accompanying notes 101-05.
200. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5332(d) (West Supp. 1995).
.
201. Id. § 5008(m). Unlike CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 9, § 853 (1995), however, the
statute does not impose a requirement that the necessity for immediate action be the
result of a sudden marked change in the patient's condition. See supra text accompany-
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adopting definitions previously promulgated in the California Code of
Regulations. 203 When no emergency exists, medication may be
administered to a protesting patient only if the treatment staff determines
that alternatives to involuntary medication are unlikely to meet the
treatment needs of the patient and the patient's incapacity to refuse
treatment has been determined in a hearing. 204 Throughout the
legislation, the hearings are referred to as "capacity" hearings.205
The hearing process is initiated by a petition filed with the superior
court.206 The facility requesting the hearing is required to provide a
written notice of its petition to the patient 207 and a mental health
professional is required to inform the person of his or her capacity
hearing rights. 208 The legislation calls for capacity hearings to be held
within twenty-four hours of the _petition's filing whenever possible.
Hearings can be postponed for twenty-four hours if any party needs
additional time to prepare. Hearings may also be postponed for an
additional twenty-four hours in cases of hardship209 but must be held
within seventy-two hours of the petition's filing. 210
By statute, capacity hearings may be conducted by a superior court
judge or a court-appointed commissioner, referee, or hearing officer.211
The superior court appoints commissioners, referees, and hearing officers
from a list of attorneys unanimously approved by the local mental health
director, the county public defender, and the county counsel or district

ing note 163.
202. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE§ 5008(1) (West Supp. 1995).
203. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 9, §§ 853, 856 (1995). See supra text accompanying
notes 160-65.
204. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5332(b) (West Supp. 1995).
205. Id. §§ 5332-5334, 5336.
206. Id. § 5333(b).
207. Id.
208. Id. § 5333(c). The mental health professional is also required to answer any
questions or concerns of the patient. Id.
209. Id. § 5334(a). The statute does not define "hardship" but authorizes the county
mental health director and the presiding judge of the superior court to develop a local
policy regarding the scheduling of hearings. Id.
210. Id.
21 1 Id. § 5334(c).
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attorney. 212 Persons appointed as hearing officers are required to
receive training on capacity hearings issues. 213
Capacity hearings are no longer judicial hearings; they are administrative hearings. Although hearing officers must be lawyers, they serve as
administrative decisionmakers not judicial decisionmakers. The patient
is no longer entitled to representation by an attorney; he or she may be
Qualifications for
represented by a patients' rights advocate. 214
individuals serving as patients' rights advocates are not specified in
either the California statutes or the California Administrative Code.215
Many patients' rights advocates are not attorneys. 216
California courts have not been called upon to determine whether an
administrative capacity hearing satisfies constitutional requirements of
due process. The requirement that hearing officers be attorneys and that
appeals of hearing officer decisions be subject to de novo review by the
superior court2 17 enhances the likelihood that the statute will be upheld
if challenged.
The statute requires that capacity hearings be conducted at the mental
health facility where the patient is being detained. 218 The use of
hearing officers facilitates this requirement. At the conclusion of the
hearing, the decisionmaker is obligated to announce his or her decision,
and as soon as practicable, to provide a written notification of the
decision, including a statement of the evidence relied upon and the
reasons for the decision. 219 A determination of incapacity to refuse
treatment remains in effect only for the duration of the seventy-two-hour

212. Id. Employees of a county mental health program or mental treatment facility
are not eligible to serve as hearing officers. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. § 5333(a). The statute provides the patient with a right to representation
by either a patients' rights advocate or legal counsel. Id.
215. The California Administrative Code identifies a "Patients' Advocate" as "the
person in a local mental health program delegated the responsibility for ensuring that
mentally disabled persons in facilities . . . are afforded their statutory and constitutional
rights." CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 9, § 863(b) (1995).
216. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 110, at 326. In San Diego County certification
review hearings, three of the five patients' advocates who assisted patients were not law
trained.
217. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE§ 5334(f) (West Supp. 1995). The person who is
the subject of the capacity hearing is entitled to appeal the decision. Id. § 5334(e)(I).
The person who petitioned for a capacity hearing may request the district attorney or
county counsel to appeal the hearing decision. Id. § 5334(e)(2). The court of appeal
hears appeals of superior court decisions; the superior court hears appeals of hearing
officer decisions. Id. § 5334(e)(l-2).
218. Id. § 5334(b).
219. Id. § 5334(d). The written notification is submitted to the superior court and
provided to the person who is the subject of the capacity hearing, the person's counsel
or advocate, and the director of the facility. Id.
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or fourteen-day detention, or both, unless the patient's capacity to refuse
treatment has been restored prior to that time. 220
The capacity hearing legislation is silent on two important issues.
First, the statutes establish no standard for measuring a patient's capacity
to refuse treatment. Second, the statutes establish no burden of proof in
capacity hearings. In the absence of a legislative decision to the
contrary, the three capacity assessment factors identified in Riese should
continue to be applied. 221 Similarly, in the absence of a legislative
decision to the contrary, the clear-and-convincing evidence burden
announced in Riese should continue to be applied. 222 The 1991
legislation made some significant modifications to the Riese capacity
hearing requirement. To the extent Riese was not modified, however, it
remains the applicable law.
The San Diego County Superior Court did not· amend its court rules
to implement the statutory modifications. ·However, nine attorneys were
appointed as mental health hearing officers, replacing the court
commissioners who acted as judges pro tem. 223 Because these hearing
officers do not serve as temporary judges, the parties are not asked to
stipulate to their designation. Hearing officers continue to impose a
clear-and-convincing-evidence burden on the facility and to use the three
competency assessment factors identified in Riese and repeated in the
220. Id. § 5336. The statute specifically refers to "the detention period described
in Section 5150 or 5250." This period is 72 hours for persons detained for evaluation
and treatment without any court order (id. § 5150 (West 1984)) and 14 days for persons
certified for intensive treatment (id. § 5250 (West Supp. 1995)). Imminently suicidal
persons certified for an additional 14 days (id.§ 5260 (West 1984)) and gravely disabled
persons certified for an additional 30 days (id. § 5270.15 (West Supp. 1995)) are also
entitled to capacity hearings. Id. § 5332(b); see discussion supra note 195. Inexplicably, the statute fails to prescribe how long incapacity determinations remain in effect for
these patients.
221. Riese v. St. Mary's Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 209 Cal. App. 3d 1303, 1322-23,
271 Cal. Rptr. 199, 211-12 (1987) (republished opinion); see supra text accompanying
notes 128-39.
222. Riese, 209 Cal. App. 3d at 1322, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 211; see supra text
accompanying note 127.
223. Of the eight persons appointed in 1990 as court commissioners, five were
appointed in 1991 as mental health hearing officers. Two court commissioners chose
not to continue serving, and one did not receive the unanimous approval of the local
mental health director, the county public defender, and county counsel required for
appointment as a hearing officer. Four attorneys who had not served as court commissioners were also appointed as mental health hearing officers, bringing the total to nine.
Telephone Interview with William D. Miller, Director, Office of Counselor in Mental
Health, San Diego County Superior Court (1992).
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court rules. Although, by statute, patients are only entitled to representation by either a patient's rights advocate or an attomey,224 in San
Diego County patients continue to be represented by public defender
attorneys.
III.

ONE DECISIONMAKER'S EXPERIENCE: STATISTICAL DATA AND
COMMENTARY

In this portion of the article, I present and analyze data on the capacity
hearings I conducted over a three-year period. From May 1990 through
December 1991, I served as a court commissioner acting as a judge pro
tern. During this time, forty-three hearings were calendared, of which
thirty-three were heard and decided on the merits. Throughout the
tables, I refer to these hearings as Group A. In January 1992, I began
serving as a mental health hearing officer. From January 1992 through
June 1993, thirty-four hearings were calendared of which thirty-three
were heard and decided on the merits. Throughout the tables, I refer to
these hearings as Group B. Thus, for each table, data are provided on
an equal number of hearings conducted under the court rules implementing the Riese decision and under the statutes enacted subsequently. Data
are also presented on the combined Groups A and B.
TABLE 1
RESULTS OF HEARINGS

Number of hearings
calendared

43

34

77

Number of hearings
decided on the
merits

33

33

66

Number of patients
found competent

18

9

27

Percent of patients
found competent

54.5

27.2

40.9

As reported in TABLE 1, I found 54.5 percent of Group A patients
competent as compared with 27 .2 percent of Group B patients. Several

224.
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factors may account for this disparity. First, in each hearing that I
conducted, the facility was represented by a psychiatrist, psychologist,
nurse, or social worker. None of these individuals was trained in law or
had the assistance of an attorney during .the hearing. In contrast, the
patient was represented by an attorney from the public defender's office
in each hearing. These attorneys focused my attention on the narrow
competency issue that was to be determined.
With experience, facility representatives have acquired an adequate
ability to present evidence of the patient's incompetence. However, in
the :first few months in which hearings were conducted, facility
representatives often were confused by the competency criteria. For
example, in the very first case I heard, the psychiatrist's testimony
focused on the patient's inability to provide food, clothing, and shelter.
Obviously, she did not understand that the issue of grave disability is
decided in a certification review hearing and _not a capacity hearing. The
psychiatrist admitted in her written declaration that the patient was able
to understand the risks and benefits of medication and to understand and
evaluate information rationally regarding the proposed treatment and
alternatives to that treatment.· The psychiatrist's sole basis for asserting
the patient's incapacity was the patient's unwillingness to acknowledge
his mental disorder. Without this acknowledgement, the psychiatrist
believed that the patient could not appreciate the benefits of the proposed
medication. On cross-examination, the psychiatrist admitted that the
patient had suffered adverse effects from a previous administration of the
same medication and that the patient's reason for refusing this medication was rational. I found this patient competent.
Second, in my opinion, the Group B patients were more seriously
mentally disordered than were the Group A patients. As the recession
struck California in 1992 and 1993, severe budgetary constraints were
placed on public mental health programs. In the San Diego County
Psychiatric Hospital, three of the four inpatient units were closed. Only
the most seriously ill patients were accepted; patients who refused
treatment were often released. Additionally, as doctors became more
familiar with capacity hearings issues, I believe they became more
selective in the cases for which they would seek a finding of incapacity.
Over time, doctors developed alternative strategies to avoid capacity
hearings. These strategies range from negotiating acceptable medication
options with the patient to coercing treatment without informing the
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patient of medication risks and without petitioning for a capacity
hearing.
Third, in Group A, ten of the calendared hearings were not heard. Of
this number, five involved patients who either refused to stipulate to my
designation as temporary judge or who refused to be represented by the
public defender. 225 Although I did not conduct evidentiary hearings
in these cases,226 I believe that most of these patients would have been
found incompetent. For example, one patient who refused to stipulate
to my designation as temporary judge expressed the belief that no one
should be able to judge his competence. Despite repeated attempts to
explain that if I did not hear the matter it would be calendared for a
hearing by a superior court judge, the patient remained adamant in his
refusal. People who are unduly suspicious of their appointed attorney
or the court commissioner are often equally suspicious of the psychiatrist
assigned by the hospital as their doctor. They are unlikely to weigh
rationally the doctor's explanation of the medicine's benefits. In
contrast, because hearing officers do not serve as temporary judges, no
request for stipulation was made in Group B hearings. In Group B, only
one calendared hearing was not conducted. In that case, the doctor
withdrew the petition because the patient began taking medication
voluntarily before the hearing could be conducted.
Fourth, two patients in Group A and ten patients in Group B refused
to attend the capacity hearing. Additionally, two Group B patients
continually interrupted the facility representative's testimony, and the
hearings had to be completed outside of their presence. In one Group
B hearing, the patient attended but remained mute throughout. When
patients choose not to participate in hearings, they forfeit the opportunity
to present direct evidence to support a finding of competence. Often
these same patients are unwilling to cooperate with their counsel.
Without such cooperation, the facility representative's testimony is rarely
refuted by effective cross-examination.

225. In five other Group A cases that were calendared, evidentiary hearings were
not conducted for the following reasons: (l) the petition was withdrawn because the
patient was taking medication voluntarily; (2) the patient was a voluntary patient and
could not be treated involuntarily; (3) the doctor had not completed the declaration of
the treating physician giving the patient notice of the facts upon which he concluded that
the patient was not competent to make treatment decisions, and the doctor did not attend
the hearing; (4) no facility representative was present at the hearing; and (5) neither the
patient nor his attorney was present at the hearing.
226. Patients who refused the services of the public defender usually demanded to
be represented by private counsel. These patients, however, had not engaged private
counsel to represent them. Because capacity hearings are conducted so quickly after the
petition is filed, I granted the patients a delay to enable them to contact private attorneys.
I did not inquire into the patients' financial ability to pay for these services.
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In only one case did I find a nonattending patient competent, and that
case occurred in Group A. The psychiatrist testified that the patient was
mentally ill and delusional. The psychiatrist admitted, however, that he
had no specific evidence on whether the patient refused medication for
an irrational reason. The psychiatrist admitted: "We can't assess his
mind. We can't get him to discuss his reasons for refusing medications." When the psychiatrist attempted to encourage the patient to
accept medication by informing him that the medication would enable
the patient to obtain release faster, the patient responded by stating that
he would wait out the detention period. I found that the facility had not
proven by clear and convincing evidence that the patient's medication
refusal was the result of an irrational reasoning process. In the thirteen
Group B cases involving patients who either did not attend their
hearings, were disruptive, or remained mute, the facility representatives
presented sufficient evidence of the patients' judgmental incapacity to
satisfy the burden of proof.
Although I believe that the above-stated reasons, whether individually
or in combination, account for the disparity in Group A and Group B
decisions, other factors are worth considering. 227 Perhaps I was simply
inconsistent in my decisionmaking. Despite my familiarity with mental
health law issues and despite my ten-years' experience as a certification
227. At the time Group A hearings were conducted, a party who was dissatisfied
with a hearing result could obtain a rehearing before the same court commissioner who
made the original decision. Policy adopted by the Honorable Michael D. Wellington,
San Diego County Superior Court, 1991. Under the legislation governing Group B
hearings, a dissatisfied party could appeal the hearing officer's decision and receive a
hearing de novo before a superior court judge. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE§ 5334(e)-(t)
(West Supp. 1995). I considered whether the difference in this procedure may have been
a significant factor accounting for the decisionmaking disparity and concluded that it was
not. I am aware of no Group A or Group B hearing in which a patient found
incompetent sought either a rehearing or a hearing de novo. However, in three Group
A hearings in which I found a patient competent, the facility requested a rehearing. In
the tables, each rehearing is counted as a separate hearing. In a rehearing, the
decisionmaker considers whether a change in the patient's mental condition since the last
hearing warrants a different result. The decisionmaker does not consider either
previously introduced evidence or new evidence of the patient's condition at the time of
the original hearing. Despite the limited nature of the inquiry, in two of the three
rehearings, the facility was able to convince me that the patient's mental condition had
deteriorated since the last hearing and that the patient was no longer competent. In only
one rehearing did I continue to find the patient competent. Thus, the requirement for
Group A hearings that rehearings be conducted before the same commissioner who found
the patient competent originally was not a factor increasing significantly the number of
decisions in which a patient was found competent.
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review hearing officer,228 I found decisionmaking in many capacity
hearings to be extremely difficult. Testimony was not merely conflicting; it was dissatisfying. Psychiatrists often assumed that patients'
unwillingness to acknowledge their mental disorder was all that was
needed to establish their incompetence. Many psychiatrists did not
provide patients with needed information on medication side effects229
or respect patients' expressed concerns about side effects.230 To these
psychiatrists, side effects were merely an annoyance but not a legitimate
reason for rejecting the anticipated benefits of the proposed therapy.
Patients often assumed that refusal of medication because of a previous
experience with medication side effects was all that was needed to
establish their competence. Many refusing patients did not consider their
doctors' explanations of the benefits anticipated from the proposed
medication. To these patients, any improvement in mental condition
could not possibly outweigh the discomfort of medication side effects.
These cases were not neat little packages for decisionmakers to unwrap
at their leisure. Nevertheless, I attempted in good faith to decide the
cases fairly and consistently. Perhaps this report will provide some
insight as to my success or failure in doing so.
In evaluating my performance as a decisionmaker, one may wish to
compare my hearing results with those of other decisionmakers.
Surprisingly, statewide data on capacity hearings have not been gathered
or analyzed by the California Department of Mental Health or anyone
else.231 Some data, however, are available on the San Diego County
experience. At infrequent meetings of court commissioners and hearing
officers with the superior court mental health judge, statistics on capacity
hearing results were occasionally provided by the Office of Counselor
in Mental Health. 232 Although no comprehensive statistics are avail-

228. See Morris, supra note 110.
229. See infra text accompanying TABLE 8.
230. See infra text accompanying TABLE 7.
231. In fact, in response to my inquiry, Lori Chin, a Research Analyst in the
Performance Outcome Reporting Section of the California Department of Mental Health,
informed me on August 8, 1994, that she had never heard of the Riese case or legislation
requiring capacity hearings. Ironically, the legislation imposes a duty on the California
Department of Mental Health to prepare a report to the legislature before January 1,
1994, summarizing information on the role of patients' rights advocates and the number
of advocates needed for adequate representation of patients in capacity hearings. Act of
Oct. 7, 1991, ch. 181, § 8, 1991 Cal. Stat. The report has not yet been prepared.
232. Copies of all San Diego County capacity hearings results are on file with the
author. Upon reviewing my case summaries, I discovered that some ofmy hearings had
been reported erroneously in the statistical reports provided by the San Diego Superior
Court's Office of Counselor in Mental Health. For example, some cases that I did not
decide on the merits were reported as decisions of incompetence. I do not know whether
data from other court commissioners or hearing officers contain similar mistakes.
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able for the twenty-month period during which I gathered data on my
Group A patients, the available statistics suggest that San Diego County
court commissioners were finding patients competent in approximately
one of five cases at a time that I was finding patients competent in
approximately one of two cases.233 Although I have no complete
explanation for this disparity, I can identify one contributing factor.
Although Riese hearings were assigned to court commissioners on a
rotating basis, one court commissioner agreed to serve whenever other
court commissioners were not available. He heard a disproportionately
large number of cases. For example, between April and November
1990, this individual heard forty-five cases while all other court
commissioners combined heard fifty-seven cases.234 In the forty-five
hearings, the individual found only one patient (2.2%) competent. The
remaining court commissioners found nineteen patients (33.3%)

Because the errors on my cases were relatively few in number, and because I know of
no other available information on capacity hearings results, I have included the data
despite these deficiencies.
233. Court commissioners serving as temporary judges conducted 53 hearings on
the merits during the three-month period of May through July 1990. Thirteen patients
(24.5%) were. found competent. OFFICE OF COUNSELOR IN MENTAL HEALTH, SAN
DIEGO SUPER. CT., RIESE HEARINGS STATISTICAL REPORT (undated) (on file with author
as report #1). During this period, I conducted five hearings on the merits and found
three patients (60.0%) competent. One of the three findings of competence occurred in
a rehearing of a previous decision.
During the eight-month period of April through November 1990, court commissioners
conducted 102 hearings on the merits and found 20 patients (19.6%) competent. OFFICE
OF COUNSELOR IN MENTAL HEALTH, SAN DIEGO SUPER. CT., RIESE HEARINGS
STATISTICAL REPORT (undated) (on file with author as report #2). During this period,
I conducted eight hearings on the merits and found five patients (62.5%) competent.
During the 12-month period of April 1990 through March 1991, court commissioners
conducted 155 hearings on the merits and found 30 patients (19.4%) competent.
PATIENT ADVOCACY PROGRAM, SAN DIEGO COUNTY, SPECIAL REPORT: THE STATUS
OF RIESE IMPLEMENTATION IN SAN DIEGO COUNTY [hereinafter PATIENT ADVOCACY
PROGRAM, RIESE REPORT] (undated) (on file with author). During this period, I
conducted 16 hearings on the merits and found 10 patients (62.5%) competent.
During the 12-month period of July 1990 through June 1991, court commissioners
conducted 146 hearings on the merits and found 28 patients (19.2%) competent. OFFICE
OF COUNSELOR IN MENTAL HEALTH, SAN DIEGO SUPER. CT. RIESE HEARINGS
STATISTICAL REPORT [hereinafter RIESE HEARINGS STATISTICAL REPORT #3] (undated)
( on file with author as report #3). During this period, I conducted 17 hearings on the
merits and found eight patients (4 7.1 % ) competent.
234. During this time period, these six court commissioners averaged 10.5 hearings
(57+6).
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competent. The individual was not appointed as a hearing officer when
the capacity hearing legislation was implemented in January 1992.
Although no comprehensive statistics are available for the eighteenmonth period during which I gathered data on my Group B patients, the
available statistics suggest that San Diego County hearing officers were
finding patients competent in just under one of four cases at a time that
I was finding patients competent in just over one of four cases. 235
Although I did not consciously revise my decisionmaking principles, my
Group B :findings are far more consistent with the findings of other
decisionmakers than were my Group A :findings.
The decisions of other hearing officers were influenced by the factors
identified above that influenced my decisions. However, although these
factors reduced significantly the percent of patients I found competent,
the percent increased slightly for other hearing officers. This anomaly
may be explainable by the absence of one conservative decisionmaker
who heard numerous cases as a court commissioner at the time my
Group A cases were decided, but who did not serve as a hearing officer
at the time my Group B cases were decided. If his decisions were
excluded, the :findings of competence for other decisionmakers would
have diminished from one of three (in the Group A time frame) to one
of four (in the Group B time frame).
San Diego County court commissioners and hearing officers have
consistently found patients competent at rates that are higher than
reported in empirical studies of law-trained decisionmaker models
utilized in other states. 236 When physician findings of patient incompetence are not upheld in 20 to 25% of the hearings, one can assert that
a law-trained decisionmaker model is needed to assure that treatment
refusal decisions of competent patients are acknowledged. 237

235. Hearing officers conducted 146 hearings on the merits during the IO-month
period of January through October 1992 and found 28 patients (21.2%) competent.
OFFICE OF COUNSELOR IN MENTAL HEALTH, SAN DIEGO SUPER. CT., RIESE HEARINGS
STATISTICAL REPORT [hereinafter RIESE HEARINGS STATISTICAL REPORT #4] (undated)
(on file with author as report #4). During this period, I conducted 12 hearings on the
merits and found three patients (25.0%) competent.
During the eight-month period of January through August 1993, hearing officers
conducted 159 hearings on the merits and found 37 patients (23.3%) competent. OFFICE
OF COUNSELOR IN MENTAL HEALTH, SAN DIEGO SUPER. CT., RIESE HEARINGS
STATISTICAL REPORT [hereinafter RIESE HEARINGS STATISTICAL REPORT #5] (undated)
(on file with author as report #5). During this period, I conducted 17 hearings on the
merits and found four patients (23.5%) competent. Two of the 17 were conducted after
the Group B patient class had been completed. Both of those patients were found
incompetent.
236. See supra note 79.
237. But cf Appelbaum & Schwartz, supra note 10, at 465 (asserting that the.
hearing process is substantially ineffective if doctors are not motivated to alter their
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TABLE 2A
AVERAGE AGE OF PATIENTS (IN YEARS)

Group A
(N=31)

Group B
(N=25)

A&B
Comb'd
(N=56)

All patients

44.5

42.6

43.7

Patients found
competent

41.3

48

43

Average Age

TABLE 2B
AGE OF PATIENTS IN HEARINGS ON MERITS
Age
Range
Group A
(N=33)

21-30
31-40
41-50
51-60
61-70
71-80
Unknown

Group B Percent
(N=33)

A&B
Comb'd
(N=66)

27.3
8
24.2
9
5
15.2
4
12.1
12.1
4
12.1
4
4
5
15.2
12.1
15.2
3
9.1
5
9.1
2
6.1
3
24.2
2
6.1
8
AGE OF PATIENTS FOUND COMPETENT

Age Group A
Range

21-30
31-40
41-50
51-60
61-70
71-80
Unknown

Percent

5 (N=9}
3 (N=5)
4 (N=4)
2 (N=5)
2 (N=5)
1 (N=3)
1 (N=2)

Percent

55.6
60.0
100.0
40.0
40.0
33.3
50.0

17
9
8
9
8 .
5
10

Percent

25.8
13.6
12.1
13.6
12.1
7.6
15.2

A&B Percent
GroupB Percent
Comb'd
1 (N=8)
1 (N=4)
2 (N=4)
1 (N=4)
0 (N=3)
1 (N=2)
3 (N=8)

12.5
25.0
50.0
25.0
0.0
50.0
37.5

6 (N=l7}
4 (N=9)
6 (N=8)
3 (N=9)
2 (N=8)
2 (N=5)
4 (N=lO}

35.3
44.4
75.0
33.3
25.0
40.0
40.0

assessments of patients' competence by adverse judgments that continue to be large in
number).
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Data on patient ages are reported in TABLES 2A and 2B. The average
age of all patients on whom. information was obtained did not differ
significantly between Group A and Group B patients. Group B patients
found competent were only slightly older than Group A patients. TABLE
2B identifies patient ages in ten-year increments. In both Group A and
Group B, approximately twice as m.any patients were in the twenty-one
through thirty age group than any other age group, and I heard similar
numbers of Group A and Group B cases for patients in higher age
groups. Although the numbers of patients found competent in each age
group is too small to perm.it a statistically significant comparison, age
did not appear to be a contributing factor in m.y Group A or Group B
decisionm.aking. Even elderly patients in the seventy-one through eighty
age group were found competent at a rate com.parable to patients in other
age groups.
TABLE 3
TYPE OF FACILITY
IN HEARINGS ON THE MERITS

A&B Percent
Group B Percent
Comb'd

Group A

Percent

Public
facilities

20

60.6

17

51.5

37

56.1

Private
facilities

13

39.4

16

48.5

29

43.9

IN HEARINGS WHEN PATIENTS FOUND COMPETENT

Perc

Group A

Percent

Group B

Percent

A&B
Comb'd

Public
facilities

12 (N=20)

60.0

3 (N=17)

17.6

15 (N=37)

40.5

Private
facilities

6 (N=13)

46.2

6 (N=16)

37.5

12 (N=29)

41.4

Data on the type of facility in which I conducted hearings are
presented in TABLE 3. I conducted somewhat m.ore hearings in public
facilities than in private facilities. I was interested in determining
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whether the type of facility affected my decisionmaking. In Group A
and Group B hearings combined, I found patients competent at almost
an identical rate regardless of facility type. The percentage of all
patients found competent declined from Group A to Group B. The
decline, however, was far more severe for hearings conducted at public
facilities (from 60.0% to 17.6%) than private facilities (from 46.2% to
37.5%). I do not believe the disparity is a result of any bias on my part
against patients in public facilities. Rather, as explained above, Group
B patients in public mental health facilities were more seriously ill than
either Group B patients in private facilities or Group A patients in either
type of facility.
TABLE 4
PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS OF
FACILITY REPRESENTATIVES
IN HEARINGS ON MERITS

Psychiatrists
All Others

Group A

Percent

22
11

66.7
33.3

Group B Percent

18
15

54.5
45.5

A&B Percent
Comb'd

40
26

60.6
39.4

IN HEARINGS WHEN PATIENTS FOUND COMPETENT

Psychiatrists
All Others

12 (N=22)
6 (N=ll)

54.5
54.5

5 (N=l8)
4 (N=l5)

27.8
26.7

A&B
Comb'd

Percent

17 (N=40)
10 (N=26)

42.5
38.5

Treating psychiatrists diagnose patients; prescribe medication; inform
patients of medication benefits, risks, and alternatives; assess patients'
competence; and petition for a hearing. They are the best source of
evidence to support findings of incompetence. As mentioned above, the
San Diego County Superior Court rules warn facilities that the failure of
the psychiatrist to testify may result in insufficient evidence to support
a finding of the patient's mental incapacity.238

238.

See supra text accompanying note 186.
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As reported in TABLE 4, the patient's treating psychiatrist served as
the facility representative in over half the Group A and Group B
hearings. I was interested in determining whether, in the hearings I
conducted, the failure of the treating psychiatrist to testify affected the
hearing's result. The data reveal that psychiatrists and nonpsychiatrists
were equally adept at proving the patient's incompetence. When the
treating psychiatrist does not testify, the court requires the psychiatrist
to submit a written declaration summarizing his or her assessment of the
patient's competence. The declaration is admitted into evidence and the
nonpsychiatrist facility representative merely offers additional testimony
to support the psychiatrist's declaration. Apparently, this procedure is
working satisfactorily to assure that the facility's case is adequately
presented.
TABLE 5A lists the psychiatric diagnoses for Group A and Group B
patients.239 Although most patients were diagnosed with one mental
disorder, two Group A and three Group B patients received dual
diagnoses. 240 In my sample population, I heard 29 cases (43.9%)
involving patients diagnosed with mood disorders (bipolar disorder and
depressive disorder) and 27 cases (40.9%) diagnosed with thought
disorders (schizophrenia and other psychotic disorder). The most
common mental disorder was bipolar disorder, diagnosed in nineteen of
the sixty-six patients (28.8%). Bipolar disorder is a mood disorder
characterized by the occurrence of one or more manic episodes or both
manic and depressive episodes.241 The second most common mental
disorder was schizophrenia, diagnosed in fifteen of the sixty-six patients
(22.7%). Schizophrenia is a psychotic disorder. Additionally, twelve
patients (18.2%) were diagnosed with psychotic disorders other than
schizophrenia. Psychotic disorders are thought disorders characterized

239. Mental disorders are described in a book published by the American
Psychiatric Association. The most recent edition of that book was published in 1994.
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS (DSM-IV) (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV]. Although psychiatrists
diagnosing Group A and Group B patients used an earlier edition of that book, i.e.,
DSM-III-R, published in 1987, discussion of diagnoses in this article will be referenced
to DSM-IV.
240. In Group A, one patient was diagnosed with psychotic disorder-NOS (i.e., not
otherwise specified) and mental retardation; another patient was diagnosed with
schizoaffective disorder and mixed substance abuse. In Group B, one patient was
diagnosed with schizophrenia and Alzheimer's dementia; a second patient was diagnosed
with schizophrenia, paranoid type, and polydrug abuse; a third patient was diagnosed
with depression and dementia.
241. DSM-IV, supra note 239, at 350.
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TABLE 5A
DIAGNOSIS OF PATIENTS IN HEARINGS ON THE MERITS

Diagnosis

Bipolar disorder (including
diagnosis of bipolar affective
disorder-manic)
Schizophrenia (including
diagnosis of schizophrenia· paranoid)
Psychotic Disorder (including
diagnoses of psychotic disorder not otherwise specified
and atypical psychosis)
Depressive disorder (including
diagnosis of major depression)
Schizoaffective disorder
Organic disorder (including
diagnoses of organic brain
syndrome, organic delusional
disorder, organic mood
disorder)
Dementia (including diagnosis
of Alzheimer's dementia)
Psychoactive Substance Use
Disorder (including diagnoses of mixed substance
abuse and polydrug abuse)
Mental Retardation

TOTAL

Group A Percent
(N=33)

GroupB Percent
(N=33)

A & B Percent
Comb'd
(N=66)

13

39.4

6

18.2

19

28.8

4

12.1

11

33.3

15

22.7

3

9.1

9

27.3

12

18.2

5
7

15.2
21.2

5
0

15.2
0.0

10
7

15.2
10.6

3.0

2

6.1

3

4.5

0.0

2

6.1

2

3.0

3.0
3.0

1
0

3.0
0.0

2
1

3.0
1.5

106.1

36

109.1

71

107.4

0

35
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by the presence of psychotic symptoms242 such as delusions,243 hallucinations,244 or disorganized speech. 245
I was interested in discovering whether the most frequently diagnosed
disorders were similar for each Group, and if not, whether the differences might have contributed to the disparity in hearing results. The data
reveal a sharp contrast. Mood disorders. were far more prevalent in
Group A, accounting for eighteen of the thirty-three cases (54.5%) as
compared with only eleven Group B cases (33.3%). Thought disorders
were far more prevalent in Group B, accounting for twenty cases
(60.6%) as compared with only seven Group A cases (21.2%).
Psychiatrists have noted that law-trained decisionmakers generally
conceptualize competence as a cognitive capacity.246 Therefore,
patients with thought disorders who are suffering from delusions,
hallucinations, and disorganized speech, are more likely to be found
incompetent than patients with mood disorders. Patients with mood
disorders may be found competent if they are capable of coherent speech
and able to articulate rational objections to medication. Psychiatrists,
however, have asserted that patients who have an intellectual understanding of a medication's risks and benefits may, nevertheless, be incompetent if their mood disorder causes them to become unduly concerned
about risks or unable to appreciate the bene:fits. 247 For example,
people with bipolar disorder who are experiencing a manic episode may
feel an inflated sense of self esteem or grandiosity. They may engage
excessively iri pleasurable activities despite the high potential for painful
consequences.248 In their euphoric state, they may deny the existence

242. Id. at 273.
243. "Delusions ... are erroneous beliefs that usually involve a misinterpretation
of perceptions or experiences." Id. at 275.
244. "Hallucinations ... may occur in any sensory modality . . . but auditory
hallucinations are by far the most common and characteristic of schizophrenia. Auditory
hallucinations are usually experienced as voices, whether familiar or unfamiliar, that are
perceived as distinct from the person's own thoughts." Id. at 275.
245. Disorganized thinking may be the single most important feature of schizophrenia. Because inferences about thought are based primarily on an individual's speech,
disorganized speech was emphasized in the definition of schizophrenia. Id. at 276.
Other criteria for schizophrenia include grossly disordered behavior and negative
symptoms, such as affective flattening, alogia, and avolition. Id.
246. Thomas G. Gutheil & Harold Bursztajn, Clinicians' Guidelines for Assessing
and Presenting Subtle Forms of Patient Incompetence in Legal Settings, 143 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1020, 1020 (1986)
247. Harold J. Bursztajn, Beyond Cognition: The Role of Disordered Affective
States in Impairing Competence to Consent to Treatment, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 383, 384 (1991).
248. DSM-IV, supra note 239, at 332.
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of a mental disorder or the potential benefit from treatment. 249 A
study comparing thirty treatment-refusing patients with thirty treatmentconsenting patients revealed a significant diagnostic difference between
the two groups: nine of the twelve diagnosed with bipolar disorder
(75%) refused medication; twenty-two of the thirty-two diagnosed with
schizophrenia (68.8%) consented.250
Because a person's mood may influence the weighing of risks and
benefits, mood disturbances are an appropriate component of a competence assessment.
However, in considering a patient's mood,
decisionmakers should not equate diagnosis of bipolar disorder or other
mood disorder with incompetence, just as they should not equate a
diagnosis of schizophrenia or any other disorder with incompetence.
Proof of mental disorder, whether acknowledged by the patient or not,
is only one factor in establishing a patient's incompetence. The question
to be determined is whether the patient is competent to refuse medication
despite his or her mental disorder. 251 Thus, as reported in TABLE 5B,
of the twenty-nine cases I heard involving patients diagnosed with mood
disorders, twelve were found competent (41.4%). Of the twenty-seven
cases I heard involving patients diagnosed with thought disorders, nine
were found competent (33.3%). Although thought disordered patients
were found incompetent at a higher rate than were mood disordered
patients, diagnosis alone was not determinative.
Some thought
disordered patients were found competent, some were not. Some mood
disordered patients were found competent, some were not.

a

249. Appelbaum & Hoge, supra note 79, at 283 (Studies have suggested that
patients experiencing the pleasurable state of grandiosity may reject medication because
they are reluctant to part with feelings of superiority.); Gutheil & Bursztajn, supra note
246, at 1021 (Patients in a manic state may deny the possibility that treatment may
benefit them.); Paul Rodenhauser, Treatment Refusal in a Forensic Hospital: Ill-Use of
the Lasting Light, 12 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 59, 61 (1984) (Among
forensic patients studied, the leading causes of medication refusal were grandiosity and
denial of mental disorder.).
250. Julie M. Zito et al., Clinical Characteristics ofHospitalized Psychotic Patients
Who Refuse Antipsychotic Drug Therapy, 142 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 822, 824 (1985).
251. The Riese court cited approvingly a federal district judge's estimate that 85%
of involuntarily committed mental patients are competent to make medication decisions.
Riese v. St. Mary's Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 209 Cal. App. 3d 1303, 1321, 271 Cal. Rptr.
199, 210 (1987) (citing with approval Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 927 (N.D.
Ohio 1980)) (republished opinion).
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TABLE 5B
DIAGNOSES OF PATIENTS FOUND COMPETENT

Diagnosis

Bipolar disorder (including
diagnosis of bipolar
affective disorder-manic)
Schizophrenia (including
diagnosis of schizophreniaparanoid)
Psychotic disorder (including
diagnoses of psychotic
disorder not otherwise
specified and atypical
psychosis)
Depressive disorder (including
diagnosis of major
depression)
Schizoaffective disorder
Organic disorder (including
diagnoses of organic brain
syndrome, organic
delusional disorder, and
organic mood disorder)
Dementia (including diagnosis
of Alzheimer's dementia)
Psychoactive Substance
Use Disorder (including
diagnoses of mixed
substance abuse
and polydrug abuse)
Mental retardation
TOTAL

398

Group A

Group B Percent A & B Percent
Percent
Comb'd

7 (N=13)

53.8

2 (N=6)

33.3

9 (N=!9)

47.4

2 (N=4)

50.0

2 (N=ll)

18.2

4 (N=l5)

26.7

1 (N=3)

33.3

4 (N=9)

44.4

5 (N=l2)

41.7

3 (N=5)
4 (N=7)

60.0
57.1

0 (N=5)
0 (N=0)

0.0
0.0

3 (N=l0)
4 (N=7)

30.0
57.1

1 (N=l)

100.0

1 (N=2)

50.0

2 (N=3)

66.7

0 (N=0)

0.0

2 (N=2)

100.0

2 (N=2)

100.0

1 (N=l)
0 (N=l)

100.0
0.0

1 (N=l)
0 (N=0)

100.0
0.0

2 (N=2)
0 (N=l)

100.0
0.0.

19 (N=35)

54.3

12 (N=36)

33.3

31 (N=71) 43.7
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TABLE 5B supports my assertion that Group B patients were more
seriously disordered than were Group A patients. In virtually every
diagnostic category, the percent of patients found competent declined
from Group A to Group B. The percent of patients found competent
when diagnosed with schizophrenia or other psychotic disorder declined
from 42.8% in Group A to 30.0% in Group B. The percent of patients
found competent when diagnosed with bipolar disorder or depressive
disorder declined from 55.6% in Group A to 18.2% in Group B.
Although mood disorder diagnoses predominated in Group A patients
and thought disorder diagnoses predominated in Group B patients, my
assertion that Group B patients were more seriously disordered is not
based on a belief that thought disorders are more serious disorders than
mood disorders. I note, for example, that a person suffering from major
depressive disorder-a common mood disorder-may lose interest in
nearly all activity, feel worthless, and have recurrent thoughts of
death. 252 Approximately 15% of people with severe cases of major
depressive disorder commit suicide.253
TABLE 6 summarizes the evidence introduced by facility representatives to support their assertions that patients were incompetent to make
medication decisions. The most frequently cited reason, mentioned in
over 90% of Group A and Group B cases, was the patient's refusal to
acknowledge his or her mental disorder. The almost universal reliance
on this reason is not surprising. To assist in the implementation of
capacity hearings, the San Diego County Superior Court approved a
"script" that was used by court commissioners who acted as temporary
judges and is currently used by mental health hearing officers. The
script contains a series of questions designed to elicit relevant testimony
from facility representatives. Because the Riese case identifies the
patient's willingness to acknowledge mental disorder as a competence
assessment factor, 254 the treating psychiatrist is asked: "Does the
patient believe that he or she suffers from a mental disorder?" When the
treating psychiatrist does not serve as the facility representative, the
physician's declaration containing a written response to the same
question is introduced into evidence.

252. DSM-IV, supra note 239, at 327, 339.
253. Id. at 340.
254. Riese, 209 Cal. App. 3d at 1322, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 211; see supra text
accompanying notes 129-31.
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TABLE 6
FACILITY REPRESENTATIVES' EVIDENCE

Reasons Given to Support
Determination of Incapacity
A Patient does not acknowledge his or her mental
disorder.
B Patient is psychotic,
delusional etc.
C Patient will not listen to
explanation of risks and
benefits.
D Patient is dangerous to self
or others.
E Patient is paranoid or
suffers from paronoia.
F Patient is mute or unresponsive.
G Patient's condition has not
improved or will not improve without medication.
H Patient refuses food.
I Patient's claim of allergic
reaction or side effects
to medication is not substantiated.
J Patient's intellectual function is impaired.

TOTAL

400

Group A Percent
(N=33)

Group B Percent
(N=33)

A & B Percent
Comb'd
(N=66)

32

97.0

30

90.9

62

93.9

20

60.6

22

66.7

42

63.6

8

24.2

13

39.4

21

31.8

12

36.4

7

21.2

19

28.8

7

21.2

12

36.4

19

28.8

7

21.2,

9

27.3

16

24.2

2
3

6.1
9.1

8
3

24.2
9.1

10
6

15.2
9.1

3

9.1

2

6.1

5

7.6

2

6.1

3.0

3

4.5

96

107

203
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Even if psychiatrists were not specifically questioned about the issue,
a patient's refusal to acknowledge mental disorder would remain a
popular reason to support a determination of incompetence. A competent decision on whether to accept or reject treatment requires a
weighing of the anticipated benefits as well as the possible risks and
alternatives of that treatment. Patients who believe that they have no
mental disorder are unlikely to value the therapeutic effects of a
medication to treat a mental disorder.
In over 60% of Group A and Group B cases, the psychiatrist testified
(either in person or by written declaration) that the patient was psychotic
or delusional. Because psychotic individuals are, by definition, grossly
impaired in reality testing,255 their ability to assess rationally the risks
and benefits of proposed medication is questionable. Psychotic
symptoms include delusions and hallucinations. 256 Thus, for example,
a patient with a delusional belief that the doctor wishes to harm him or
her may believe that the proposed medication is poison. A medication
refusal for this reason would be irrational.
In TABLE 6, evidence that the patient is paranoid or suffers from
paranoia is categorized as a separate reason. Although, properly used,
the words· "paranoid" or "paranoia" imply the presence of delusions or
hallucinations,257 sometimes these words are used inappropriately to
suggest suspiciousness. Because suspiciousness may be rationally based,
it is not an appropriate symptom of psychosis. In fourteen of the
nineteen cases in which the psychiatrist testified that the patient was
paranoid or suffers from paranoia, the psychiatrist also testified that the
patient was psychotic or delusional. When the two reasons are
combined, but not double-counted, the data reveal that in twenty-two
Group A cases (66.7%) and twenty-five Group B cases (75.8%),

255. DSM-IV, supra note 239, at 273.
256. Id.; see supra notes 243-44.
257. The essential feature of schizophrenia, paranoid type, "is the presence of
prominent delusions or auditory hallucinations in the context of a relative preservation
of cognitive functioning and affect." DSM-IV, supra note 239, at 287. The essential
feature of delusional disorder "is the presence of one or more nonbizarre delusions that
persist for at least 1 month ...." Id. at 296. In the previous edition of the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual, delusional disorder was named delusional (paranoid) disorder.
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS (DSM-III-R) 199-203 (3d ed. rev. 1987).
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evidence was introduced that the patient was either experiencing
psychotic symptoms or paranoia.258
Facility representatives offered an average of three reasons to support
a determination of incapacity. The two most frequently cited reasons
were the patient's refusal to acknowledge mental disorder and the
patient's psychosis or delusions. 259 No other single reason was offered
in more than one-third of the combined Group A and Group B cases.
Nevertheless, there were some differences between the two groups in the
use of various reasons. For example, evidence that the patient was
dangerous was introduced more frequently in Group A hearings than in
Group B hearings. Perhaps as psychiatrists became more familiar with
the criteria used to determine competence, they realized that evidence of
the patient's dangerousness is irrelevant to the assessment of competence.
Evidence that the patient was paranoid and evidence that the patient
would not listen to an explanation of risks and benefits was introduced
more frequently in Group B hearings than in Group A hearings. The
two reasons compliment each other. A person who is preoccupied by
paranoid delusions may not be willing to listen to the doctor's explanation of medication risks and benefits. The more frequent use of these
reasons in Group B hearings may indicate that the Group B patients
were more seriously mentally disordered than the Group A patients.
Evidence that the patient's condition had not improved without
medication or that it would not improve without medication was also
introduced more frequently in Group B hearings than in Group A
hearings. I can only speculate why this occurred. Perhaps the reason
was offered to suggest that the patient was seriously mentally disordered
and that alternatives to the proposed medication did not exist. Perhaps
the reason was offered to suggest that the psychiatrist was willing to
accept the patient's medication refusal if improvement in the patient's
mental condition could occur without medication.
If, however,
psychiatrists were more willing to defer to their patients' treatment
refusal decisions, the number of hearings should have decreased. It did
not. The number of San Diego County hearings conducted during the
Group A time period averaged less than thirteen per month. 260 When

258. Evidence of either psychotic symptoms or paranoia was introduced in 47 Group
A and Group B cases combined (71.2%).
259. In four cases, the psychiatrist gave only one reason to support a finding of
incapacity. Refusal to acknowledge mental disorder was the reason given in three of the
four cases.
260. From April 1990 through March 1991, 155 hearings were conducted on the
merits, an average of 12.9 per month. PATIENT ADVOCACY PROGRAM, RIESE REPORT,
supra note 233. From July 1990 through June 1991, 146 hearings were conducted on
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TABLE 7
PATIENTS' EVIDENCE
Reasons Given For
Refusing Medication

A 1 Patient experienced side
effects from previous
administration of medication.
B 1 Patient says he or she
doesn't need or doesn't
want the medication.
C 1Patient does not trust or is
angry at the psychiatrist.
D 1 Patient denies having a
mental disorder.
E1 Patient claims the medication has not helped in
the past or will not
help now.
F1 Patient expresses concem about possible side
effects.
G1 Patient asserts risks and
benefits of proposed
medication have not
been explained.
H1 Patient asserts that he
or she is being detained
illegally, or that he or
she has a legal right to
refuse treatment.
I 1 Patient's lifestyle or religious belief is to reject
all medicines.
J 1 Patient says he or she
doesn't care whether he
or she gets well or not.
TOTAL

Group B Percent A
Group A Percent
&
(N=33)
(N=33)
Comb'd
(N=66)

23

69.7

17

51.5

40

60.6

9

27.3

12

36.4

21

31.8

6

18.2

14

42.4

20

30.3

7

21.2

12

36.4

19

28.8

6

18.2

8

24.2

14

21.2

7

21.2

6

18.2

13

19.7

5

15.2

5

15.2

10

15.2

4

12.1

6

18.2

10

15.2

6

18.2

2

6.1

g

12.1

3.0

2

3.0

3.0
74

the merits, an average of 12.2 per month.
supra note 233.

83

RIESE

157

HEARINGS STATISTICAL REPORT #3,
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Group B hearings were conducted, the number of hearings rose to 14.6
per month from January through October 1992 and to 19.9 per month
from January through August 1993.261
TABLE 7 summarizes the evidence introduced by patients to support
their assertions that their medication refusal decisions were competently
made. In most cases, the table reflects the testimony of patients in their
hearings. Although the testifying psychiatrist is asked what information
was given to the patient on medication risks, benefits, and alternatives
and what did the patient say or do in response, the best source of
evidence on reasons for a patient's treatment refusal is the testimony of
the patient himself or herself. In the two Group A and thirteen Group
B hearings in which the patient did not participate, the table reflects the
psychiatrist's answer.
The most frequently cited reason for medication refusal, mentioned in
almost 70% of Group A cases and over 50% of Group B cases, was side
effects experienced from previous administration of medication. Patient
concern about potential medication side effects was categorized as a
separate reason. In nine of the thirteen cases in which patients testified
that they were concerned about potential side effects, they also testified
that they had previously experienced medication side effects. When the
two reasons are combined, but not double-counted, the data reveal that
in twenty-six Group A cases (78.8%) and eighteen Group B cases
(54.5%), evidence was introduced that the patient either experienced side
effects previously or was concerned about potential side effects.262
Psychotropic medications are powerful drugs that may produce temporary and permanent side effects that are discomforting,263 painful,264

261. From January through October 1992, 146 hearings were conducted on the
merits, an average of 14.6 per month. RIESE HEARINGS STATISTICAL REPORT #4, supra
note 235. From January through August 1993, 159 hearings were conducted on the
merits, an average of 19.9 per month. RIESE HEARINGS STATISTICAL REPORT #5, supra
note 235. Some of the increase in the number of hearings is attributable to the
elimination of the requirement that the patient stipulate to the decisionmaker's
qualifications. See supra text accompanying notes 225-26.
262. Evidence of either an experience with medication side effects or concern about
potential side effects was introduced in 44 Group A and Group B cases combined
(66.7%).
263. Sedation is a common non-neurologicalside effect of psychotropic medication.
Sedated patients experience drowsiness and fatigue. Cichon, supra note 9, at 297. Other
non-neurological side effects include anticholinergic disturbances such as blurred vision,
dry mouth, urinary retention, and constipation. Id. at 297-98.
264. Ak:athisia is an extrapyramidal side effect of psychotropic medication.
Ak:athisia "is characterized by a painful irritability and a persistent desire to move.
Symptoms can include a constant tapping of feet, alteration of posture and shifting of
legs, fidgeting, pacing, and an inability to feel comfortable in any position." Id. at 301.
Dystonias are another extrapyramidal side effect. "Dystonic reactions often involve
acute and very painful spasms of muscle groups including those in the neck, face, eyes,
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disabling, 265 and even deadly.266 Although competent decisionmaking
should also weigh the potential benefits of the proposed medication, a
patient's concern about side effects, particularly if those side effects have
been experienced previously, may be a rational basis to support a
medication refusal.
In each hearing, the psychiatrist is asked whether the patient objected
to the use of psychotropic medication because of side effects from prior
treatment. In many cases, the psychiatrist reported no such patient
objection. In subsequent testimony, however, the patient often stated
that he or she refused medication because of previous experiences with
side effects. The underreporting of pl3:tient concern about side effects is
not unique to the psychiatrists who testified in the hearings that I
conducted. In a study of mental patients admitted to four acute inpatient
units in Massachusetts mental health facilities, the researchers compared
the reasons given by patients for refusing medication with their doctors'
perceptions of those reasons. 267 The single most frequently cited
reason for medication refusal was side effects, mentioned by 35% of the
patients. Physicians, however, identified patient concern about side
effects in only 7% of the cases.268

pelvis, trunk, and the extremities." Id. at 303.
265. Tardive dyskinesia is a side effect of psychotropic medication that is
characterized by "uncontrollable repetitive movements principally affecting the face,
tongue, mouth, trunk (including respiratory muscles), upper and lower extremities, neck,
shoulders, and pelvis. In the more pronounced cases, patients may have difficulty in
swallowing (resulting in weight loss), talking, and breathing ...." Id. at 304.
Parkinsonism is an extrapyramidal side effect of psychotropic medication. "Its
symptoms include a mask-like face, tremors of the limbs, muscle rigidity, spasms,
drooling, a stooped and shuffling gait, and a general slowing of motor responses." Id.
at 300. Akinesia is a subcategory of Parkinsonism, "characterized by a decrease in
spontaneous mobility and speech along with a general feeling of listlessness and apathy."
Id. at 301. Other disabling side effects include obstructed vision, blindness, and sexual
dysfunction. Id. at 298, 303.
266. Neuroleptic malignant syndrome is a side effect of psychotropic medication.
Its symptoms include "hyperthermia (fever), severe skeletal rigidity, elevated blood
pressure, tachycardia, and alterations in consciousness including delirium, mutism,
stupor, and coma. . . . This disorder is fatal in twenty to thirty percent of the cases .
. . ." Id. at 308. Dyscrasias are potentially fatal blood disorders that may occur as
psychotropic medication side effects. Id. at 298-99.
267. Hoge et al., supra note 11, at 950-51.
268. Id. at 954.
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In the hearings I conducted, there were other obvious inconsistencies
in the evidence. As one such example, in more than 90% of the cases,
psychiatrists reported that patients did not acknowledge their mental.
disorder. However, in fewer than 30% of the cases, patients testified
that they refused medication because they had no mental disorder. As
another example, psychiatrists responding to a standard question
uniformly testified that they informed or attempted to inform the patient
of the potential risks and benefits of, and alternatives to, the proposed
medication. Nevertheless, in 15.2% of the cases, patients testified that
they refused medication because they had not been so informed. Other
patients testified that they had not been informed but did not base their
refusal on the lack of information. Often, these patients experienced side
effects previously and were aware of at least some of the medication
risks. Although their medication refusal was based on their prior
experience, they were entitled to the full explanation of medication
benefits, side effects, ·and alternatives. Granted, in some cases, an
individual may be too confused to remember that he or she heard a
psychiatrist's explanation. Nevertheless, the frequent patient complaint
that no explanation was given is highly disturbing.
In the Massachusetts study, researchers reported that patients and their
doctors agreed only 37% of the time on reasons for medication
refusal. 269 The researchers, including Drs. Appelbaum, Gutheil, and
other noted psychiatrists, concluded: "The frequent failure of psychiatrists to recognize patients' reasons for refusing suggests a lack of
communication between them· about the basis for refusal . . . ." 270At
a minimum, hearing officers should be skeptical of psychiatrists' reports
of their patients' reasons for refusing medication.271
Patients offered an average of two reasons to explain why they refused
medication. However, no single reason other than previous experience
with medication side effects was offered in more than one-third of the
combined Group A and Group B cases.272 Nevertheless, there were
some differences between the two groups in the use of various reasons.
For example, evidence that the patient rejected medication because of a
religious belief or a lifestyle choice was introduced more frequently in
Group A hearings than in Group B hearings. Such evidence may

269. Id.
270. Id.
271. In a related context, Drs. Appelbaum and Hoge noted that when researchers
offer their own opinions as to why patients refuse medication, the possibility. of
researcher bias is significant. Appelbaum & Hoge, supra note 79, at 285.
272. In 13 cases, the patient gave only one reason for refusing medication. Previous
experience with medication side effects was the reason given in eight of the 13 cases.
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support a finding of competence. In one of the first appellate cases
recognizing the right to refuse psychotropic medication, the Second
Circuit held that a practicing Christian Scientist, whose religious beliefs
predated any mental disorder and who had not been adjudicated
incompetent, stated a claim for damages resulting from forced medication in violation of her constitutional right to religious freedom. 273
Over the years, the right to refuse psychotropic medication has evolved
to protect the competent decisionmaking of patients who also refuse
medication for nonreligious reasons, including a lifestyle choice to reject
any medical treatment. An individual's decision to forego medication
and to substitute natural treatments - herbs,vitamins, or even fresh
air-is not a fortiori irrational simply because it deviates from the norm.
In a free society, an individual's idiosyncratic or eccentric beliefs must
be respected even if society views them as strange.
In more Group B than Group A cases, the patient either denied having
a mental disorder or testified that he or she did not trust or was angry
at the psychiatrist. On their face, these reasons do not seem to support
the patient's position. In fact, their more frequent use in Group B
hearings may suggest that the Group B patients suffered from more
serious mental disorders than Group A patients. After all, when a
psychiatrist, whose training and expertise is in diagnosing mental
disorder, has diagnosed a mental disorder, is the patient's denial worthy
of consideration? When a psychiatrist, ·whose training and expertise is
in treating mental disorder, prescribes a psychotropic medication to
improve the patient's condition, is the patient's hostility toward the
psychiatrist justifiable? Surprisingly, the answer to both questions may
be "yes."
Previously, I suggested that hearing officers should consider whether
a patient's seemingly rational objections to medication were so
influenced by a mood disorder that the patient's judgment was irrational.274 Similarly, a hearing officer should consider whether a patient's
seemingly irrational objections to medication were, in fact, rationally
based. For example, does the patient who appears to deny a mental
disorder acknowledge a problem in nonmedical terms? Is the patient
denying mental disorder in order to maintain control over his or her life
and to avoid being thrust into the dependent role of a mental patient?
273.
274.

Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971).
See supra text accompanying notes 247-51.
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Is the denial an attempt to avoid a catch-22 situation, i.e., by admitting
mental disorder the patient strengthens the psychiatrist's assertion that
medication is the appropriate remedy? Is the patient's hostility toward
the psychiatrist a rational reaction either to the patient's involuntary
detention or to the lack of communication between the psychiatrist and
the patient?
Through cross-reference with TABLES 6 and 7, TABLE 8 identifies the
evidence introduced to support the parties' positions in each hearing.
Although this evidence was categorized for purposes of tabular
presentation, the evidence introduced in each case was distinct.
Although certain types of reasons were more influential than others, I
did not decide individual cases by focusing on the types of reasons
presented. Rather, I considered the evidence that was introduced in each
case, the credibility of witnesses, and the· oral arguments of both sides.
Each case was unique.
TABLE 8
SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE INTRODUCED, DECISIONS
MADE, AND RATIONALE FOR EACH DECISION

Case
No.

Facility's
Evidence
(From
Table 6)

Patient's
Evidence
(From
Table 7)

Decision and Rationale

GROUP A
#1-43 (Cases that were not decided on the merits have been deleted.)

408

1

A,B

A1,C1

Competent. Although the patient was
unwilling to acknowledge that he suffered from a mental illness, the psychiatrist admitted that the patient was
cognitively able to understand the
risks and benefits of medication and to
evaluate them rationally. In his testimony, the patient complained of a
side effect (sleeplessness) which
ceased when the medication was discontinued.

2

A, I

A1,H1

Competent. Although the patient
claimed to be someone other than the
person who was lawfully committed to
the facility, nevertheless, the patient's
refusal of medication was based on
concern about possible side effects
from the proposed medication. Because she previously experienced side
effects, the patient's concern seemed
rational.
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Case
No.

3

Facility's
Evidence
(From
Table 6)
A,B

Patient's
Evidence
(From
Table 7)
B1,C1,
J1

Decision and Rationale

Incompetent. The patient stated that the doctors
were practicing witchcraft and didn't trust any of
them. The patient also believed the medicine
was poison. The patient did not indicate that he
was refusing medication because of concern
about side effects. (Rehearing of case # 1).

4

A,G,
I

A1,H1

Competent. The patient's condition had not
deteriorated since the last hearing. She based
her refusal primarily on side effects that she had
suffered previously and could suffer if medication was administered. These side effects have
been documented. (Rehearing of case #2).

5

A,B,
D

A1,D1,
E1,H1

Incompetent. The patient did not acknowledge
suffering from a mental disorder, although he
made statements in the hearing that indicated he
was psychotic. In explaining why he refused
medication, the patient simply asserted his right
to dissent but gave no rational basis for his dissent. He did not express a concern about side
effects until he was prompted to do so by the
public defender.

7

A,E,
H

A1

Incompetent. This profoundly dehydrated and
malnourished patient could not give a rational
explanation for why he refused food. Although
he had experienced side effects from previous
medications and expressed concern about side
effects as his reason for refusing medication, I
concluded that he had not considered rationally
the anticipated benefits of the medication.

409

Case
No.

8

Facility's
Evidence
(From
Table 6)
B,F,

Patient's
Evidence
(From
Table 7)
A1,C1

Competent. The patient articulated rational
concerns about side effects she had experienced. She also expressed a willingness
to continue taking medications if not on an
empty stomach. Although the psychiatrist
stated that the patient might not take the
medication, the question to be decided is
whether she is competent to make a judgment regarding mediation, not whether her
judgment is to accept the medication.

H

10

A,D

A1,B1,
l1

Competent. The patient experienced side
effects previously and thus had a rational
reason for refusing. Additionally, the patient expressed a sincere belief in homeopathy and rejects all medicine .

17

A,B

A1,D1

Incompetent. Although the patient's refusal
was based in part on side effects of previous administration, patient's irrational concem that others were trying to poison him
so affected his judgment that he could not
make a rational decision.

18

A,D,

A1,G1

Competent. The patient rationally refused
medication because of side effects he was
suffering. The patient was willing to consider taking other medication that might not
have same effect.

A1,F1

Competent. The patient acknowledged his
mental disorder. The patient expressed a
willingness to take medications, despite his
concern about side effects, to avoid being
placed in restraint and seclusion. This decision seems rationally based.

F

19
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Decision and Rationale

A,B
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Case
No.

Facility's
Evidence
(From
Table 6)

20

A,C,
D,F

A1,B1,
D1,F1,
I1

21

A,B,
D,G,
J

A1

22

A,B,
F

23

A,B,
C,D,
E

A1,B1,
C1

24

A,C,

A1

Patient's
Evidence
(From
Table 7)

A,B

Incompetent. Although the patient expressed
some concerns about side effects, the primary
reason she refused was her belief she was not
mentally ill. Her testimony, however, led me
to conclude she was mentally ill.
Competent. The patient was in contact with
reality and gave a rational reason-experiencing side effects--for refusing. He expressed a willingness to take medications
· because he realizes he's "a confused human
being."
Incompetent. The patient was not able to
communicate.

H

25

Decision and Rationale

A1,D1,
I1

Competent. Two days before the hearing, the
patient was medicated intramuscularly on an
emergency basis when he acted violently
toward a staff member. At the hearing, the
patient was sedated and in good contact with
reality. He gave a rational reason for refusing
medication-various side effects. Nevertheless, he expressed a willingness to take lithium, which he previously refused.
Competent. The patient acknowledged her
mental disorder. The patient had a rational
reason-side effects--for refusing. The patient was willing to take some psychotropic
medication.
Incompetent. The patient denied being mentally ill but admitted having "an environmentally
ill personality." She did not consider the
potential benefits from medication but refused
it because it tasted bad and because it might
affect her unborn fetus. The patient, however,
was not pregnant. The patient's reasoning
was not rational.
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Case
No.

412

Facility's
Evidence
(From
Table 6)

Patient's
Evidence
(From
Table 7)

Decision and Rationale

26

A,B,
C,F

A1

Incompetent. The patient did not attend the
hearing. The patient's attorney merely speculated that the patient's refusal was based on
concern about side effects mentioned in the
patient's chart.

27

A,B,
C

A1,E1

Incompetent. The patient was extremely
depressed. Although her answers sounded
rational, she did not appear to be making a
risk/benefit assessment and was not refusing
medication due to side effects she had experienced previously. Rather, her feeling of hopelessness--i.e., that the medication won't do any
good-led her to refuse.

28

A,D

A1,B1
E1

Competent. The patient acknowledged having a
mental disorder, was able to articulate the benefits that the psychiatrist believed would result
from the medication, and articulated rational
concerns about side effects he had experienced
and the lack of positive results from prior administration of psychotropic medication.

29

A,D,
J

C1,D1

Incompetent. Evidence of violent outbursts by
the patient indicated his failure to understand
how the medicine would benefit him by reducing agitation. The patient appeared confused at
the hearing. (Rehearing of case #28).

31

A,B,
C

32

A,D,
I

Incompetent. The patient interrupted the facility representative's testimony several times.
When the patient was called to testify, however, she became upset and left the hearing. No
reason was given for refusing medications.
A1,F1,
G1

Competent. The patient expressed rational concerns about side effects he had suffered and
side effects he had observed others suffering.
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Table 7)
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33

A,B,
E

B1,F1,
I1

Competent. The patient gave rational reasons
for refusing medications: concern about how
the medications would affect a thyroid condition that the patient had years ago and a lifestyle belief against taking any drugs.

34

A,B,
C,D,
E

A1,G1

Incompetent. Although the patient expressed a
rational concern about side effects, he did not
acknowledge his mental disorder and did not
understand what the psychiatrists were attempting to accomplish by treating him with
medication. Although risks and benefits were
explained to him, he was unwilling to consider the psychiatrist's perspective before making
a decision.

35

A,D

A1,G1

Competent. The patient was depressed because he had tested HIV-positive. Nevertheless, his refusal of an antidepressant was rationally based and the facility representative
so testified, contradicting the declaration of
the treating psychiatrist.

36

A,B,
E,F

A1

Incompetent. The patient did not testify coherently. Her statements shifted from one topic
to another with no apparent connection. At
one point, the patient became agitated at me
and others for no apparent or expressed reason.

37

A,B,
C,E

D1,E1,
F1,H1

Competent. The patient had both rational and
irrational reasons for refusing. In part, he was
concerned about side effects; in part, he believed he was not mentally ill.

38

A,B

B1,C1,
D1

Competent. Although the psychiatrist expressed an opinion that the patient was mentally ill and delusional, he offered no evidence
that the patient's reason for refusing medication was irrational. The patient did not attend
the hearing.

413

Facility's
Evidence
(From
Table 6)

Patient's
Evidence
(From
Table 7)

40

A,B

B1, I1

Incompetent. Throughout the hearing, the patient was extremely agitated and distraught.
She continually interrupted the psychiatrist's
presentation. When given an opportunity to
speak, she gave no rational reason for refusing
medication.

41

A,B
D

A1,E1,
G1, I1

Competent. The patient was knowledgeable
about, and expressed a sincere belief in, the
Christian Science religion. Additionally, the
patient experienced side effects from the medication previously administered to her.

42

A,E,
F

43

A

Case
No.

414

Decision and Rationale

Competent. A court interpreter spoke to the
patient in her native Philippine dialect---Uocano.
Her answers were rational and coherent. She
showed no signs of depression or muteness.
She expressed a willingness to take psychotropic medication.
B1,E1,
F1

Incompetent. Although the patient articulated a
rational concern for refusing medication - her
daughter experienced side effects from the same
medication-I did not believe she adequately
considered its possible benefit. She did not
believe she was mentally ill and did not understand how the medication would help her condition. She was unable to focus on a single topic
for any length of time.
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GROUP B
#44-77 (Cases that were not decided on the merits have been deleted.)
44

A,C,
E

B1,C1,
E1

Incompetent. The patient did not state a rational reason for why she refused an injectable or
liquid form of medication 'but was willing to
accept medication in pill form. At the hearing,
she expressed no concern about side effects,
although in cross-examination of the psychiatrist, the patient's attorney established that she
had suffered anticholinergic side effects caused
by the medication.

45

A,B,
C,E

C1,D1,
F1,H1

Incompetent. The patient denied being mentally
ill but gave lengthy, and sometimes incoherent,
answers to questions. The patient's unwillingness to discuss the psychiatrist's information on
the effects of medication, or consequences to
her if she refused to take it, suggested that her
thought process was irrationaL

46

A,B,
C,D

A1,B1,
C1,D1,
E1,G1

Incompetent. The patient repeatedly interrupted
the hearing with verbal abuse toward the psychiatrist. Ultimately the hearing was conducted
outside the patient's presence. The evidence
established that the patient was incapable of
listening to information and evaluating it rationally. The patient would not consider the
medication's benefits.

47

A

A1,B1,
E1

Competent. The patient had rational reasons for
refusing medications. The patient expressed
concern about side effects she had suffered
when she took medication voluntarily earlier,
during this detention. Additionally, she claimed
medication had not helped her sort out her
thoughts. The patient was knowledgeable about
medications and their effects.

415

Case
No.

Facility's
Evidence
(From
Table 6)

Decision and Rationale

48

A

A1,E1,

Competent. The patient gave rational responses to
questions. He previously experienced side effects
of medications and based his refusal on concerns
about side effects. He was willing to take some
medications but not the specific psychotropic medications that were being proposed.

49

A,B,
C,E,
G

A1,C1,
D1,H 1

Incompetent. The patient continually interrupted
the hearing claiming everyone was violating his
rights. The patient did not trust the psychiatrist
and would not consider potential benefits of the
medication. Although he expressed a concern
about side effects, I was not convinced that he was
refusing medication because of this concern.

50

A,B,
C

C1,D1,
H1

Incompetent. The patient denied any mental illness
despite the psychiatrist's evidence to the contrary.
The patient's conduct at the hearing and testimony
also confirmed her disordered condition. She also
asserted that it was unlawful for the psychiatrist to
treat her. She was unable to evaluate risks and
benefits rationally.

51

C,F

C1

Incompetent. The patient did not attend the hearing. The evidence established that she refused
medication but gave no reason for doing so. She
did not listen to explanations about risks and benefits. She exhibited extreme behavioral disorganization in the hospital.

52

A,E,

C1,D1,
G1

Incompetent. The patient did not attend the hearing. The patient denied being mentally ill, despite
strong evidence to the contrary. The psychiatrist
stated that without treatment, the patient would be
placed in a locked skilled nursing facility. With
treatment, she may be able to return home. The
patient was unable or unwilling to consider this
benefit of medication.

J

416

Patient's
Evidence
(From
Table 7)
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Evidence
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Decision and Rationale

54

A,B,
D, I

A1

55

A,B,
C,D,
E

B1,C1,
D1

Incompetent. The patient did not attend the hearing. The psychiatrist reported that the patient
would not listen to information about risks and
benefits, was isolative and hostile, and denied
mental illness.

56

A,B

A1,F1,
GI

Competent. Although the patient was manic and
highly verbal, she had experienced incontinence
from previous doses of medication that she accepted during this hospitalization. Her concern about
side effects appeared rational.

57

A,B,
C,D,
E, I

A1,E1

Incompetent. Although the patient expressed concern about weight gain from medication, this side
effect does not occur from the medicine prescribed. Additionally, the patient's concern about
this side effect did not seem genuine. Finally,
even if the patient's concern was genuine, the
patient did not appreciate how dangerous and
assaultive he was without medication. He was not
rationally considering the benefits as well as the
risks.

Incompetent. Although the patient expressed some
concern about side effects, the claimed side effect
was not one that the proposed medication produces. In response to questions, the patient talked on,
rather incoherently, about other matters. Despite
strong evidence of mental illness and inappropriate
behavior, the patient did not acknowledge any
mental problem.

417

Case
No.

418

Facility's
Evidence
(From
Table 6)

Patient's
Evidence
(From
Table 7)

Decision and Rationale

58

F

A1

Incompetent. Although the patient expressed concem about stomachaches from large dosages of
medication, he was unwilling to consider small
dosages even though they did not upset his stomach. The patient was unwilling to acknowledge
that his mental condition had improved from medication that he took sporadically while in the hospita!.

59

A,G

B1, I1

Incompetent. The patient refused medication, asserting that food and vitamins were sufficient.
The psychiatrist's testimony indicated the patient
was severely depressed and in a state of denial.
The patient did not adequately consider the benefits of mediation and was not particularly concemed about the risks.

60

A,F

J1

Incompetent. According to the psychiatrist, the
patient expressed no complaints or concerns about
medication. At the hearing, the patient merely
asserted that the medication was not the right
medication or insufficient in amount, and that it
didn't make any difference ifhe took it or not.
He gave no explanation for rejecting medication.

61

A,B,
C,E

G1

Competent. The patient was not fluent in English.
I believe this language difficulty, not her mental
disorder, created a lack of understanding about the
psychiatrist's explanation of risks and benefits.
The patient did not believe the medication was
poison and expressed a willingness to follow the
advice of her own (nonhospital) doctor. Her
thought process appeared rational.
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No.

62

63

Facility's
Evidence
(From
Table 6)

A,B,

Patient's
Evidence
(From
Table 7)

Decision and Rationale

D,E

A1,B1,
E1

Competent. The patient spoke rationally
about his concerns that the medication affected him adversely. Although the patient did
not fully appreciate his mental disorder or the
benefits of the medication, his opinion of
how the medication affected his thinking was
entitled to deference.

A,B,

C1,D1

Incompetent. The patient was unwilling to
speak with the public defender or to attend
the hearing. The facility representative reported that the patient was out of touch with
reality and responded to information on risks
and benefits by claiming there was a plot
against her. The patient voiced no concerns
regarding side effects. No contradictory evidence was offered.

E,F,

G

64

A,B

A1,E1,
F1

Incompetent. Although the patient had experienced side effects from the medication, she
had no insight or appreciation of her current
mental condition. She lacked appreciation of
the benefits of the medication-to alleviate
psychotic symptoms that she demonstrated at
the hearing.

65

A,B,

B1

Incompetent. The patient did not attend the
hearing. Uncontradicted evidence was presented that the patient had been mute for one
and one-half weeks and refused food, fluids,
medications, and medical testing procedures.
Her behavior indicated a suicidal intent
caused by her major depression.

A1,F1

Competent. Although the evidence clearly
established that the patient was severely
mentally disordered, he made a rational complaint about the extrapyramidal side effects
he was suffering. Sincere concerns about
side effects was his sole basis for refusing
medication.

F,H

66

A,B,
C,E,

H

419

Case
No.

420

Facility's
Evidence
(From
Table 6)

Patient's
Evidence
(From
Table 7)

Decision and Rationale

67

A,B,
G

A1,B1,
C1,D1,
E1,F1,
H1

Competent. Although the evidence convinced me
that the patient's problem was probably mental,
not physical, and the patient did not appreciate
this possibility, nevertheless, the patient suffered
a bad side effect from haloperidol and did not
want another dose of this drug. In addition to
this rational reason for refusing, the patient also
relied on a finding of competence that was made
at a hearing two days earlier.

68

A,C,
G

D1,H1

Incompetent. The patient did not attend the hearing. The psychiatrist's testimony established the
patient would not listen to an explanation of
risks and benefits because he did not believe he
was mentally ill. The patient merely redirected
the conversation to his legal status and asserted
that he should not be confined in the hospital.
He appeared unable to understand the benefits of
medication.

69

A,B,
E

C1,D1,
H1

Incompetent. The patient interrupted the hearing
on several occasions with angry and delusional
outbursts. It became necessary to complete the
hearing out of his presence. The psychiatrist's
unrefuted testimony established that the patient
suffered from delusions and was hostile. Because of his suspiciousness that hospital staff
desired to hurt him, he was unable to evaluate
the benefits of the proposed medication.

70

D,F,
H

A1

Incompetent. Although the patient attended the
hearing, he remained mute throughout and did
not respond to questions as to why he refused
treatment. The psychiatrist's unrefuted testimony established that the patient suffered from a
major mental disorder that impaired his ability to
understand risks and benefits of medication. The
patient refused to decide whether to accept medication because he was afraid to make a mistake.
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Table 6)

Patient's
Evidence
(From
Table 7)

71

A,B,
G

B1,C1,
D1

Incompetent. The patient did not attend the
hearing. Uncontroverted testimony was presented by the facility representative that the patient
was suffering from a major mental disorder and
a major physical disease but denied these illnesses and denied the need for any medication
to assist her. The evidence established the
patient's psychotic thought process.

72

A,B,
F

B1

Incompetent. The patient did not respond rationally to questions. When asked why she was
opposed to taking medication, she stated: "Because it creates an illusion and that's Walt
Disney." When asked what medications she
had taken in the past, she stated: "Reality."

73

A,B,
C,G

A1,C1,
D1

Incompetent. Although the patient previously
experienced side effects from medication and
expressed an unwillingness to take it again because of those side effects, the patient's main
reason for refusal was a belief that she was not
mentally ill. She seemed clearly delusional,
expressing a belief that she was royalty and that
people were living within her. Her mental
disorder prevented her from rationally considering potential benefits of the medication.

74

A,B,
D,F,
G

A1,C1

Incompetent. The patient gave inconsistent answers to questions and did not seem to have
any appreciation for possible benefits of medication. He stated that the psychiatrists wanted
to give him medication because they are psychotic.

Case
No.

Decision and Rationale

421

Case
No.

422

Facility's
Evidence
(From
Table 6)

Patient's
Evidence
(From
Table 7)

Decision and Rationale

75

A,B,
F

B1,G1,
l1

Competent. Although the psychiatrist's declaration descnoed the patient as unable to communicate, at the hearing the patient testified in a
mostly coherent fashion. Even prior to his
hospitalization, the patient had a history of
refusing medications of any kind. Further, the
psychiatrist's declaration did not clearly indicate
that the patient had been informed of risks and
benefits of the proposed medication.

76

A,B,
C

A1,B1

Incompetent. The patient did not attend the
hearing. Although the patient was reported to
have suffered side effects from a previous administration of the proposed medication, he had
not articulated a reason for refusing other than
that he didn't want it. Umefuted evidence was
presented that the patient was confused and
disoriented.

77

A,E

A1,F1

Competent. The patient gave rational reasons
for refusing medication. She suffered side
effects from a previous administration of the
proposed medication. Through her professional
training, she understood the effects of psychotropic medications. She believed that a close
family member was over-medicated when treated for the same mental disorder. The patient
was able to articulate why the psychiatrist wanted her to take the medication-to help alleviate
her mental disorder.
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In TABLE 8, I report my decision in each hearing conducted on the
merits275 and summarize my reasons for each decision. 276 My
decisionmaking was guided by several principles. First, my objective
was to assess the patient's competence to perform the narrow task of
deciding whether to accept or refuse psychotropic medication. Evidence
of general incompetence, although relevant, was not determinative of this
issue. For example, a psychiatrist's testimony that the patient was
psychotic or paranoid, or that the patient's intellectual function was
impaired, did not, by itself, establish the patient's incapacity to make
medication decisions. Similarly, evidence of specific incompetence on
other matters, although relevant, was not determinative of medication
refusal competence. For example, a psychiatrist's testimony that the
patient was dangerous or refused to eat did not, by itself, establish the
patient's incapacity to make medication decisions.
Second, I evaluated the patient's reasons for refusing medication and
whether those reasons were rationally based. Generally, I regarded
patients' concerns about side effects to be rational. However, there were
exceptions. For example, in one hearing, the patient testified that she
was pregnant and refused medication because of her concern about the
effects of the medication on her unborn fetus. However, the facility
representative introduced conclusive medical proof that the patient was
not pregnant. I found that the patient's reasoning was irrational.
Third, I evaluated the patient's assessment of the medication's
potential benefits and whether that assessment was rationally based.
Patients who did not acknowledge any mental disorder often did not
acknowledge any medication benefits. Such denial is evidence of
decisional incompetence, but it is not necessarily conclusive. When
asked to do so, patients could often explain what they perceived were
the psychiatrists' reasons for prescribing the medication. Sometimes

275. In TABLE 8, the cases are numbered one through 77, in the order they were
calendared for hearing. Sixty-six cases were heard on the merits. Cases that were not
heard on the merits were omitted from the table.
276. Because I assessed the patient's competence in each hearing, I was particularly
interested in, and often influenced by, the patient's testimony. Thus, the reasons
explaining my decisions reflect my evaluation of that testimony. In every hearing in
which the patient testified, I asked questions of the patient. These questions helped
resolve differences in the testimony introduced by the psychiatrist and the patient.
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these explanations demonstrated that the patient had identified and
rationally considered the medication's therapeutic potential but had
refused treatment because medication side effects were of greater
concern. 277
Fourth, in accordance with Riese, I imposed on the facility the burden
of proving the patient's incapacity by clear and convincing evidence.278
As expressed by the California Court of Appeal in a case involving a
mental patient's capacity to give or withhold informed consent to
electroconvulsive treatment, this burden requires proof that leaves no
substantial doubt, i.e., proof that is "sufficiently strong to command the
unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind."279 If a patient's
incapacity could not be proven with such certainty, I found the patient
competent even though his or her incompetence was·more probable.than
not.
Although my decisionmaking principles are easy to state, their
application to specific cases was far more difficult. One recurring fact
situation involved patients who offered both rational and irrational
reasons for refusing medication. Typically, the patient would deny any
mental disorder despite the psychiatrist's overwhelming proof that mental
disorder existed. The denial of mental disorder led the patient to
disclaim any benefit from medication that would treat the disorder.
Although the patient's reasoning could be labeled irrational, the patient
also offered rational reasons. Typically, the patient had experienced side
effects from previous administration of medication and refused
medication in order to avoid a reoccurrence.
The California Court of Appeal considered the problem in a closely
related context. In Conservatorship of Waltz,2 80 the patient became
agitated and psychotic when doctors attempted to discuss electroconvul-

277. Sometimes I tested the patient's preference for avoiding side effects by
suggesting that the patient might be detained for a longer period of time if he or she
refused medication that the psychiatrist believed was needed to improve the patient's
mental condition. Invariably, patients expressed a willingness. to endure extended
commitment as preferable to medication side effects.
In some hearings, the psychiatrist testified that he or she would order the patient
released if the patient was found competent. When such testimony was introduced, I did
not suggest to the patient that a medication refusal might lengthen the patient's
detention.
278. Riese v. St. Mary's Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 209 Cal. App. 3d 1303, 1322, 271
Cal. Rptr. 199, 21 I (1987) (republished opinion).
279. Lillian F. v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 314, 320, 206 Cal. Rptr. 603,
606 (1984) (quoting Sheehan v. Sullivan, 126 Cal. 189, 193, 58 P. 543, 544 (1899)).
Lillian F. was cited with approval in Riese. Riese, 209 Cal. App. 3d at 1322, 271 Cal.
Rptr. at 211.
280. 180 Cal. App. 3d 722, 227 Cal. Rptr. 436 (1986).
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sive therapy. with him. He would not listen to their explanations.281
However, in his nonpsychotic moments, including during his testimony,
he understood that electroconvulsive therapy could cause memory loss
and could kill him. 282 The court, characterizing the patient's fears as
both psychotic and rational,283 found the patient competent to make the
treatment decision. 284
Waltz suggests that a patient's rational fears of side effects outweigh
psychotic or irrational fears. In Waltz, however, the patient acknowledged that he suffered from a mental disorder,285 and he was willing
to take psychotropic medication to treat it. 286 The disagreement
between psychiatrist and patient as to the best course of treatment did
not establish the patient's inability to make an informed judgment.287
If, however, a patient does not acknowledge mental disorder or any
potential benefit from medication, should the patient's rational concern
about side effects trump the patient's inability to weigh medication risks
and benefits rationally? California court decisions provide no definitive
answer.
Riese imposes on hearing officers the obligation to assess the patient's
ability to understand risks and benefits of, and alternatives to, the
proposed medication. 288 Riese also imposes on the hearing officer the
obligation to assess the patient's ability to µnderstand and evaluate the
information about those risks, benefits, and alternatives that is required
to be given to the patient. 289 Often it was not possible to make those
assessments. In many cases, psychiatrists had not provided patients with
the required information.
When psychiatrists were asked whether they informed patients of the
potential risks and benefits of, and alternatives to, the proposed

281. Id. at 729, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 440.
282. Id. at 731, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 441.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 734, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 443-45. The court reversed the trial court
judgment that found the patient incapable of giving informed consent to electroconvulsive therapy.
285. Id. at 731, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 441.
286. Id. at 734, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 443-45.
287. Id.
288. Riese v. St. Mary's Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 209 Cal. App. 3d 1303, 1322-23,
271 Cal. Rptr. 199, 211-12 (1987) (republished opinion); see supra text accompanying
notes 132-35.
289. Id. at 1323, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 212; see supra text accompanying notes 136-39.
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treatment, they answered affirmatively. 290 But when they were then
asked what they informed patients, frequently their answers did not
support their claims of disclosure. 291 In many hearings, psychiatrists
testified that they informed patients only about medication benefits.292
For example, in one case, the psychiatrist testified that he told the patient
"that haloperidol would help reduce her feelings of anxiety and would
reduce some or all of her hostility." In another case, the psychiatrist
testified that he informed the patient that "she would feel less agitated
and that her thinking would improve if she agreed to medications." In
another case, the psychiatrist simply stated: "I informed the patient that
medication would be necessary to help her with her distress and
encouraged her to take it."
Even when psychiatrists did discuss risks, they did not divulge "all
information relevant to a meaningful decisional process"293 - thetest
of disclosure imposed by the California Supreme Court. To obtain a
patient's informed consent, that test requires the psychiatrist to divulge
all risks that are material to the patient's decision. 294 Sometimes
psychiatrists spoke about risks in general terms, informing patients that
any medication can have detrimental as well as beneficial effects. Of

290. Sometimes, a psychiatrist testified that he or she attempted to inform the
patient but the patient would not listen to the psychiatrist's explanation.
291. For example, in one hearing the psychiatrist testified that the prescribed
medication was relatively new and that side effects had not been summarized for
psychiatrists' use with patients. He produced the manufacturer's lengthy list of
contraindications and side effects to demonstrate the difficulty of informing patients of
all risks. However, he did not testify that he informed the patient of any risks.
292. For example, in one hearing the psychiatrist testified (in a written declaration)
that he informed the patient "that haldoperidol would help reduce her anxiety and
paranoid feelings and would reduce some or all of her hostility." In another hearing, the
psychiatrist testified (in a written declaration) that the patient "would feel calmer, less
agitated, thinking would improve if she agreed to medications." In a third hearing, the
psychiatrist testified (in a written declaration) that he informed the patient that "medicine
might stop voices and paranoid thinking." In these written declarations, the psychiatrists
did not assert that they informed patients about either medication risks or alternatives to
medication. The psychiatrists did not attend the hearings, and the written declarations
were the only evidence introduced that emanated from the treating psychiatrists.
293. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 242, 502 P.2d l, 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 513
(1972).
294. The California Supreme Court summarized the physician's disclosure duty as
follows:
In sum, the patient's right of self-decision is the measure of the physician's
duty to reveal. That right can be effectively exercised only if the patient
possesses adequate information to enable an intelligent choice. The scope of
the physician's communications to the patient, then, must be measured by the
patient's need, and that need is whatever information is material to the
decision. Thus the test for determining whether a potential peril must be
divulged is its materiality to the patient's decision.
Id. at 245, 502 P.2d at 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 515.
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course, the psychiatrists asserted that the medication was prescribed for
its beneficial effects. At other times, psychiatrists discussed some side
effects but not others. Typically, the psychiatrist would inform the
patient of non-neurological side effects such as sedation or anticholinergic side effects, i.e., dry mouth, blurred vision, urinary retention, and
constipation, but would omit any discussion of neurological side effects
such as dystonia, Parkinsonism, akathisia, akinesia, and tardive
dyskinesia. Obviously, if the risk of non-neurological side effects is
material to a patient's decision, the risk of neurological side effects is
likely to be more so.
When psychiatrists disclosed the risk of neurological side effects, they
usually sugar-coated the information. 295 For example, psychiatrists
testified that they prescribed Cogentin®296 to alleviate extrapyramidal
side effects. They failed to mention that Cogentin® may intensify mental
symptoms and can even precipitate a toxic psychosis.297 Cogentin®
may aggravate symptoms of tardive dyskinesia. 298 Cogentin® may also
cause tachycardia (rapid heart beat), hyperthermia, and other anticholinergic side effects.299 It is not a magic pill devoid of risks. And yet,
psychiatrists rarely disclosed them. When psychiatrists informed patients
about tardive dyskinesia, they mentioned that patients might experience
uncontrollable movements but failed to disclose the irreversible nature
of the side effect. Additionally, psychiatrists reassured patients by
saying that tardive dyskinesia typically develops only after a lengthy
course of treatment with psychotropic medication. They failed to
disclose that in some cases, tardive dyskinesia develops after only a brief
course of treatment. 300

295. I deliberately chose the word "sugar-coated." In one hearing, in response to
my question: "Did you treat the patient with antipsychotic medication during this
admission?," the psychiatrist testified: "No and yes. I managed to sweet talk him into
taking Navane® a couple of times - three days in a row." Navane® is the Roerig
Division (of Pfizer Incorporated) brand ofthiothixene hydrochloride. PHYSICIANS' DESK
REFERENCE, supra note 87, at 2093.
296. Cogentin® is the Merck & Company brand of benztropine mesylate. Id. at
1512.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. 1d. at 1512-13.
300. See, e.g., George Gardos & Jonathan 0. Cole, Overview: Public Health Issues
in Tardive Dyskinesia, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 776, 777 (1980) (Some patients
developed tardive dyskinesia after only a few months of medication exposure.); C.
Thomas Gualtieri et al., Tardive Dyskinesia Litigation and the Dilemmas ofNeuroleptic
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Sometimes psychiatrists testified that they used a written advisement
to inform patients about medication side effects. Typically, those socalled consent forms contained no information about risks but merely
asserted that the prescribing physician had provided information about
medication risks and benefits. Often those forms were used ritualistically to substitute for the process of obtaining informed consent rather than
as evidence that informed consent was, in fact, obtained. 301 A
patient's signature on such a form did not, in and of itself, provide
adequate proof that the required information was disclosed and that the
patient's acquiescence was uncoerced.
Information about side effects was usually inadequate; but information
about alternatives to medication was usually nonexistent. A biological
approach-medication-was the therapy of choice, and it was the only
choice. Other treatment modalities, including psychodynamic therapy,
group therapy, marital and family therapy, and even milieu therapy, were
not discussed. 302 Although some psychiatrists and other mental health
professionals might view these therapies as appropriate for some
medication-protesting patients, the psychiatrists who testified in the
hearings I conducted did not. Although some patients might have been
receptive to treatment with these alternative therapies, they were not
given that choice.
Some treating psychiatrists were rigid even in their choice of
medication. For example, even if a patient complained of extrapyramidal symptoms from Prolixin®,303 the psychiatrist would continue to
prescribe that medication instead of another phenothiazine, such as
Mellaril®, which is less likely to cause extrapyramidal side effects,
although more likely to cause anticholingeric side effects. 304 If the

Treatment, 14 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 187, 201, 204 (1987) (Some patients on low-tomoderate doses of psychotropic medication experienced severe tardive dyskinesia after
only a few weeks or months of treatment.).
301. BARBARA A. WEINER & ROBERT M. WETTSTEIN, LEGAL ISSUES IN MENTAL
HEALTH CARE 139 (1993).
302. In 1984, the American Psychiatric Association published a two-volume book
on the psychiatric therapies. Part I focused on pharmacotherapies, nutritional therapies,
COMMISSION ON PSYCHIATRIC
electroconvulsive therapy, and psychosurgery.
THERAPIES, AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, THE SOMATIC THERAPIES (1984). Part II
focused on psychoanalysis and individual psychotherapy, group therapy, family therapy,
behavior therapy, milieu therapy, creative therapies, psychodrama, and occupational
therapy. COMMISSION ON PSYCHIATRIC THERAPIES, AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N,
THE PSYCHOSOCIAL THERAPIES (1984).
303. Prolixin® is the Apothecon (a Bristol-Myers Squibb Company) brand of
fluenazine hydrochloride. PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE, supra note 87, at 526.
304. Prolixin® is a high-potency medication that has primarily extrapyramidal side
effects. Mellaril® is a low-potency medication that has primarily anticholinergic and
sedating side effects. WALDINGER, supra note 2, at 418-19.
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therapeutic benefits of two medications are similar, shouldn't the patient
be given the choice of which side effects he or she is willing to endure
to achieve that benefit?
The failure of psychiatrists to inform patients adequately of medication
risks and alternatives was not limited to a few isolated incidents. It was
pervasive. Although, surely, some psychiatrists made the required
disclosures, those psychiatrists were the exception, not the rule. 305
Even Dr. Stone admits that typically the treatment decision is a fait
accompli before the patient is given much information. The patient is
simply pressured to conform promptly to that fait accompli. 30
How can the decisionmaker assess the patient's competence when the
psychiatrist has failed to provide the patient with required information
about risks and alternatives to the proposed medication? One obvious
answer is to find the patient competent. Even Dr. Appelbaum concedes
that when patients are uninformed or inadequately informed, an
assessment of their decisionmaking ability is almost always impossible.307 When the psychiatrist's breach of the information disclosure
requirement renders an assessment of the patient's competence impossible, the facility has not sustained its burden of proving the patient's
incompetence by clear and convincing evidence. The insufficiency of
the evidence warrants a finding that the patient is competent. A finding
of competence is also warranted to penalize inappropriate psychiatrist
behavior and to induce future compliance with the disclosure obligation.308 Nevertheless, in some cases, despite the psychiatrist's failure

305. In one hearing, the patient complained of side effects he experienced from
Haldol®. The psychiatrist responded by expressing a willingness to prescribe Prolixin®
or some other antipsychotic medication that might not produce the same side effects.
The patient agreed to try the new medication. I found the patient competent, and the
patient accepted the alternative medication.
306. Stone, supra note 16, at xii. A researcher in Ohio found that many patients
remember what they are told about medications that were prescribed for them, but they
were told very little. Typically, the only side effects mentioned were nausea and
drowsiness. Lisa A. Callahan, Changing Mental Health Law: Butting Heads with a
Billygoat, 4 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 305, 314 (1986); see also Hargreaves et al., supra
note 11, at 191 (Fewer than six of the 51 patients interviewed were able to state the
benefits and risks of the prescribed medication.).
307. Appelbaum & Grisso, supra note 128, at 1637.
308. California statutes require that patients detained on 72-hour holds be informed
of medication benefits, risks, and alternatives. These statutes specifically preclude
release of patients for failure to provide the required information. CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE§§ 5152(c), 5213(b) (West Supp. 1995). Nevertheless, psychotropic medication
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to provide required information, the available evidence clearly established the patient's incompetence, and I so held. A hearing officer's
function is to determine the patient's competence to refuse treatment, not
to exact punishment for a psychiatrist's transgression.
Undoubtedly, my consideration of evidence and my decisionmaking
were influenced by the widespread nondisclosure practice. For example,
in over 30% of the combined Group A and Group B cases, the patient
testified that he or she did not trust, or was angry at, the psychiatrist.
Typically, the psychiatrist testified that such hostility was due to
paranoia--a symptom of the patient's mental disorder. Before accepting
such explanation, however, I attempted to determine whether the hostility
was attributable to the psychiatrist's refusal to involve the patient in the
process of treatment decisionmaking. Was the patient's hostility a
rational response. to the psychiatrist's failure to provide information
about medication risks and to address the patient's concerns about those
risks?
Similarly, when patients refused medication because they had
previously experienced medication side effects, I was sympathetic to
their concern. For example, during one hearing, the patient described
and then demonstrated a dystonic reaction that he had suffered from
medication. 309 He was terrified by the experience. The patient's
concern was genuine and was based in reality. If he had been fully
informed of other potential side effects, he probably would have been
even more reluctant to accept medication. Although the patient had not
considered the potential benefits of medication, I concluded that even if
he had rationally considered them, he would.not have changed his mind.
Under such circumstances, I found the patient competent.
A patient's prior experience with medication side effects or the failure
of the psychiatrist to disclose other side effects did not always outweigh
the patient's failure to consider medication benefits. For example, in one
case, the patient testified that he suffered side effects-"shaky nervousness," dry mouth, and muscle stiffness--when previously treated with
psychotropic medication. He refused medication now because he did not
wish to suffer those side effects again. However, the patient had stopped
eating, was suffering severe malnutrition, and was profoundly dehydrated. He claimed that he did not eat only because he lacked an appetite.
Medication was prescribed to relieve the patient's psychosis so that he
would start eating and drinking. In this case, I found the patient

may only be administered to medication-refusing patients if they are found mentally
incapable of refusing that treatment. Id. § 5332(b).
309. See supra note 264 (describing dystonic reaction).
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incompetent. The patient's failure to consider how medication might
benefit him could have disastrous consequences. Not only would his
mental condition continue unimproved, but his physical condition would
continue to deteriorate dangerously. Under such circumstances, the
patient's failure to weigh medication benefits against medication risks
was irrational.

IV.

CONCLUSION: ASSURING COMPETENT PATIENTS THEIR RIGHT
TO REFUSE TREATMENT

To implement the Riese decision in San Diego County, lawyers were
appointed as temporary judges to conduct competency hearings. The
legislature converted those judicial hearings into administrative capacity
hearings but continued to require that the hearing officers be law trained.
Hearings have been conducted, and are being conducted today, without
significant problems or costs. Hearings are conducted within forty-eight
hours of their request. The facility is represented by the treating
psychiatrist or, if that individual is not available, by another treatment
staff person who introduces into evidence the treating psychiatrist's
declaration. The patient is represented by the public defender or the
patient advocate. A typical hearing is completed within thirty to forty
minutes, and, at the hearing's conclusion, the hearing officer announces
a decision and reasons for the decision. Patients found incompetent can
be treated without further delay. Although hearings are performed
expeditiously, they are not performed perfunctorily. During a three-year
period, law-trained decisionmakers in San Diego County found patients
competent in 20 to 25% of the hearings.
Efficiency is but one consideration. More importantly, law-trained
decisionmakers are nee.ded to assure due process. Doctors are trained to
diagnose and treat illness. When they assess a patient's capacity to
refuse medication, they are unduly influenced by their own assessment
of the medication's anticipated benefit to the patient they are treating.310 For this reason, they are not suited to serve as impartial judges
of the patient's competence. Even Dr. Appelbaum admitted, "When
physicians act as judges, they still tend to think like physicians."311

310. Zito et al., supra note 250, at 826.
.
.
311. Appelbaum, supra note 10, at 417; see also Hargreaves et al., supra note 11,
at 191-92. When independent psychiatrists reviewed medication refusal decisions, they
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My experience as a hearing officer confirms Dr. Appelbaum's
observation. Most psychiatrists equated incompetence with either their
finding of mental disorder or the patient's unwillingness to acknowledge
mental disorder. When psychiatrists made a professional judgment that
a medication was medically appropriate to treat the patient's disorder,
they often viewed any patient objections as irrational. They failed to
consider whether the patient had made a rational assessment of risks,
benefits, and alternatives, and to decide the patient's competence using
those criteria. Psychiatrists not only performed as biased judges, they
practiced bias in relating to their patients. When psychiatrists withheld
or otherwise manipulated information about risks and alternatives,· they
undermined their patients' abilities to make competent decisions. 312
The legislature has imposed on psychiatrists the duty to disclose to
.their patients the risks and benefits of, and alternatives to, psychotropic
medications they prescribe.313 Psychiatrists must not be allowed to
ignore or circumvent their disclosure obligation. The requirement of
informed consent is not an interference with medical 'practice; it is a
prerequisite to it. A law-trained decisionmaker can, and should, demand
that the patient be provided with adequate information. When such
information has not been provided, law-trained decisionmakers can, and
in appropriate cases should, find that the evidence is insufficient to prove
the patient's incompetence.
The problem of information nondisclosure is not resolved, however,
by the use of law-trained decisionmakers in capacity hearings. Those
hearings are co11ducted only for patients who adamantly refuse treatment.
Such patients are few in number. In San Diego County, during the

approved the administration of medication in 98.9% of the cases. Id. at 192. "The
reviews did not reduce the average dose of antipsychotic medication received by
involuntary patients, did not make it easier for patients to successfully refuse medication,
and did not seem to be visible to patients as a new right or an
improvement in their
situation." Id. at 191.
312. John S. Carroll, Consent to Mental Health Treatment: A Theoretical Analysis
of Coercion, Freedom, and Control, 9 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 129, 132 (1991); see also
Roth, supra note 23, at 143 ("Information is given to patients largely to achieve their
compliance, not to involve the patient in decision making."). To make a competent
decision, a patient must analyze relevant information in terms of his or her own
knowledge, beliefs, and goals. Carroll, supra at 132.
313. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5152(c), 5213(b) (West Supp. 1995). These
statutes require that risks and benefits of, and alternatives to, proposed medication be
disclosed to involuntary mental patients during the initial 72-hour detention period. See
also id. § 5332(a). In addition to requiring disclosure of information about risks,
benefits, and alternatives, this statute requires disclosure of the patient's right to refuse
medication. See also id. § 5326.2 (West 1984) (listing the information that must be
provided patients to obtain their informed consent); see supra text accompanying notes
138-39.
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twelve-month period of July 1990 through June 1991, 4,077 patients
were detained on seventy-two-hour holds and 1,904 patients were
detained on fourteen-day holds. 314 During that twelve-month period,
only 146 capacity hearings were conducted on the merits. 315 The
overwhelming number of patients either consented or did not object to
treatment. Who demanded that psychiatrists meet their information
disclosure obligation to these patients? There was no one. What
safeguards assured that patient decisions accepting treatment were
voluntary, informed, and competent? There_ were none.
The information disclosure requirement can be strengthened through
litigation, legislation, ·and administrative regulation. For example: (1)
Instead of allowing treatment to proceed on nonobjecting patients,
written, informed consent should_ be required from any patient before
treatment can be administered. Currently, voluntary mental patients must
give such consent. 316 Why should competent involuntary mental
patients receive any less protection? (2) The forms used to document a
patient's consent are often inadequate. They merely state that the
psychiatrist has disclosed required information. Those forms should be
modified to require the psychiatrist to record the information that was
actually disclosed. (3) When a psychiatrist medicates an objecting
patient in an emergency, he or she should be required to justify the
decision by documenting the specific facts that, in the psychiatrist's
judgment, warranted the coerced treatment. (4) The Patients' Advocate,
acting as the person responsible for ensuring that mental patients are
afforded their rights, should be required to monitor the informed consent
process, to investigate individual patient complaints of abuse, and to
compel appropriate corrective actions. 317
The coerced treatment of competent mental patients will not be
eliminated solely by changes in laws or rules. What is needed is a
change in attitude. Psychiatrists do not treat mental disorders; they treat
314. PERFORMANCE OUTCOME AND REPORTING SECTION, CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF
MENTAL HEALTH, REPORT NO. 93-02, SUMMARY OF INVOLUNTARY DETENTIONS IN
COUNTY DESIGNATED FACILITIES AND STATE HOSPITALS FOR THE MENTALLY DISABLED,
FISCAL YEAR 1990-91 (1993). Statewide, 78,548 adults (plus 5717 children) were
detained on 72-hour holds, and 33,266 patients were detained on 14-day holds during the
July 1990 through June 1991 period.
315. RIESE HEARINGS STATISTICAL REPORT #3, supra note 233. Statewide data on
capacity hearings is not available. See supra text accompanying notes 231-32.
316. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 9, § 851 (1995).
317. Id.§§ 863(b), 863.l(a), 863.2(4)-(5).
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people with mental disorders. 318 Those people are entitled to make
their own decisions. When patients refuse treatment, psychiatrists must
resist the urge to pressure them into complying "for their own
good."319 Medical paternalism-doctor knows best-must be replaced
by acceptance of patient autonomY-1)atient knows best. As Dr. Stone
warned, the unwillingness of psychiatrists to accept "informed consent
is symptomatic of a more serious disorder in the healing relationship. "320
Grudging acceptance of patient autonomy is not enough. Psychiatrists
should not merely defer to competent decisions of their patients, they
should actively promote competent decisionmaking by their patients.
Psychiatrists do so when they fully disclose information on the risks of,
and alternatives to, the medication they prescribe. Patient empowerment
is not only socially desirable, it is therapeutically desirable as well. 321
Patient choice increases the patient's satisfaction and confidence in the
treatment process. 322 Patient choice promotes the patient's trust of,
and confidence in, the therapist. 323 A therapeutic alliance can not be
achieved by forcing therapeutic compliance.
An American Psychiatric Association resource document, approved by
the Association's Board of Trustees, urges psychiatrists, as a matter of
good medical practice, ''to maximize the patient's participation in the
treatment decisionmaking process; and, if the patient registers objections,
to try to understand the basis for these objections and take them into
account in formulating a treatment plan."324 If patient participation
becomes the standard of medical practice, informed consent will no
longer be a burden that the law imposes on psychiatrists, but rather, an

318. The American Psychiatric Association has cautioned that the classification of
mental disorders does not classify people but only the disorders that people have. Thus,
for example, a person with schizophrenia should not be referred to as "a schizophrenic."
DSM-IV, supra note 239, at xxii.
319. Nathan T. Sidley, The Right of Involuntary Patients in Mental Institutions to
Refuse Drug Treatment, 12 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 231, 241 (1984).
320. Stone, supra note 16, at xiii.·
321. Bruce J. Winick, The Right to Refuse Mental Health Treatment: A Therapeutic
Jurisprudence Analysis, 17 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 99 (1994) [hereinafter Winick,
A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis]; see also Bruce J. Winick, Competency to

Consent to Treatment: The Distinction Between Assent and Objection, 28 Hous. L.
REV. 15, 46-53 (1991).
322. See Winick, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis, supra note 321, at 100-11

(discussing psychological research).
323. See id. at 111-16.
324. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, RIGHT TO REFUSE MEDICATION
RESOURCE DOCUMENT 3 (1989). Although the Resource Document was approved by
the Board of Trustees, it does not represent official policy of the American Psychiatric
Association.
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opportunity for a true therapeutic alliance that psychiatrists willingly
offer their patients.
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